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TO BE LET ALONE: FLORIDA'S PROPOSED RIGHT OF
PRIVACY
GERALD B. COPE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 7, 1978, Florida citizens will vote on a proposed
revision of the state constitution. One of the most significant-and
controversial-proposals in the omnibus revision measure is a new
right of privacy. This simple but much-debated provision declares
the right of each individual "to be let alone and free from govern-
mental intrusion." In addition, closely related sections set forth the
relationship between the right of privacy and the "right to know."
Inclusion of the right of privacy must be considered one of the
major recommendations by the 1978 Constitution Revision Com-
mission. Ratification would place Florida among the national lead-
ers in an emerging trend to protect individual privacy. Ten states
now include a right of privacy in some form in their constitutions,
but only three have adopted privacy measures like those in the
Florida proposal. Florida could become the fourth state-after
Alaska, California, and Montana-to adopt a strong, freestanding
right of privacy as a separate section of the state constitution.
This article was written in order to explore the newly drafted right
"to be let alone": Florida's proposed right of privacy. It is designed
to review in addition the several other privacy-related sections rec-
ommended by the 1978 Constitution Revision Commission. The ar-
ticle is a sequel to an earlier paper on the right of privacy, also
published in this review. That paper was addressed primarily to the
Constitution Revision Commission and urged it to add a new section
to the declaration of rights setting forth a right of privacy for every
Floridian.'
The thesis of the earlier paper was that the states have a crucial
role to play in protecting privacy. It reviewed the degrees of protec-
tion afforded the right of privacy by the federal and state constitu-
tions. The paper demonstrated how, for a variety of reasons, the
right of privacy in the Federal Constitution is inadequate. It argued
* B.A. 1968, Yale University; J.D. 1977, Florida State University College of Law; Asso-
ciate, Arky, Freed, Steams, Watson, & Greer, Miami, Florida. The author's earlier work on
the right of privacy was Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional
Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 631 (1977). The author testified before the 1978 Constitution
Revision Commission, urging it to place a freestanding right of privacy in the revision pro-
posal.
1. Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 631 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Toward a Right of Privacy].
19781
674 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:671
that the right to be let alone will be protected in a meaningful way
only if the states choose to act. Reviewing the innovative steps taken
in several states in the past decade, the author recommended a
"package" of constitutional measures to confer strong protection on
the right of individual privacy.
The members of the Constitution Revision Commission were, if
anything, ahead of the author in their thinking about privacy. In his
remarks to the commission's opening session, then Chief Justice
Ben Overton called for action on the subject.2 Commission Chair-
man Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte created a Committee on Ethics,
Privacy and Elections, recognizing that the individual right to pri-
vacy and the public "right to know" are potentially in conflict. It
was essential that a single committee explore the interrelationship.
The members and staff of the Ethics, Privacy and Elections Com-
mittee developed a privacy package which is among the strongest
and most comprehensive in the nation. This package was adopted
with modifications by the commission.
Despite broad support for the proposal in the commission, there
have been suggestions that a constitutional right of privacy could
have drastic unintended consequences. The most far-reaching ques-
tions involved the basic functions of government. One commissioner
expressed the fear that the right of privacy could block the use of
electronic surveillance in organized crime investigations, while an-
other suggested that the privacy right could undermine the police
and taxing powers of the state and limit the use of discovery in civil
litigation.' Other persistent questions were whether a constitutional
privacy right could be used to limit "sunshine" legislation designed
to require disclosure of lobbying or other political activity; whether
certain public records, like government employee personnel files,
must be made confidential; whether possession of marijuana in the
home would be made legal; and whether state laws regulating con-
sensual sexual conduct between adults would be invalidated.'
The purpose of this article is to analyze the commission's privacy
proposals and draw conclusions about what is-and is not-likely
to happen if those proposals become part of the Florida Constitu-
tion. Fortunately, this can be more than a matter of guesswork.
2. Address by Chief Justice Ben F. Overton to the Constitution Revision Commission
(July 6, 1977).
3. 2 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 39-42 (Jan. 9, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
January 9, 1978 Transcript]; Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 10-16 (Mar. 7, 1978)
[hereinafter cited as March 7, 1978 Transcript].
4. Miami News, Feb. 2, 1978, § A, at 15, cols. 2-4.
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Other states have preceded Florida on this path, and their courts
have already faced some of the issues debated here. The proceedings
of the Florida Constitution Revision Commission provide insight
into the drafters' intent. Existing principles of Florida constitu-
tional and privacy law yield some clues to the course Florida courts
may take in the interpretation of a new constitutional right.
Last year the Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission filed
its report. In reviewing California's first four years' experience with
its 1972 constitutional right of privacy, the commission noted,
"Perhaps most significantly, the California constitutional amend-
ment, the court decisions predicated on it and the statutes that have
flowed from them do not appear to have levied an undue burden on
State government or private organizations."'5 In the sections that
follow, this article will examine whether the proposed right of pri-
vacy, if adopted, would be a boon or a burden for the Florida citi-
zenry.
II. THE COMMISSION PROPOSALS
The Constitution Revision Commission's privacy proposals fall
into three groups. First, and most important, is the suggested addi-
tion of a freestanding right of privacy to the declaration of rights.
Proposed article I, section 23, would read as follows:
SECTION 23. Right of privacy.-Every natural person has the
right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his
private life except as otherwise provided herein.'
Second, the commission proposes to add the word "privacy" to
four related sections of the constitution. These sections are designed
to describe how the balance is to be struck between the right of
privacy and the right to know. Article I would contain two new
sections, to read:
SECTION 24. Public records.-No person shall be denied the
right to examine any public record made or received in connection
with the public business by any nonjudicial public officer or em-
ployee in the state or by persons acting on the officer's or em-
ployee's behalf. The legislature may exempt records by general law
5. PRIVAc Y PROTECTION STUDY COMMSSION, PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATEs i (1977) (preface)
[hereinafter cited as PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATIS). The Commission was created by the
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1896, reproduced in comment to 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (Supp. V 1975).
6. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 23 (May 11, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Rev. Fla.
Const.].
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when it is essential to accomplish overriding governmental pur-
poses or to protect privacy interests.
Schedule to Article I, Section 24.-This section shall become
effective June 1, 1979.
SECTION 25. Open meetings.-No person shall be denied
access to any meeting at which official acts are to be taken by any
nonjudicial collegial public body in the state or by persons acting
together on behalf of such a public body. The legislature may
exempt meetings by general law when it is essential to accomplish
overriding governmental purposes or to protect privacy interests.,
For article V, similar language is proposed.8 Section 1 applies to
the courts:
SECTION 1. Courts.-... All judicial hearings and records
and all proceedings and records of judicial agencies except grand
and petit juries shall be open and accessible to the people. When
it is essential to accomplish overriding governmental purposes or
to protect privacy interests, the supreme court by rule or the legis-
lature by general law may exempt hearings, proceedings and
records from this section.'
Judicial nominating commissions are dealt with correspondingly:
SECTION 11. Vacancies.-
(c) . . . Uniform rules of procedure for the judicial nomi-
nating commissions shall be prescribed by the supreme court. All
proceedings and records of the judicial nominating commissions
shall be open and accessible to the public. The supreme court may
by rule exempt portions of the proceedings and records from this
provision when it is essential to accomplish overriding governmen-
tal purposes or to protect privacy interests. 0
Third, the proposed constitution would carry forward unchanged
the present text of article I, section 12, which protects "private
communications" from unreasonable searches and seizures.
7. Id. §§ 24-25.
8. The proposed constitution carries forward intact the existing confidentiality provisions
of art. V, § 12(d), relating to the Judicial Qualifications Commission. Commission proceed-
ings are confidential until there is a finding of probable cause and filing of charges, after
which all further proceedings are public. Unlike §§ 1 and 11, § 12(d) is not framed in terms
of "privacy interests" and "overriding governmental purposes."
9. Rev. Fla. Const., supra note 6, art. V, § 1.
10. Id. § 11.
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SECTION 12. Searches and seizures.-The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures, and against unreasonable in-
terception of private communications by any means, shall not be
violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause,
supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places
to be searched, the person or persons, thing or things to be seized,
the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of evidence
to be obtained. Articles or information obtained in violation of this
right shall not be admissible in evidence.
All these proposals will be presented to the voters in November,
1978, as part of the main constitutional document. None of the
sections is among the seven controversial items isolated for separate
voting.
III. THE AMERICAN LAW OF PRIVACY"
Privacy is a concept for which there is no generally accepted defi-
nition. Privacy may be visualized as a physical and psychological
zone within which an individual has the right to be free from intru-
sion or coercion, whether by the government or by the society at
large.
The modern concept of privacy has evolved during the past cen-
tury. The right "to be let alone" was first described by Thomas M.
Cooley in the 1880 edition of his Treatise on the Law of Torts."2 In
1886, in Boyd v. United States, the Supreme Court noted for the
first time that the Constitution, through the fourth and fifth amend-
ments, protects "the privacies of life.' 3 In 1889, the newly admitted
State of Washington adopted a constitution which protected each
person's "private affairs," though that language was ultimately
given a very restricted meaning. 4 In 1890, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis wrote a famous law review article entitled The Right
to Privacy, 15 which gave birth to a new tort, the invasion of privacy.
11. Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, explored in detail the development of the
right of privacy. That note may be helpful to the reader, as it is the predicate for the
discussion that follows. Space allows only a few words of overview here.
12. T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1st ed. 1880).
13. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
14. WASH. CONST, art. I, § 7. In 1910, Arizona adopted an identically worded measure. See
Amiz. CONST. art. II, § 8. Both states have construed the sections to be equivalent to the fourth
amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The sections have not
served as the launching point for a more expansive right of privacy. Indeed, Washington has
yet to recognize the invasion of privacy tort. See Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at
726-27.
15. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
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From these beginnings American privacy law evolved. Primarily
because of the nature of our constitutional and judicial system, the
law of privacy developed along two separate tracks. One
track-constitutional privacy-involved the citizen's effort to assert
a right of privacy against governmental intrusion. Such privacy
cases invariably involved the federal or state constitutions, since
only through constitutional limitations can the power of the govern-
ment be restrained.1
6
The second track-the tort law of privacy-involved the citizen's
effort to assert a right of privacy against intrusion by other private
citizens or private businesses. It was this sort of privacy that Warren
and Brandeis described in 1890. Recognition of the new tort, inva-
sion of privacy, could be accomplished directly by judicial or legisla-
tive decision and did not involve constitutional interpretation at
all. 7
In the twentieth century there has been considerable development
of both kinds of privacy law. The invasion of privacy tort has been
recognized by most states, usually by judicial decision, but in some
states by legislative action.
As he was wont to do, Professor Prosser dissected the right of
privacy and announced that it could be divided into four separate
parts. One's privacy, he said, could be invaded by:
(1) appropriation-unauthorized use of a person's name or like-
ness, usually in advertising;
(2) intrusion-physical invasion or electronic eavesdropping in
one's home or place of business;
(3) public disclosure of private facts-dissemination of true
(and therefore not defamatory), but objectionable, information
about a person, as by posting a sign that a person owed money and
would not pay; or
(4) false light in the public eye- giving publicity to facts,
whether or not defamatory, which place a person in a false light, for
example, using a picture of an honest taxi driver to illustrate a story
about dishonest taxi drivers.
16. In the case of the federal government, the Constitution is a grant of power. Constitu-
tional limitations exist by implication, since the federal government cannot act in excess of
the power it has been granted. In the case of state governments, the constitutions are direct
limitations on otherwise unrestrained sovereign power.
17. State constitutions were sometimes incidentally involved, as state courts pondered
whether they had the power to "recognize"-in essence, create-a new tort or whether that
was exclusively a legislative prerogative. This determination generally involved examination
of something like the "access to courts" provision of the state constitution. See section IVA(1)
infra.
18. W. PaossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw ov Tors § 117, at 804-14 (4th ed. 1971).
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Prosser's classification of tort privacy cases was adopted by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,'9 for which Prosser served as re-
porter, and has been very influential with the courts. 0 But while the
Prosser imprimatur has undoubtedly helped gain acceptance for
privacy cases in the courts, Prosser also asserted that the right of
privacy had no conceptual unity and should actually be broken into
four component torts. His view has not gone unchallenged," and it
seems manifest that the four categories merely represent modes of
intrusion into a physical and psychological zone which one has a
right to expect will remain inviolate. If the division of privacy law
into tort and constitutional aspects has inhibited development of a
general theory of privacy, Prosser's further subdivision has com-
pounded the problem.
Constitutional privacy law developed somewhat more slowly than
the tort law. Although the Supreme Court recognized in Boyd that
privacy was one of the interests safeguarded by the Constitution,
formalistic legal reasoning emphasized the protection of physical
objects, spaces, and persons. Thus, in 1928 the Supreme Court held
that the fourth amendment did not protect telephone calls from
unauthorized wiretapping because such calls were not "things to be
seized. 21 2 But twentieth century social and technological realities
are often at odds with the eighteenth century political theory under-
lying the Constitution, and the Court increasingly moved toward a
more interest-oriented analysis. By the mid-1960's, the Court had
concluded that "the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is
the protection of privacy rather than property .... ,,21 The Court
recognized privacy as also protected by the first, third, fifth, eighth,
and ninth amendments.
2'
Finally, in 1965, the Supreme Court recognized a right of privacy
based in the United States Constitution.2 5 In many ways a curious
creation, this right of privacy has its source in the "liberty" pro-
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977).
20. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L. REV. 962, 964 (1964).
21. Id.
22. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
23. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (citations omitted).
24. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (first amendment); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (first amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350
n.5 (1967) (citing third amendment); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)
(fifth amendment); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (eighth amendment) (by implica-
tion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
amendments) (Douglas, J.); id. at 486 (ninth amendment) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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tected by the fourteenth amendment. 21 It protects the right of an
individual to make important decisions about marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, abortion, family relationships, childrearing,
and education without government interference. 2 The Burger Court
has generally resisted any effort to expand or diminish thi$ federal
right of privacy,28 though it was that Court which rendered the
abortion decisions in 1973.29
Thus, the right of privacy has developed along two parallel tracks,
and the twain have not met. The tort right of privacy is founded
exclusively in state law. It protects against invasion of privacy by
private persons or entities. It protects one's "interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters" 3 or what might be called one's
"right to selective disclosure."'3' In contrast, the federal right of
privacy is grounded exclusively in the Federal Constitution. It
protects against invasion of privacy, by governmental, not private,
intrusion. It protects one's "independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions, 31 2 or what might be termed one's "auto-
nomy. 13 3 When, on occasion, the Supreme Court has been invited
to merge the two, it has steadfastly refused to do so."
It is the limited scope of the federal privacy right which makes
essential the addition of such a right to state constitutions. Even
during the Warren era, when one would expect the Court to have
taken an expansive view of privacy, the Court said, "the protection
of a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by
other people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very
life, left largely to the law of the individual States. '35 Outside of the
marriage -procreation -childrearing areas, then, any protection of
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
27. Id. at 152-53 (1973).
28. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptive sales); Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (disclosure of medical information; federal right of privacy might
be implicated in limited circumstances); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(abortion regulation); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F.
Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (consensual homosexual relations); Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S.
238 (1976) (police hair length regulations); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (disclosure of
information).
29. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (footnote omitted).
31. Beardsley, Privacy. Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, in PRuvAcy 56 (J. Pennock &
J. Chapman eds. 1971).
32. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (footnote omitted).
33. Beardsley, supra note 31.
34. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (possibility not entirely foreclosed); Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
35. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (footnote omitted).
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privacy against governmental intrusion must be done by the
states.
36
The crucial position of the states was underlined by the 1977
report of the Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission. It said:
. The States have been active in privacy protection, and in many
cases innovative, but neither they nor the Federal governmental
have taken full advantage of each other's experimentation. Alto-
gether, the Commission's inquiry into State record-keeping prac-
tices forces it to conclude that an individual today cannot rely on
State government to protect his interests in the records and record-
keeping practices of either State agencies or private entities.
37
Moreover, state sovereignty stands as a barrier to federal legislation
to regulate state government recordkeeping, except as a condition
of federal funding."
Ten states have adopted express language in their constitutions
to protect privacy-eight of them since 1968.19 Florida, whose 1968
constitutional provision protecting "private communications" from
unreasonable searches and seizures was quoted above, is one of the
ten. The other states' privacy sections are all more extensive than
Florida's but differ considerably from each other. The evolution and
case law under each was reviewed extensively in Toward a Right of
Privacy and will not be repeated here, though the text of each is
reproduced in the Appendix. The experience of the states, even in
such a short time, teaches valuable lessons about what to do-and
what not to do-in developing a state right of privacy.
The most successful approach has been to adopt a freestanding
state right of privacy, either in a separate section of the constitution
or in the list of inalienable rights. Only three states have done this,
and their formulations bear repeating here. All were adopted in
1972.
Alaska's right of privacy was adopted by amendment. Article I,
section 22, provides: "Section 22. Right of Privacy.-The right of
the people to privacy is recognized .and shall not be infringed. The
legislature shall implement this section."
36. Congress must do so in the case of federal invasions of privacy not covered by existing
federal constitutional provisions.
37. PmvAcY PROTECTION STUDY COMMUSSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY
489 (1977).
38. Id. at 488-89; see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
39. Washington and Arizona had adopted limited privacy provisions in 1889 and 1910,
respectively. See note 14 and accompanying text supra, and Appendix.
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Montana's right of privacy and right to know were adopted as part
of its 1972 constitution. Article II, sections 9 and 10, provide:
Section 9. Right to know.-No person shall be deprived of the
right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all
public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivigions,
except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly
exceeds the merits of public disclosure.
Section 10. Right of privacy.-The right of individual privacy is
essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be in-
fringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.
California's privacy right was added by amendment. Article I,
section 1, reads: "Section 1. Inalienable Rights.-All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
those are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possess-
ing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness and privacy." California's right of privacy, unlike the
rights recognized in Alaska and Montana, reaches private action as
well as state action. In this respect, California's privacy right is
more sweeping than that of any other state.
If Florida's right of privacy and related sections are approved in
November, Florida will become the fourth state to adopt a strong,
freestanding privacy right in its constitution.
IV. THE FLORIDA LAW OF PRIVACY
Florida privacy law has followed many of the patterns outlined
above. Since 1944, Florida has recognized the invasion of privacy
tort, the dimensions of which are now reasonably well defined. The
Florida Legislature has enacted some measures designed to protect
privacy, while also adopting strong legislation to guarantee open
meetings and open public records. And the courts have recognized
that privacy is an interest protected by some state constitutional
provisions. Since 1968, the Florida Constitution has protected pri-
vate communications from unreasonable search and seizure; and,
since 1976, the constitution has required substantial public finan-
cial disclosure by elected constitutional officers. The Florida Su-
preme Court has not discerned a constitutional right of privacy in
the current constitution, though one district court of appeal has
recently done so.40
40. Byron Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assoc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, No. DD-30 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 1978), discussed in sections IVC and IVF infra.
[Vol. 6:671
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A. The Invasion of Privacy Tort
1. A Tort is Born
The Florida Supreme Court first recognized the invasion of pri-
vacy tort in 1944 in Cason v. Baskin." Zelma Cason sued authoress
Marjorie Kinnan Baskin, better known as Marjorie Kinnan Rawl-
ings, for having depicted her in a recognizable form in the book
Cross Creek. Baskin had described Zelma as "'an ageless spinster
resembling an angry and efficient canary . . . [who combined]
the more violent characteristics of both [a man and a mother].' "42
Although the full treatment of Zelma went on to portray her "as a
fine and attractive personality,"' 3 it was nevertheless "a rather vivid
and intimate character sketch.""
The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the supreme court
reversed. The court conducted a comprehensive review of the law of
privacy and concluded that if the book had thrust Zelma into the
public eye without her consent, she would have a prima facie case
for at least nominal damages.
But the court was faced also with the question of whether it had
the power to recognize a new tort, or whether that was a legislative
function. Justice Armstead Brown found two sections of the state
constitution to be relevant. Section 1 of the declaration of rights in
the 1885 constitution provided that "'[a]ll men . . . have certain
inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending
life and liberty, acquiring[,] possessing and protecting property,
and pursuing happiness and obtaining safety.' ""i More important,
section 4 guaranteed that " '[aill courts in this state shall be open,
so that every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods,
person or reputation shall have remedy . ' ",.
The court decided that the word "person," used in the latter
section, included the "mind and spirit" as well as "thoughts, emo-
tions and feelings."' 7 And, while the courts could not exercise legis-
lative power, they had the authority, Justice Brown reasoned, to
fashion a remedy for "an injurious invasion of any right of the indi-
vidual which is recognized by or founded upon any applicable prin-
ciple of law, statutory or common ... " Section 4 was a mandate
41. 30 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1947); 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944). See also Annot., 168 A.L.R. 430
(1947).
42. 20 So. 2d at 245.
43. Id. at 247.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 250 (current version at FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2).
46. 20 So. 2d at 250 (current version at FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21).
47. 20 So. 2d at 250.
48. Id.
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to fashion such a remedy. Section 1 was not the source of the right
of privacy but rather was evidence of the fundamental principles of
the common law.
The court recognized that the right of privacy had limitations,
which included those imposed by freedom of speech and press. Thus
there was a privilege to publish legitimate matters of public or gen-
eral interest, though the privilege did not extend to matters of
C'mere curiosity.' "" Additionally, the right of privacy would be
governed by ordinary tort law limitations: a reasonable person stan-
dard, foreseeability of injury, and the "'customs of the time and
place.' "o
The court adopted Warren and Brandeis' statement of the scope
of the tort, which bears repeating here:
"In general, then, the matters of.which the publication should
be repressed may be described as those which concern the private
life, habits, acts and relations of an individual, and have no legiti-
mate connection with his fitness for a public office which he seeks
or for which he is suggested, or for any public or quasi public
position which he seeks or for which he is suggested, and have no
legitimate relation to or bearing upon any act done by him in a
public or quasi public capacity. . . . Some things all men alike are
entitled to keep from popular curiosity, whether in public life or
not, while others are only private because the persons concerned
have not assumed a position which makes their doings legitimate
matters of public investigation."
"The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of
any matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is
made under circumstances which would render it a privileged com-
munication according to the law of slander and libel."'"
Truth is not a defense to an invasion of privacy action, since the
interest invaded is privacy, regardless of the truth or falsity of the
statement. Absence of malice would likewise not be a defense, nor
would special damages need to be proved.
At trial after remand, authoress Baskin won a verdict on the
defense that Cross Creek "was of legitimate public and general in-
49. Id. at 251 (citing 41 Am. Jut. Privacy § 14 (1942)).
50. Id. (citing 41 AM. JUR. Privacy § 12 (1942)).
51. Id. at 252. Again relying on Warren and Brandeis, the court said that "mere spoken
words cannot afford a basis for an action based on an invasion of the right of privacy." Id.
Prosser points out that "the growth of radio alone has been enough to make this quite
obsolete, and there now can be little doubt that writing is not required." W. PRossER, supra
note 18, § 117, at 810 (footnotes omitted); accord, Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 306 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir. 1962); see section IVA(4) infra.
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terest." 52 On appeal the Florida Supreme Court disagreed, conclud-
ing that there was no "pre-existing legitimate general or public
interest" in Zelma Cason, apart from that created by the book. 53 A
closely divided court rendered judgment for Miss Cason but, finding
that no actual damages had been shown, awarded nominal damages
only.
Florida decisions have since filled out the contours of this tort
right of privacy, generally along the lines described by Justice
Brown. Prosser's four categories are helpful in understanding these
decisions so far as they describe certain common factual patterns.
The categories are not, however, conceptually distinct. The cases
are not easy to classify, and many fit more than one category. In
pleading, the pattern has been to follow the more general terminol-
ogy of Warren and Brandeis, or of Cason; the use of Prosser's termi-




This category involves the appropriation of one's name or likeness
for some advantage, usually pecuniary. 55 While this usually involves
advertising, Cason may be classified here. As the court opinions
point out, Cross Creek was a best seller and a tremendous financial
success; Zelma's "pen portrait" had been appropriated for private
gain.
No subsequent cases have rested primarily on this ground. The
ambiguity of the classification can be seen, for whenever a profit-
making enterprise-including a newspaper-invades someone's pri-
vacy under one of the other classifications, arguably there has also
been an appropriation.
Florida has by statute amplified the remedies available for this
form of invasion of privacy. Section 540.08, Florida Statutes,0 pro-
hibits publication of the name or likeness of a natural person with-
out written or oral consent. The consent may be given by the person
himself or by any person or corporation authorized to license com-
mercial use of his name or likeness, or, if he is deceased, by his
surviving spouse and children. Damages and injunctive relief are
available.
The statutory protection extends for forty years after a person's
52. 30 So. 2d 635, 638 (Fla. 1947).
53. Id. at 638.
54. See Note, The Right To Be Let Alone, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 597 (1965), for an earlier
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death. The law exempts publication in connection with bona fide
news reporting as well as photographs of a person "solely as a mem-
ber of the public" where the individual "is not named or otherwise
identified.""7 There is no liability for broadcasters or publishers who
accept paid advertising without knowledge or notice that the re-
quired consent has not been obtained. 58 Finally, the statutory reme-
dies are in addition to, and not in limitation of, the remedies avail-
able "under the common law against the invasion of his privacy"5'
-an indirect legislative endorsement of the line of cases since
Cason.
Although this statute has been in existence since 1967, no appel-
late cases construing it have been reported. As has been accomp-
lished by decision in some other jurisdictions, the statute recog-
nizes a proprietary interest in the use of one's own name or like-
ness which can be licensed to others. 0 The statute pertains only
to natural persons, presumably because other measures protect un-
authorized use of a corporate name." Florida courts have not had
occasion to consider the general rule that "the right of privacy is
one pertaining only to individuals, and that a corporation or a part-
nership cannot claim it as such ....1,,2
The statute is in accord with Florida's survival act, under which
most causes of action in tort survive one's death. 3 But the law is
liberal in allowing suit for publication about someone who is dead.
Common law decisions hold the opposite.6'
3. Intrusion
This form of invasion of privacy involves physical intrusion,
eavesdropping, electronic surveillance, and some other forms of
unauthorized prying. 5 The cause of action will lie against a munici-
pality, for example, for police negligence in wrongly entering and
searching a person's residence. 6 Surveillance by private detectives
57. FLA. STAT. § 540.08(3)(c) (1977).
58. Id. § 540.10.
59. Id. § 540.08(6).
60. See W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 117, at 807.
61. FLA. STAT. § 607.024(1) (1977).
62. W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 117, at 815 (footnotes omitted).
63. FLA. STAT. § 46.021 (1977).
64. W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 117, at 815.
65. Id. at 807-08.
66. Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1961), cert.
denied, 147 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1962). The opinion does not reveal the precise circumstances
causing the intrusion. The main issue in Thompson was whether invasion of privacy was an
intentional tort, in which case the applicable Florida law was believed to bar municipal
liability, or whether it could be committed through negligence, in which case the municipality
would be liable. The court took the latter view. See also Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201
So. 2d 70, 76 (Fla. 1967).
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does not automatically constitute an invasion of privacy, but it is
actionable if the surveillance is done in an intrusive manner. 7 Rem-
edies for unauthorized wiretapping have been provided by law."8
In Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc. in 1961 a newspaper article
stated, " 'Wanna hear a sexy telephone voice? Call - [the article
listed the phone number] and ask for Louise.' ,,s Louise was not
impressed by the resulting flood of telephone calls and recovered a
judgment. But no invasion of privacy was found two years later
where an error in the telephone directory resulted in numerous calls
for "Charlie." 70
4. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
Here the cause of action exists for "publicity, of a highly objec-
tionable kind, given to private information about the plaintiff, even
though it is true and no action would lie for defamation."'"
Aside from Cason, Florida's first case of this type resulted in
liability for a newspaper which published information about a confi-
dential narcotics addiction proceeding, even though the information
had been acquired from public docket entries.7" That decision can-
not survive the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.73 On the other hand, the First District
Court of Appeal held that there was no invasion of privacy where a
newspaper published detailed accounts of a pending confidential
adoption proceeding, because there had been no showing the infor-
mation had been obtained from confidential court files.74
67. Sharp v. Sharp, 209 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Tucker v. American
Employers' Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), subsequent summary
judgment rev'd and trial ordered, 218 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), writ discharged as
improvidently issued, 227 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1969).
FLA. STAT. ch. 493, pt. I (1977) establishes a regulatory scheme for private investigative
agencies and prohibits such already illegal practices as assault, battery, kidnapping, imper-
sonation of a law enforcement officer, and use of force. Id. § 493.14. However, the statute also
prohibits divulgence of investigatory information, except to the investigator's principal. Id.
§ 493.19.
68. FLA. STAT. § 934.10 (1977).
69. 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
70. Britt v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 Fla. Supp. 72 (4th Cir. Ct. 1963).
71. W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 117, at 809.
72. Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied,
153 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1963). The court relied on the fact that commitment records were by
statute confidential, though docket entries were not.
73. 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) ("Once true information is disclosed in public court docu-
ments open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it."). See also
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 46 U.S.L.W. 4389 (U.S. May 2, 1978); Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
74. Jordan v. Pensacola News-Journal, Inc., 314 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Very similar reasoning was followed by the United States Supreme Court in a recent nonpri-
vacy case, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 46 U.S.L.W. 4389 (U.S. May 2,
1978).
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The leading case in this area is the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., in which the court
construed Florida privacy law.75 Plaintiff Santiesteban had pur-
chased tires from Goodyear on credit and was current in his pay-
ments. Believing he was not, Goodyear employees went to the coun-
try club at which Santiesteban worked, removed the tires from his
automobile, and left the automobile sitting on its rims in the park-
ing lot in full view of coworkers and club members. The court had
little difficulty concluding a cause of action had been stated.
5. False Light in the Public Eye
This invasion of privacy can take various forms. One of the most
common is the use of a person's picture in a book or an article with
which it has no connection-for example, using an honest taxi
driver's photograph to illustrate an article about dishonest taxi driv-
ers or placing a person's name or photograph in a publicly distrib-
uted list of convicted criminals when, in fact, there has been no
conviction of a crime."
Florida's leading case is Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television
Co." Jacova had the misfortune to patronize a hotel coffee shop just
as the local authorities descended on it to conduct a gambling raid.
Jacova was released as soon as the police realized he was not the
man they sought. Nonetheless, a local television station televised a
photograph of Jacova being searched by the police. In finding no
liability, the Florida Supreme Court held that "a television com-
pany . . .has a qualified privilege to use in its telecast the name
or photograph of a person who has become an 'actor' in a news-
worthy event."s
Relief was likewise denied a plaintiff filmed by a television crew
in a bar in the aftermath of an evacuation for a bomb scare.79 But,
as Harms illustrates, not every matter chosen for publication is
automatically newsworthy in the eyes of the law. There must be
some genuine public interest beyond mere curiosity.
6. Defenses
As Jacova illustrates, a person's status as a "public figure" or his
involvement in a "newsworthy event" may be a defense to an action
75. 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962).
76. W. PRossER, supra note 18, § 117, at 812-13.
77. 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
78. Id. at 37. It is debatable whether the rule was correctly applied in this case. The
picture of Jacova being frisked was used during part of the telecast about gangsters and
gambling, without explaining that he was a bystander.
79. Stafford v. Hayes, 327 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d
604 (Fla. 1976). Plaintiff was a patron in a Tallahassee bar when the Capitol was evacuated
for a bomb scare. Many of the evacuees retreated to the bar. They were followed by a
television crew which recorded the event for the evening news.
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by him for invasion of privacy. However, precise definitions of
"newsworthy event" and "public figure" have eluded the law of libel
and privacy. Determinations of "public figure" or "newsworthy
event" status have largely been made on a case-by-case basis.
Jacova was relied on in a Florida libel case in which the court held
that a newspaper publisher who undertakes a public campaign
against a large local business thereby becomes a public figure for
purposes of that controversy. 0
In another libel case, Time, Inc. v. Firestone, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that filing a divorce action does not make one
a public figure.8 ' One has little choice whether to go to court or not,
since a divorce can be obtained only through court action. More-
over, the Cox Broadcasting rule protecting the publication of truth-
ful information found in court records does not create a privilege for
all reports of judicial proceedings. One can still be held liable for
libelous statements, if intentionally or negligently made. 2
Consent is a defense to a complaint of invasion of privacy by
intrusion, even if the consent came after the intrusion had com-
menced. The consent may be shown by conduct as well as by
words.13 And, as suggested in Cason, to state a cause of action for
invasion of privacy by publication, the published matter must in
some way identify the person whose privacy is being invaded. Thus,
publication of a photograph retouched to make it impossible to
identify the plaintiff or his household does not constitute invasion
of privacy."'
The Florida Supreme Court held in Florida Publishing Co. v.
Fletcher that there is neither trespass nor invasion of privacy when
a news photographer accompanies a fire marshal onto premises
where there has been a fire, takes pictures, and publishes them in
the newspaper.85 The court said that consent to the entry was im-
plied by custom and usage and would be voided only if actual ob-
80. Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970).
81. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
82. The constitutional privilege developed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964), was applied to the law of privacy in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
83. Rawls v. Conde Nast Publications, Inc., 446 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1038 (1972). Plaintiff's minor children allowed photographers from Vogue Magazine to
use the home as a setting for fashion pictures. Plaintiff returned while the session was in
progress and allowed it to be completed but a month later demanded that defendant with-
draw the photographs from publication.
84. Id.
85. 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977). The fire occurred while
plaintiff was out of town, and plaintiff's seventeen-year-old daughter died in the blaze.
When the daughter's corpse was moved, her outline remained as the only unburned area in
the charred floor. This "silhouette of death," published in the newspaper, was the source by
which plaintiff learned of her daughter's death.
19781
690 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:671
jection was made by the owner of the premises. There was no in-
vasion of privacy by intrusion. Nor did publication of the photo-
graphs constitute an invasion of privacy, for a major fire was a
newsworthy event.
These general outlines parallel the development of tort privacy
law nationally. Indeed, Florida courts frequently look to the deci-
sions of other states when confronted with novel questions. As the
comparatively small number of cases illustrates, the invasion of
privacy tort has not been a prolific breeder of litigation. In the
sections that follow, the focus shifts to legislative and constitutional
protection of privacy, but the tort is involved in some of the topics.
B. Privacy and the Private Sector
1. Consumer Credit Reporting Practices
Mutual credit organizations have generally been afforded a quali-
fied privilege against defamation actions, so as to allow the sharing
of credit information, at least so far as credit inquiries are made in
good faith and the information is shared only with subscribers."6 In
Vinson v. Ford Motor Credit Co. ,"T the First District Court of Appeal
expressly rejected this doctrine, declining to follow a 1918 Florida
Supreme Court case. 8 The court concluded that the rule could no
longer be justified in the light of changed conditions and held that
privilege would not shield the defendant from a libel action for
dissemination of untrue and grossly inaccurate credit information
about the plaintiff. Arguably, the same result could have been
reached under conventional doctrine, which holds the conditional
privilege available only if the agency acted in good faith.8 Although
Vinson was a libel case, the same type of suit has been brought
under a privacy theory. 0
Credit reporting has been substantially affected by recent stat-
utes, including the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act"' and portions
of a state law dealing primarily with debt collection practices.2 The
Florida law simply regulates the disclosure of credit information to
third persons. 3 However, the Federal Act is a comprehensive
scheme providing rights of access and dispute reconciliation, limit-
86. W. PROSSER, supra note 18, § 115, at 790; see id. § 117, at 818.
87. 259 So. 2d 768 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
88. Putnal v. Inman, 80 So. 316 (Fla. 1918).
89. See id.; Caldwell v. Personal Fin. Co., 46 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1950).
90. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Rehurek, 317 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1970).
92. FLA. STAT. ch. 559, pt. V (1977).
93. Id. § 559.72.
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ing use of obsolete credit information, and providing remedies.94 A
qualified privilege is provided for certain disclosures made under
the Federal Act, thus limiting to some extent the impact of the
Vinson decision."
The Federal Act allows states to adopt more stringent credit stan-
dards, and some states have done so, 6 though Florida has not. One
metropolitan Florida county adopted a comprehensive credit ordi-
nance. However, much of the ordinance was promptly invalidated
by a poorly reasoned federal district court decision." Thus, in Flor-
ida, credit reporting is 'regulated primarily by federal law.
2. Collection Practices
Santiesteban is the leading case finding an invasion of privacy
through objectionable credit collection practices. State privacy law
has been expanded by the enactment of part V of chapter 559,
Florida Statutes, which sets up a regulatory scheme for collection
agencies, specifies a lengthy list of prohibited practices, and pro-
vides for liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs for a person
aggrieved by a violation. One court has ruled that the statute comes
under the general rubric of the tort right of privacy, saying "the
legislature has further defined and protected an individual's right
of privacy in this state. ' '9 8 And, while the' creditor still has some
latitude to invade privacy to collect a debt, the reasonableness of
the invasion is a matter for the jury." The statute covers not only
commercial agencies but also small non-interest-bearing loans be-
tween private individuals, making it extremely broad in scope.1°°
3. Depositor Records
The privacy of banking records has been a matter of increasing
concern since the United States Supreme Court's decisions in
California Bankers Association v. Shultz 0' and United States v.
94. The Act is summarized in PRIVAcY LAW IN THE STATES, supra note 5, at 7-9.
95. See Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, Fla., 393 F. Supp. 577, 583-84 (S.D. Fla. 1975);
15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) (1970).
96. See PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES, supra note 5, at 9-11.
97. Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, Fla., 393 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Fla. 1975). The
ordinance contained measures identical to those in effect in other states. See PRIVACY LAW IN
THE STATES, supra note 5, at 9-11. In effect, the court required the county to resolve policy
issues in the same way that Congress had, despite the express provision of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act allowing states to adopt more stringent regulations.
98. Collection Bureau v. Continental Cas. Co., 342 So. 2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
99. Story v. J.M. Fields, Inc., 343 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 348
So. 2d 954 (Fla. 1977) (100 telephone calls in a five-month period).
100. Heard v. Mathis, 344 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (oral, non-interest-
bearing loan of $200).
101. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
1978]
692 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:671
Miller. 02 Those decisions held that an individual depositor's bank-
ing records are business records of the bank. An individual has no
fourth amendment interest in his banking records, such as checks
and deposit slips, that are in possession of the bank. Thus, an inves-
tigative agency may subpoena those records directly from the finan-
cial institution without notifying the depositor before or after the
fact. These decisions, though, apply only where access is sought by
a federal agency. State law still governs access by state authorities.
Florida has no statute regulating the confidentiality of depositor
records in banks. In 1935, the Florida Supreme Court held that
banking records are not privileged from discovery in civil litiga-
tion. 103 But the Third District Court of Appeal held more recently
in Milohnich v. First National Bank that there is an implied con-
tractual duty that a bank not disclose information about a deposi-
tor's account negligently, wilfully, maliciously, or intentionally. '0
Milohnich seems to have been implicitly approved by the Florida
Supreme Court in Hagaman v. Andrews, in which the court noted
that Milohnich did not deal with disclosure required by the govern-
ment or under compulsion of law. 0 1 The court in Hagaman sus-
tained, over a claim of associational privacy, the power of a legisla-
tive committee to obtain discovery of banking records of a private
organization for an official investigation.'
0 6
Unlike banking records, the confidentiality of savings and loan
association records is regulated by statute in Florida. Access to a
depositor's records may be had by the depositor, by the banking
regulatory authorities, upon court order, or by legislative sub-
poena. 07
A recent statute authorizing remote financial service units (elec-
tronic funds transfer systems) contains privacy provisions. System
owners are required to maintain safeguards to protect funds and
information. Rules may be adopted by the regulatory authorities,
and annual reports must be made discussing the protection of pri-
vacy and the regulation of access to customer accounts. Use of social
102. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
103. Commercial Bank v. Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry., 162 So. 512 (Fla. 1935).
104. 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The court did not mention or distinguish
Commercial Bank v. Atlanta & St. A.B. Ry., 162 So. 512 (Fla. 1935).
105. 232 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970).
106. Hagaman involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the House Committee on
Elections for banking records of The Governor's Club. The committee sought the records for
use in an investigation. The court rejected the associational privacy claim on the particular
facts rather than in principle. See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539 (1963).
107. FLA. STAT. § 665.111 (1977).
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security numbers as identifiers is forbidden. Civil remedies are pro-
vided in case of violation.' 8
Neither Florida's statutes nor the case law deals with the crucial
issue of customer notification when an agency seeks a customer's
financial records. In contrast, several states require service of pro-
cess on the customer as well as on the bank. California expressly
provides a procedure by which a customer may seek to quash a
subpoena and confers on the customer standing to do so, thus reject-
ing at the state level the doctrine of California Bankers and Miller. ,
A similar process is available in California civil discovery." '
4. Medical Records
Reports of mental or physical examinations are made confidential
in Florida by statute. The law creates a right of access for the pa-
tient, or for the guardian or personal representative where appropri-
ate. Otherwise, reports can be released only by written permission
of the patient (or guardian or personal representative). An exception
exists when a person or organization has procured an examination
with the patient's consent; the report may go directly to the person
or organization. When a physical examination is ordered pursuant
to rule 1.360, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, disclosure must be
made to both parties."'
C. The Public Sector: The Right of
Privacy vs. The Right to Know
Where public-sector activities are concerned, conflict often devel-
ops between two competing policies. On the one hand, the public
has the right to know what its government is doing. To that end,
access is needed to the records of public agencies, the meetings of
public bodies, and the activities of public officials. On the other
hand, individual rights of privacy need protection. To that end,
some records and official proceedings are made confidential. Al-
though the activities of public officials are generally subject to pub-
lic scrutiny, even a public official has a zone of privacy, albeit a
smaller zone than that of private citizens. The difficulty lies in
determining precisely where to strike the balance."'
10S. Id. § 659.062(13)-(14).
109. PmvAcy LAW IN THE STATES, supra note 5, at 12-13.
110. Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975).
111. FLA. STAT. § 458.16 (1977).
112. Unconsidered for the moment is the fact that confidentiality sometimes protects a
public purpose rather than individual privacy. Obvious examples include keeping civil service
examination answers confidential and keeping competitive bids confidential until the time
for the bid opening.
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1. Public Records
Florida's "freedom of information act" is chapter 119, Florida
Statutes. ' 3 Section 119.01 declares the general policy that all state,
county, and municipal records are at all times open for a personal
inspection by any person." 4 Section 119.07 implements the policy by
commanding the custodians of records to permit public inspection,
and section 119.02 provides penalties for failing to do so. Records are
exempt only if they are "provided by law to be confidential or...
are prohibited from being inspected by the public, whether by
general or special law . ... "I
There are numerous exemptions from disclosure. Generally ex-
empt are case files made by government health, welfare, social serv-
ice, and correctional agencies,"' though one notable exception is a
statute making public the names of all welfare recipients and the
amounts received."7 Likewise confidential is certain information
gathered in connection with taxation," ' economic development,"'
unemployment compensation, 120 and crimes compensation.' 2 ' A par-
ticularly comprehensive statute protects student records.' 22 Some
court records are exempt from disclosure.'1 Much licensing and
regulatory information is held confidential, 24 as are various agency
113. (1977).
114. "Public record" is defined as any document or other material, regardless of form,
"made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of
official business by any agency." FLA. STAT. § 119.011(1) (1977).
In PRIVAcy LAw IN THE STATES, supra note 5, it is observed that this definition is less
comprehensive than that of states which include "any record or information that relates to
the conduct of government or is in the possession of the State." Id. at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
But see Byron Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc. v. State ex ret, Schellenberg, No. DD-
30, slip op. at 7-9 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 1978).
115. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2) (1977).
116. E.g., id. §§ 382.35 (birth records), 393.13 (retarded persons), 394.459 (clinical records
of mental patients), 396.112 (alcohol treatment), 397.053, .096 (drug abuse), 400.321 (nurs-
ing home ombudsmen committees), .494 (home health agencies), 402.32 (school health ser-
vices), 409.3636 (adult protective services), 413.012 (blind services), 413.22 (vocational re-
habilitation), 458.22 (termination of pregnancy), 741.0592 (premarital medical examination),
827.07 (child abuse), .09 (abuse of developmentally disabled persons), 945.10, .25 (adult
corrections), 959.225 (state youth services).
117. Id. § 409.355.
118. Id. §§ 195.027, .084, 198.09, 199.222, 206.95, 213.072, 214.21, 220.242.
119. Id. § 288.075.
120. Id. §§ 443.12, .16.
121. Id. § 960.15.
122. Id. §§ 228.093, 232.23, 239.77.
123. E.g., id. §§ 39.03 (juvenile fingerprints), .12 (juvenile court records), 63.162 (adop-
tion), 742.091 (certain paternity proceedings).
124. E.g., id. §§ 322.125-.126 (driver licensing-medical disabilities), 377.606, .701 (en-
ergy), 403.111 (pollution control), 460.37 (chiropractic hospitals), 468.188 (electrical contrac-
tors), 473.06 (accountancy), 474.101 (veterinarians), 656.211, 658.10 (banking and finance),
657.061 (credit unions).
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investigations,'25 examinations for licensing or public employ-
ment,' 6 records relating to the regulation of agricultural market-
ing,' 7 and library circulation records.' 8 The statutes vary widely.
Some confer exemption only on certain records, for the early phases
of an investigation, or on complaints found not to be meritorious.'
2'
Public employee personnel records have not, in general, been
made confidential, though statutory exemptions have been given
employees of the educational system.'30 Medical records contained
in public employee personnel files are deemed exempt from public
disclosure,' 3 ' though the rationale for doing so seems questionable.' 3
Personnel files are otherwise deemed open for public inspection. An
individual's desire for privacy, without more, is not enough to shield
his records: in one case, a court ordered disclosure even though city
employees had signed forms requesting that their own files not be
released. 3
Thus far, the Florida Supreme Court has made no definitive
statement on whether privacy rights would ever require the closing
of personnel records in the absence of a statute. The court consid-
ered but avoided the issue in News-Press Publishing Co. v.
Wisher. '33 There the district court of appeal had held that public
policy required personnel files to be held in confidence,'1 relying in
part on Cason v. Baskin. The Florida Supreme Court reversed on
125. E.g., id. §§ 106.25 (election campaign financing), 112.324 (ethics commission), 215.19
(public works wage rates), 455.08 (professional and occupational licensing).
126. Id. § 119.07.
127. E.g., id. §§ 502.051 (milk), 573.26 (celery and sweet corn marketing), .855 (soybean
marketing), .882 (tobacco marketing), 601.77 (citrus).
128. Ch. 78-81, 1978 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 179 (West) (SB 770 (1978)) (to be codified at
FLA. STAT. §§ 119.07, 257.125).
129. E.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 112.324 (public officers and employees-preliminary investiga-
tion confidential until alleged violator requests records be made public or until completed),
455.08 (similar) (1977).
130. Id. §§ 230.7591, as amended by ch. 78-3, 1978 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 3 (West) (SB 216
(1978)) (community colleges), 231.29 (teacher performance evaluations), 239.78 (universi-
ties).
131. FLA. STAT. § 458.16 (1977), which provides a general privilege for all medical records.
See Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 227-28 (Dec. 8, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Decem-
ber 8, 1977 Transcript]. See also 1973 FLA. Op. Arr'Y GEN. 073-51.
132. The records are initially made confidential while in the hands of the physician by
FLA. STAT. § 458.16 (1977). The record is deemed to retain its confidential character after it
passes to a nonphysician's hands, so the confidentiality in effect "runs with the record." The
difficulty is that § 458.16 is part of the Medical Practice Act, a chapter addressed to physi-
cians and enforced through the licensing process. There are statutes which provide that con-
fidentiality is not to be lost through disclosure, see §§ 394.459, 917.22, but § 458.16 is not
one of them.
133. Browning v. Walton, 351 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
134. 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977).
135. 310 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977). The
power of the courts to create judicial exceptions to the public records law is considered below.
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the narrow ground that the privacy claim was not warranted under
the unusual facts of the case. 36 The court left open the question of
whether under some circumstances privacy might dictate confiden-
tiality, but the court clearly was not inclined to make personnel files
confidential in their entirety.
The supreme court amplified its views in Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. v. Marko. 37 There a grand jury had criticized two highway
patrolmen for misconduct but had not indicted them. A statute
provided that such a report could not be released publicly unless the
individual criticized first had an opportunity to review it and to
move to suppress any portion which was "'improper and unlaw-
ful.' ,1' Rejecting the argument that disclosure would violate the
patrolmen's right of privacy, the court observed that "[t]he 'con-
stitutional' right of privacy has generally been narrowly confined
to matters of marital intimacy, procreation and the like.""13 Since
the grand jury report criticized the patrolmen's performance of
their official duties, the court concluded that it was "proper" and
"lawful" within the meaning of the statute.
The First District Court of Appeal has recently held that certain
personnel records must be kept confidential. In Byron Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Associates, Inc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, the
Jacksonville Electric Authority had employed a psychological con-
sulting firm to search for and interview applicants for the position
of managing director.1' ° Applicants were assured of confidentiality,
and the interviews covered a great deal of highly personal informa-
tion."' A local television station sought access to the consultants'
notes and papers, correctly arguing that they were, under Florida
law, public records. The district court of appeal held that a funda-
mental right of privacy is guaranteed by the due process clauses of
the Florida and Federal Constitutions which would be violated by
136. The county commission had, at its regular meeting, criticized a department head and
directed that a letter be placed in the employee's file-but refused to name the department
head or the department. The press then sought to peruse county employees' personnel files
in order to discover the identity of the person reprimanded. The supreme court took a dim
view of the county's effort to circumvent the open meetings law, reasoning that the identity
of the employee and the letter both should have been disclosed.
137. 352 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1977).
138. Id. at 519..
139. Id. at 520 n.4 (citing Laird v. State, 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977)).
140. No. DD-30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 1978).
141. The consulting firm gave the assurance of confidentiality to the interviewees after
the general counsel of the Jacksonville Electric Authority advised that any notes would not
be public records subject to disclosure.
When the case arrived in the court of appeal, the court recognized "the stake in this
proceeding of persons not then before the court" and invited the identifiable interviewees to
intervene under pseudonyms. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
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disclosure of the consultants' notes. The constitutional aspects of
this rather sweeping decision are reviewed in section IVF below.
Like the dilemma regarding personnel records, public access to
arrest records has posed a serious privacy issue in many jurisdic-
tions. 4 2 Arrest is not proof of guilt. It is only a minimal statement
of probable cause-a statement that there is reason to believe a
crime has been committed by the person arrested. Many perfectly
valid arrests are found, on further investigation, to involve no crime
at all. But the arrest record has been made and much evidence
shows that it can create severe difficulty in obtaining employment,
professional and occupational licensing, and the like-not to men-
tion that it can cause simple embarrassment.
This problem is compounded by the failure to impose sufficient
requirements for recording disposition information or to provide
procedures for expungement in many arrest record systems. Control
over access to information and procedures to prevent misuse or un-
authorized release have been inadequate. The situation has im-
proved much of late in many states, but not in Florida.
For a time it appeared that regulations of the Federal Law En-
forcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) would force state
adoption of privacy rules for LEAA-supported information sys-
tems. 4 3 However, protests by Florida and other states caused the
LEAA regulations to be withdrawn.'" Corrective legislation has not
been enacted, and arrest records remain accessible to the public. It
is clear that privacy measures like those taken by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation' or the states of California 4 ' and Alaska 47 can
prevent abuses without hampering law enforcement. Florida's fail-
ure to act must be considered a major unsolved privacy problem. In
contrast to arrest records, investigative records are deemed confi-
dential under the "police records rule," a public policy exception to
the open records law.4 8
It is not clear whether the courts any longer have the power to
create judicial "public policy" exceptions to the public records law.
142. See, e.g., Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Loder v. Municipal
Court, 553 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1976); Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 642-46, 707-09.
143. See PRIVACY LAW IN THE STATES, supra note 5, at 7.
144. Florida Times-Union, Dec. 4, 1977, § B, at 2.
145. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 20, subpt. C (1977); Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at
645-46.
146. See Loder v. Municipal Court, 553 P.2d 624 (Cal. 1976).
147. See Toward A Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 693 n.311.
148. Lee v. Beach Pub. Co., 173 So. 440 (Fla. 1937). There is some irony in the fact that
one of the few judicial exceptions to the public records law protects agency "privacy," while
little attention has been paid the privacy situation of individuals who come into contact with
the same agency in an arrest context.
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In 1935, the Florida Supreme Court held that exceptions could only
be created by statute."' But two years later the court transgressed
its own ruling and created the judicial exception for the police re-
cords rule.'" While often invited to create public policy exceptions,
the courts have rarely done so, even where public harm would result
from public disclosure.'' The Fourth District Court of Appeal has
construed a 1975 amendment to the public records law to remove
whatever judicial flexibility may have previously existed.'5 On the
other hand, the First District Court of Appeal has created a judicial
exception since 1975, though the decision is anomalous and proba-
bly erroneous.5 3
The Florida Supreme Court has not yet specifically addressed the
subject. Wisher was decided on the basis of pre-1975 law, so the 1975
statute was not before the court. Even if the 1975 amendment re-
moved the power to create judicial exceptions, the judiciary would,
naturally, retain power to fashion remedies for violations of consti-
tutional privacy, as in Byron Harless.
2. Open meetings
Section 286.011, Florida Statutes,' 5' is Florida's "Government in
the Sunshine" law, which provides that all governmental meetings
are open to the public, except as otherwise provided in the Florida
Constitution. Violation is a misdemeanor, and actions taken at a
nonpublic meeting are void.
Like the public records law, Government in the Sunshine has
generally been strictly enforced. Unlike the public records law, there
has been great reluctance to create statutory exemptions. The law
extends to all meetings of public officials, even if a quorum is not
present.'55 Since there is no exemption for conferences with counsel,
the law waives the attorney-client privilege for collegial public bod-
ies.'15 The law extends to meetings of citizens' committees ap-
149. State ex rel. Cummer v. Pace, 159 So. 679 (Fla. 1935).
150. Lee v. Beach Pub. Co., 173 So. 440 (Fla. 1937).
151. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. Goldtrap, 302 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974)
(appraisal report).
152. State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
153. State ex rel. City of Bartow v. PERC, 341 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
The court gave a substantive, rather than procedural, reading to the "reasonable times, under
reasonable conditions" language of the statute, holding that a "reasonable time" for disclo-
sure of PERC documents would be after PERC had completed its preliminary investigation.
154. (1977).
155. Bigelow v. Howze, 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
156. Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The
privilege is not waived, however, in those aspects of the attorney's duties that involve pending
or impending litigation. Id. at 475.
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pointed by a governmental entity"7 and makes public the quasi-
judicial activities of deliberative bodies.'" A constitution-based ex-
ception has been found for labor negotiations with public employ-
ees,'5 9 but the law has been found not to apply to consultations
between a public official and his staff.'8 0
Privacy formed the basis for one of the few exclusions from the
open meetings law. The supreme court has held that meetings
cannot be closed in order to discuss personnel matters, the issue
about which privacy concerns are most likely to be raised.'' But
the First District Court of Appeal has since created a judicial ex-
ception designed in part to protect privacy, though the logic of this
exception is rather curious. "2 The district court reasoned that if a
record is exempted from disclosure under the public records law,
any meeting which involves the contents of that record must also
be closed. Otherwise, the court argued, the confidentiality of the
record would be lost. Given the number of exemptions from the
public records law, this is a potentially far-reaching decision, and
it ignores the deliberate choice of the legislature in adopting two
separate statutory schemes. As with the public records law, the
Florida Supreme Court has not directly confronted the question of
whether the judiciary has the power to create public policy excep-
tions to the open meetings law.
3. Public Officials
It is common knowledge that public officials sacrifice much of
their personal privacy when they enter the public arena. But public
officials also retain a zone of privacy, "3 and much debate has at-
tended the question of where the line bounding that zone should be
drawn.
Two Florida cases have dealt with the question of whether one's
name may be placed on an election ballot against one's will. In
Battaglia v. Adams, the Florida Supreme Court sustained the right
of Richard Nixon to remove his name from the 1964 Florida presi-
157. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
158. Occidental Chem. Co. v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336, 341 n.7 (Fla. 1977); Canney v. Board
of Pub. Instruction, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973) (on rehearing). Contra, State Dep't of Pollution
Control v. State Career Serv. Comm'n, 320 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
159. Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
160. Occidental Chem. Co. v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977); see 6 FLA. ST. U.L. Rv.
199 (1978).
161. City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971); Board of Pub. Instruction
v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
162. Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 341 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1976), cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1977).
163. See Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 252 (Fla. 1944) (quoting Warren & Brandeis,
supra note 15).
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dential primary ballot."' The court rejected the argument that a
public figure automatically waives "'any right of privacy in this
area' that he may have had."'' 5 But the court ruled in Yorty v. Stone
in 1972 that the exercise of that right may be conditioned on the
execution of an affidavit that one is not now, and does not intend
to become, a candidate. 66 Without that, the court reasoned, there
is no invasion of privacy in placing a generally recognized candi-
date's name on the ballot. In yet another and more recent case, the
court held constitutional a law requiring write-in candidates to reg-
ister, thus eliminating the writing-in of unregistered candidates. 7
The court reasoned that one purpose of the law was to protect the
privacy of those who do not wish to be on the ballot.
Unquestionably, the major contemporary debate about privacy
and public officials concerns financial disclosure legislation. 8 In
Goldtrap v. Askew, in 1976, the Florida Supreme Court sustained a
financial disclosure statute which required disclosure of sources, but
not amounts, of income."' While noting that the federal right of
privacy does not reach matters of this type, the court observed that,
in any event, the state had a "compelling interest" in financial
disclosure which would outweigh any privacy interests that could be
asserted. It does not appear that the existence of a state constitu-
tional right of privacy was argued in Goldtrap, though presumably
any such right would likewise have yielded to the compelling state
interest.
That same year, the Florida Constitution was amended by popu-
lar initiative to provide a more stringent scheme of financial disclo-
sure. Popularly known as the Sunshine Amendment, the new sec-
tion required public disclosure of sources and amounts of income. 70
In Plante v. Gonzalez, several state senators challenged the Sun-
shine Amendment in federal court, arguing that it swept over-
broadly into individual financial affairs, thus offending the federal
164. 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964).
165. Id. at 198.
166. 259 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972). The requirement of an affidavit is contained in § 103.101,
Florida Statutes (1977). Yorty sought removal without filing an affidavit. Nixon, by contrast,
had withdrawn entirely from the 1964 campaign.
167. Pasco v. Heggen, 314 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975).
168. Compare, e.g., City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1970) and
County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 522 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1974) with Stein v. Howlett, 289 N.E.2d
409 (Ill. 1972), appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 925 (1973) and Illinois State Employees Ass'n v.
Walker, 315 N.E.2d 9 (Ill.), cert. denied sub nom. Trooper's Lodge No. 41 v. Walker, 419 U.S.
1058 (1974).
169. 334 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1976).
170. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8; see Note, Legislative Efforts to Amend the Florida Constitu-
tion: The Implications of Smathers v. Smith, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 747, 755 n.40, 781 (1977).
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right of privacy. 7' In a long and thoughtful analysis, the district
court noted that the federal right of privacy does not encompass
matters of financial disclosure, thus obviating the need for strict
scrutiny of the Sunshine Amendment. Measured by either the ra-
tional basis test or the balancing test, the court concluded that the
measure was "undeniably constitutional."72
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision. The court noted that Americans have a consti-
tutional right to privacy, embodied in several of the Bill of Rights
amendments and protected by the fourteenth amendment. That
right to privacy, the court said, consists of an interest in autonomy
or independent decision making, and an interest in avoiding disclo-
sure of personal information.
7 3
The court held that a decision not to disclose one's financial af-
fairs is not the type of important, intimate decision protected by the
autonomy branch of the right of privacy. Financial disclosure does
not remove any alternatives from the decision making process; at
most, disclosure may deter some decisions. "' Moreover, the sena-
tors' interest in avoiding disclosure had to be balanced against the
interest of the public in deterring corruption and knowing the inter-
ests of its elected officials. Since the senators chose to run for of-
fice, the court reasoned, they should expect some limit on their
privacy.'5
A final area of inquiry is the conflict between the individual right
of privacy and the public right of access to divorce proceedings
involving public officials. In English v. McCrary, a three-justice
plurality addressed the question, as did two dissenting justices. "'
Though the plurality opinion was later withdrawn, it is nevertheless
worthwhile to consider, for it provides some insight into the views
of several members of the court.
In English, a newspaper reporter was excluded from the divorce
proceeding of an elected State's attorney. The trial judge had closed
the hearing on the ground that it was a "'private matter.' "" The
reporter then sought review, which was decided adversely to him on
an issue not relevant here. "8
171. 437 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, No. 77-3109 (5th Cir. June 30, 1978).




176. No. 49,039 (Fla. May 6, 1977), modified on denial of rehearing, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla.
1977). Only six of the seven justices considered the case.
177. 348 So. 2d at 299 n.1. (England, J., dissenting).
178. The reporter had brought a writ of prohibition to restrain the judge from proceeding
with the hearing. The supreme court eventually denied relief on the ground that he had
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Justice Karl wrote for the plurality. He rejected "the assumption
that the public and the press have a legitimate interest in all civil
litigation where an elected public official is a party," and noted
there had been no showing that "the matter being litigated would,
in some way, affect official duties or otherwise involve information
to which the public would be entitled."'79 Karl and the plurality
placed substantial reliance on the reasoning in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, in which the United States Supreme Court observed that
resort to the judicial process for a divorce could not be deemed truly
voluntary.180 Thus, Justice Karl reasoned, "a dissolution proceed-
ing is not always a 'public controversy' that automatically nullifies
the parties' right to privacy, even though the marital difficulties
may be of interest to some members of the public."''
Under Justice Karl's plurality view, closure would not be avail-
able of right. The determination of whether to close a civil proceed-
ing would be made on a case-by-case basis, so that the power to
close judicial proceedings would "never be permitted to hide official
misconduct of any kind, regardless of the status of the parties."' 82
Karl argued that the right to know is "not absolute and must be
placed in juxtaposition and balanced with other fundamental rights
such as the right to a fair trial and to privacy."'1' And, though the
plurality did not say so, part of the balancing must encompass the
fact that usually only one of the two marriage partners seeking the
divorce is a public official-a point often overlooked in public figure
cases of this type.
brought the wrong writ, despite the fact that two constitutional provisions forbade such a
ruling. See id. at 299; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21; id. art. V, § 2(a).
Subsequently, the supreme court adopted a rule which provides an expedited procedure
for review of closure orders, though the procedure does not differ substantially from that used
in English. For the current procedure, see In re Proposed Fla. Appellate Rules, 351 So. 2d
981, 990-91 (Fla. 1977); FiA. R. APP. P. 9.100(d). Additional procedural suggestions were made
in State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904, 911-12 (Fla. 1977)
(as modified on denial of rehearing) (Sundberg, J., concurring).
179. No. 49,039, slip op. at 8. The court correctly noted that there is no constitutional
requirement for public proceedings in civil litigation; the guaranty of a "speedy and public
trial" pertains to criminal cases. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16. Even
in criminal matters, nonpublic proceedings are sometimes permissible to assure a fair trial.
See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). It is not clear whether the public
trial provision is a right personal to, and exercisable only by, the defendant, or whether it is
the right of the public at large.
In civil matters, certain proceedings, such as adoption, are closed by statute. 348 So. 2d at
301 n.10.
180. No. 49,039, slip op. at 9-10 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976)).
181. Id. at 9.
182. Id. at 8 n.2.
183. Id. at 10.
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Justices England and Sundberg dissented."8 ' They argued that no
reason had been given why the hearing could not be held in public.
They said that the preference of the parties for privacy was not a
sufficient reason to close a hearing. Rather, the parties should have
to show that publicity would impair their right to a fair trial. Thus,
under the dissenting view, the relational privacy of marriage de-
served no special consideration. 8'
Because English was ultimately decided on other grounds, the
question of whether and under what conditions a court may close
civil proceedings involving a public official remains unresolved.
D. Privacy in the Judicial Process
The potential for infringement of privacy in litigation is very
great. Aside from constitutional and statutory privileges, there is no
general privilege to refuse to be a witness, or to disclose any matter,
or to produce documents or objects.' Nor is a general privilege
afforded on grounds of privacy. It thus falls to legislative and court
action to protect privacy interests.
Certain protections of privacy are well-settled. Evidentiary privi-
leges, for example, safeguard the relationship of husband and wife,
psychotherapist and patient, and priest and penitent.'87 The privacy
of one's person is given limited recognition in the discovery rules
pertaining to physicial examinations, for an examination may be
ordered only for good cause.' 8 And there is a right to refuse an
examination without penalty for contempt, though the non-
contempt sanctions are compulsive nonetheless.8 9 Medical records
enjoy limited statutory protection against discovery.11
Beyond these basic ground rules, the protection of privacy in
judicial proceedings is an unsettled matter, often depending on dis-
cretionary protective measures in individual cases. The following
sections explore some of the basic issues.
184. 348 So. 2d at 299.
185. The" 'fair trial considerations' "urged by the dissent are certainly legitimate criteria
for closing a hearing and undoubtedly are constitutionally compelling in civil as well as
criminal proceedings. But the inquiry does not stop there. The dissent fails to explain why
"'fair trial considerations'" should be the only criterion for closure. This is certainly not
the criterion by which the legislature opted to close certain proceedings involving adoption,
child custody, and the like. The dissent simply dismisses, without analysis, the relational
privacy of marriage as being the "mere preference of the parties." Id. at 300-01.
186. FLA. STAT. § 90.501 (1977).
187. Id. 99 90.503-.505. Other privileges, such as lawyer-client and trade secrets, id. 99
90.502, .506, are recognized but protect confidential relationships which do not necessarily
involve privacy.
188. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.360. Gasparino v. Murphy, 352 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1977) outlines the elements of "good cause" in a civil proceeding.
189. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.380(b)(2).
190. FLA. STAT. § 458.16 (1977).
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1. Discovery
Although the discovery rules relating to physical examinations
are clear, the rules are less certain when a protective order is sought
on the ground that discovery would invade privacy. In two reported
alimony cases decided by district courts of appeal, an ex-wife sought
discovery of financial information about the ex-husband's current
wife. In one case, an objection to an interrogatory was sustained on
grounds of relevancy without reaching the privacy issue."' In an
earlier decision, an ex-wife sought the joint income tax return of the
ex-husband and his current wife. The privacy issue was avoided by
giving the ex-husband an alternative means of supplying the finan-
cial information."1
2
In Springer v. Greer, in 1976, two plaintiffs sought discovery of
extensive information about prescriptions for addictive drugs writ-
ten by the defendant physician over a period of several years."1
3
They sought the prescription records of five pharmacists as well as
the names and addresses of all persons for whom the defendant had
prescribed the named drugs. The Fourth District Court of Appeal
ordered disclosure of the total number of prescriptions written, but
not the identities of the patients. The trial court was given the
responsibility of supervising discovery so as to protect privacy and
prevent harassment.
In News-Press Publishing Co. v. State, in 1977, the desire to pro-
tect the family of a crime victim from publicity was held an insuffi-
cient reason for the sealing of depositions."' The depositions were
sealed during pendency of a murder case. After a guilty plea the
press sought access. The Second District Court of Appeal held that
sealing records would be proper to protect the right to a fair trial,
to protect life, or for other compelling reasons, but not "to protect
the victim's family from exposure of the details of what was appar-
ently a heinous crime . . . ." " The case was remanded for a more
specific statement of the trial court's reasons for sealing the deposi-
tions.
2. Sealing or expungement of records
One year earlier, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Collazo, a
trial court sealed a settlement agreement between the City of Miami
191. Schneider v. Schneider, 348 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
192. Ramona v. Ramona, 223 So. 2d 569 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
193. 341 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 351 So. 2d 406 (Fla.
1977). Plaintiffs alleged that defendant had engaged in a conspiracy to cause addiction among
his patients.
194. 345 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
195. Id. at 867.
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and a private litigant who had sued for police misconduct.'" The
settlement had been reached during trial and approved by the court
in chambers. It was sealed because" 'the amount of money involved
was no one's business but those of the parties involved'" and in
order to avoid affecting certain other pending claims against the
city.' 7 The Third District Court of Appeal held that the right to
know clearly outweighed the personal preference of the litigants,
particularly when one of the parties was a governmental entity.
The Florida Supreme Court has twice considered the issue of
expungement of arrest records. In Mulkey v. Purdy, the court held
that the judiciary was without power to order expungement, absent
either legislative authority or evidence that the law enforcement
agency had abused its statutory discretion in making the record in
the first instance.'" s Subsequently, the legislature provided for ex-
pungement for certain first offenders.' The supreme court then
held that the statute constituted an unconstitutional encroachment
on judicial power and substituted a procedure by which trial courts
collect and seal-rather than destroy-records for which expunge-
ment is sought.2 "
3. The Power to Close Judicial Proceedings
As indicated in section IVC, closure of judicial proceedings is a
highly controversial procedure, and it is not at all clear to what
extent closure will be allowed to protect personal privacy.
There is no constitutional requirement that civil litigation be
public, and the guarantee of a speedy and public trial in criminal
cases is arguably a right personal to the defendant rather than a
right belonging to the public at large.20' The first amendment has
been held not to confer a right of access where it does not otherwise
196. 329 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 342 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1976).
197. 329 So. 2d at 335, 338.
198. 234 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1970), aff'g 228 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). The
supreme court was seemingly oblivious to the plight of the petitioner, who had been placed
on six months' probation for petit larceny at age 17. Eight years later he sought expungement
after Pan American World Airways promised to hire him-if the records were expunged.
Although the policy and constitutional questions are substantial, the court's position rings
hollow when one recalls its contrary resolution of the legislative power issue in Cason, dis-
cussed in section IVA supra, and the court's solicitude for citizen Nixon's privacy in
Battaglia, discussed in section IVC supra. Perhaps the key to the decision lies in its applause
for a New York court which had denied "a petition by a group of students to have their arrests
expunged from the record when charges against them were dropped . 234 So. 2d at 110
(citation omitted).
Justice Ervin's dissent took a broader view of the court's equitable powers. Id. at 111.
199. See FLA. STAT. § 901.33 (1977).
200. Johnson v. State, 336 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1976) (4-3 decision); see FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.692.
201. See note 179 supra.
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exist."2 Even in criminal cases, closure is only rarely authorized in
order to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial from impairment
by pretrial publicity.
0 3
It is well-settled that civil proceedings may be closed in some
circumstances. Florida courts thus far have not questioned the va-
lidity of statutes requiring or authorizing closure of proceedings re-
lating to unwed mothers, adoption, paternity, custody, or place-
ment of children. 204 Indeed, the statutory provisions are some evi-
dence of a legislative concern for safeguarding privacy, for that is
the interest protected.
The courts also appear to agree that they have the equitable
power to close hearings in addition to those made confidential by
statute. 205 Thus the question for the courts has not been whether in
principle hearings can be closed, but rather, under what circum-
stances, if any, the public right to know is outweighed by the indi-
vidual right of privacy (or some other strong, countervailing inter-
est). The recent cases which have presented the question involved
divorce. Given the outcome in English v. McCrary, discussed more
fully in section IVC, the present view of the Florida Supreme Court
on the subject is in doubt.06
The issue confronted by the supreme court in English was consid-
ered previously by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in State ex
rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson.207 There the press sought access
to the divorce proceedings of comedian Jackie Gleason. Mrs. Glea-
son moved to close the hearing, a motion in which Mr. Gleason
joined. The trial court closed the proceedings, but the district court
of appeal reversed.
The appellate opinion in Tyson rests on the theory that the Glea-
202. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 46 U.S.L.W. 4830 (U.S. June 26, 1978); Pell v. Procu-
nier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Shevin v.
Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977), appeal filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S.
Mar. 7, 1978).
203. State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1977).
204. FLA. STAT. § 39.09 (1)(b) (unwed mothers, custody, or placement), 63.162 (adoption),
742.031 (paternity) (1977); see English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d at 301 & n.10 (England, J.,
dissenting).
205. The withdrawn plurality opinion in English v. McCrary, expressing the views of
three justices, so stated. No. 49,039, slip op. at 7; accord, 348 So. 2d at 300-01 (England &
Sundberg, JJ., dissenting); State ex rel. English v. McCrary, 328 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1976); State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1975), overruled on other grounds, English v. McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
206. See Section IVC(3) supra. Chief Justice Overton did not express a view on the
privacy issue in English, and Justice Boyd did not participate. Justice Karl has since left the
court.
207. 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), overruled on other grounds, English v.
McCrary, 348 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1977).
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sons were public figures and, therefore, their divorce was a matter
of great public interest. That view cannot stand in light of Time,
Inc. v. Firestone.08 The Tyson court suggested that it might be
appropriate in some circumstances to close such a divorce proceed-
ing, or that of a nonpublic figure, but indicated that the desire to
protect individual privacy would not be a sufficient reason.109 The
district court of appeal was divided on the question.
4. Jurors
In Smith v. Portante, the Florida Supreme Court expressed con-
cern about the potential for invasion of the privacy of prospective
jurors .2 1 A statute authorized questionnaires to be sent to prospec-
tive jurors, the answers to which were meant to facilitate voir dire.
Response was compulsory, but the statute did not limit the subjects
of inquiry. The court invalidated the statute as an unlawful delega-
tion of legislative authority. The matter is now regulated by rule.",
5. Financial Disclosure and Open Meetings
Financial disclosure for judges, like other public officers, is regu-
lated by the Sunshine Amendment-article II, section 8, of the Flor-
ida Constitution-and by the Code of Judicial Conduct."' Proceed-
ings of judicial nominating commissions may be public or nonpublic
at the option of each commission . 13 Proceedings of the Judicial
Qualifications Commission are confidential until there is a finding
of probable cause and a filing of formal charges." '
E. Privacy and Autonomy: The Right to Decide
One major aspect of privacy, from the time of Warren and Bran-
deis to the present, has been the right to selective disclosure-the
right to determine whether or not information about oneself will be
disclosed to others. The foregoing sections have been almost exclu-
sively concerned with this "disclosural" privacy.
A second major aspect of privacy is autonomy-the right to make
fundamental decisions about one's own life. It may be that auton-
omy-the right to decide-is the basic characteristic of privacy, for
selective disclosure also involves decision: the decision whether or
208. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
209. 313 So. 2d at 785-87. The court placed particular weight on the public right to know
what occurs in its courtrooms and on Wigmore's observation that public scrutiny improves
the quality of justice.
210. 212 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1968).
211. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.431(a); FLA. R. Civ. P. FORMS 1.983, 1.984.
212. FLA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 6.
213. See In Re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1973); 1973 FLA.
Op. Arr'Y GEN. 073-348.
214. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 12.
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not to disclose personal information. From that standpoint, auton-
omy is fundamental. Selective disclosure is a special case, albeit a
very large special case.1
5
The following sections deal primarily with the autonomy aspect
of privacy rather than with selective disclosure.
1. The Griswold Constellation
The federal right of privacy deals with issues of autonomy and
has, at least so far, excluded issues of disclosure. The Griswold
constellation-Griswold v. Connecticut 26 and its progeny-could be
said to establish the right of family relation, for those cases protect
the right to make fundamentally important decisions about mar-
riage, contraception, procreation, abortion, childrearing, and educa-
tion.27 Where this federal right of privacy is involved, it is, natu-
rally, controlling.
Prior to the abortion decisions of the United States Supreme
Court,2t5 the Florida Supreme Court invalidated the state abortion
statutes.t In State v. Barquet, the Florida court struck statutes
punishing abortion except as necessary to preserve the mother's life
or advised to be so by two physicians, though it retained the com-
mon law misdemeanor penalty. 22 The privacy issue was raised, but
the court did not reach it, preferring instead to rely on the ground
of vagueness. Later Florida abortion decisions have been based on
the federal right of privacy, 22t though the courts have been faced
with questions about the impact of the abortion right on state-
created rights of an unborn child.
2 2
The federal right of privacy was construed by the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Springer v. Greer, a case involving a physician's
prescriptions for addictive drugs.223 There the court relied on the
federal right of privacy in preventing disclosure of patients' names
215. See Beardsley, supra note 31.
216. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
217. See section III supra.
218. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
219. State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972). See generally Walsingham v. State, 250
So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1971).
220. 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972).
221. Wright v. State, 351 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 1977) (constitutionality of terms of current
abortion law); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 958 (1974) (natural father cannot restrain mother from having abortion).
222. Day v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (fact
that mother could terminate pregnancy does not obviate cause of action for prenatal injuries
if child is carried to term); Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(mother's right to terminate pregnancy does not confer on her the right to contract away the
child's statutory right to natural father's support, if carried to term).
223. 341 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 351 So. 2d 406 (Fla.
1977); see section IVD(1) supra.
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and prescriptions, while permitting the collection of aggregate sta-
tistics about the total number of prescriptions the defendant doctor
had written. The United States Supreme Court's later decision in
Whalen v. Roe leaves unanswered the extent to which the physician-
patient relationship is implicated in the federal right of privacy, as
well as the extent to which the federal right of privacy protects
disclosure rather than decisionmaking
2 24
The federal right of privacy also anchored the decision in Franklin
v. White Egret Condominium, Inc., holding that condominium
agreements which exclude children from residency are unconstitu-
tional.22 5 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reasoned that such
agreements interfere unreasonably with family relationships and
childrearing, thus violating the federal right of privacy.
2. Helmets, Hair, and Neckties
Once one leaves the sector specifically protected by the federal
right of privacy, the Griswold line of cases is useful only by analogy.
The right of privacy, if any, is protected by the state, rather than
the federal, constitution. Two areas in which privacy challenges
frequently have been brought are regulations relating to one's dress
and regulations requiring the use of safety devices.
In State v. Eitel, a motorcyclist argued that he had a "right to
be let alone" by the state, insofar as state law required motorcyclists
to wear helmets. " ' Citing John Stuart Mill,2 2 Eitel maintained that
the statute was designed to protect the cyclist and that the cyclist
therefore had a right to determine whether or not he wished to be
protected. The court responded with a view which, because of the
philosophical difficulties it presents, is rarely directly expressed:
"that society has an interest in the preservation of the life of the
individual for his own sake. '"2 8 The court also quoted Mill's observa-
tion that "'[n]o person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossi-
ble for a person to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to
himself without mischief reaching at least to his near connections,
and often far beyond them.' ",229 The statute was sustained.
224. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
225. No. 76-1535 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 1977), petition for rehearing denied with
opinion (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. May 31, 1978).
226. State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1969) (Mann, Dist. Ct. App. J., sitting by designa-
tion).
227. J. MILL, ON LIBmRTY (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1956).
228. State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489, 491 (Fla. 1969) (footnote omitted) (citing as an
example the fact that suicide was a common law crime). The difficulty with the court's view
is that it permits the state to substitute its judgment for that of the individual regarding what
is in the individual's own best interest, a notion that cuts against generally held conceptions
of individual liberty.
229. Id. (quoting J. MILL, supra note 227, at 97).
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Another court reached a different result in Florida's leading case
on hair length regulations, Conyers v. Glenn.2 30 There the Second
District Court of Appeal relied in part on the federal right of pri-
vacy, saying that "the one clear consequence of Griswold is that
some showing of overriding public necessity is a necessary predicate
to state action intefering with the freedom of the individual." 23' The
court reasoned that unless such necessity was shown, "this part of
the child's nurture rests with the parent" 32-who in Conyers had
given permission for the student to wear his hair long. Noting that
a "clear majority of the Chief Justices of the United States would
be ineligible by the Pinellas Board's standards to matriculate at
Clearwater High School, 2 33 the court found that no overriding pub-
lic necessity was shown and the regulation was void.
A more recent case of this kind involved contempt citations
against an attorney who preferred to wear a medallion instead of a
necktie for appearances in court. The contempt convictions were
affirmed in two district court of appeal decisions characterized pri-
marily by failure even to identify the privacy issue.2 3 It is plain that
the attorney was being punished primarily for the manner in which
he refused to wear a tie rather than for the fact that he failed to do
80.235
3. Marijuana
The right of privacy has, in Alaska, served as the basis for invali-
dation of state laws against the possession of marijuana. 23 Two
challenges to a similar law have been considered by the Florida
Supreme Court. Both have been unsuccessful, but others are pend-
ing at this writing.
In 1969 in Borras v. State,237 the appellant argued that the state
could not prohibit use of marijuana in the privacy of the home,
230. 243 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (Mann, J.).
231. Id. at 206.
232. Id. at 207.
233. Id.
234. Sandstrom v. State, 309 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975), writ discharged for
want ofjuris., 336 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1976); Sandstrom v. State, 311 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975) (per curiam affirmance citing Fourth District opinion), writ discharged for
want of juris., 336 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1976).
235. See Sandstrom v. State, 336 So. 2d 572, 573 n.5 (Fla. 1976) (England, J., dissenting);
Sandstrom v. State, 309 So. 2d 17, 22-23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). Sandstrom had
appeared without incident in numerous courts, including the Florida Supreme Court, in the
same attire. 336 So. 2d at 578 (Boyd, J., dissenting). Ironically, the validity of the contempt
citations was defended in the Florida Supreme Court by Assistant Attorney General C. Marie
Bernard-who was wearing a tie. Id. at 578-79. Justice England, in a dissent joined by
Justices Boyd and Adkins, dealt with the privacy issue in a substantial way. Id. at 576-78.
236. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
237. 229 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1969).
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reasoning by analogy to Stanley v. Georgia.138 Stanley, however, had
been decided on the first amendment right to consume ideas. The
Stanley court distinguished laws prohibiting possession of narcotics,
firearms, and stolen property. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court
concluded that marijuana was harmful to the individual and to
society and sustained the validity of the statute.
The court revisited the marijuana issue in 1977 in Laird v.
State. 3 There it was urged that the marijuana law violated the
right of privacy insofar as the law prohibited noncommercial posses-
sion or use in a private home. The court again canvassed the federal
decisions and concluded that the federal right of privacy did not
extend so far. As it did in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Marko,10
the court viewed privacy solely in a federal context. It distinguished
the Alaska decision, Ravin v. State, 4' because Ravin rested on an
express state right of privacy in the Alaska Constitution.242 The next
logical question was whether a right of privacy is implicit in the




The Laird court went on to observe, however, that the record was
inadequate to determine whether there was a rational basis for the
proscription of private marijuana possession. The court left open
"the possibility of making such a determination on a properly-
developed record wherein both sides have had an opportunity to
present evidence of competing expert authorities before an impar-
tial tribunal." 4" The court noted that the rational basis standard
would be used rather than the compelling state interest test, since
there was no fundamental right to smoke marijuana. This invitation
has been accepted in several cases now pending before the supreme
court on a conventional rational basis, rather than privacy, chal-
lenge .245
4. Sexual Behavior
The Florida Supreme Court has on several recent occasions con-
sidered challenges to statutes regulating sexual behavior. The keys
to the court's analysis have, as in the abortion cases, been vague-
238. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
239. 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977).
240. 352 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 1977).
241. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
242. 342 So. 2d at 965.
243. It is not clear from the opinion whether the court was asked to recognize a right of
privacy under an existing provision of the Florida Constitution. If it was, the invitation was
ignored. Cf. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972) (Alaska Supreme Court found a right
"'to be let alone'" in the Alaska Constitution).
244. 342 So. 2d at 965.
245. State v. Leigh, No. 53,339 (Fla., filed Feb. 6, 1978); Bourassa v. State, No. 51,926
(Fla., filed June 27, 1977); Hamilton v. State, No. 51,812 (Fla., filed June 9, 1977).
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ness, overbreadth, and statutory construction. But privacy chal-
lenges have on occasion been addressed.
The leading case is Franklin v. State, in which the court held void
for vagueness an 1868 statute prohibiting "the abominable and de-
testable crime against nature." ' The court alluded to "the invasion
of private rights by state intrusion,"2 '7 but privacy analysis played
no part in the decision. The court imposed on the defendants a
misdemeanor penalty for committing an "unnatural and lascivious
act." The latter statute has been deemed not vague, and its enforce-
ment has been held not to invade privacy.248
Privacy has been held not to be infringed by a prosecution for
engaging in sexual intercourse in the presence of one's own child,29
nor by Bar inquiry into, and disbarment for, sexual intercourse with
a minor child.250 Privacy has not been involved in recent cases re-
viewing statutes regulating sexual behavior in public or commercial
settings.251
There appears to be no case posing directly the question of
whether the state has the power to punish sexual behavior by con-
senting adults in the home or other private place. Franklin involved
consenting adults, but the conduct took place in a car parked in a
public place. The language in Franklin suggests that such acts could
be forbidden under a clearly drawn statute,52 but the privacy issue
was not directly considered.
The Florida Supreme Court has recently held that sexual prefer-
ence is not a basis for excluding an otherwise qualified candidate
from admission to the Bar.2 3 The court concluded that there was no
rational connection between a homosexual orientation and one's
fitness or lack of fitness to practice law. The court noted that there
must be "'a substantial connection between a member's antisocial
behavior and his ability to otherwise carry out his professional res-
ponsibilities as an attorney. Otherwise, The Bar will be virtually
246. 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971).
247. Id. at 23.
248. Witherspoon v. State, 278 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1973).
249. Chesebrough v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971). The couple showed their child "how
babies are made," and were charged under a statute prohibiting "any lewd or lascivious act
in the presence of [a] child [under the age of fourteen]." Id. at 676.
250. Florida Bar v. Hefty, 213 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 1968) (by implication). The majority
opinion did not directly address the privacy issue, but Justice Ervin dealt with it in his
dissent.
251. State v. Bales, 343 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1977) (statute regulating massage parlors); Camp-
bell v. State, 331 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1976) (statute forbidding "open and gross lewdness and
lascivious behavior" applied to conduct in a bar).
252. 257 So. 2d at 23.
253. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978).
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unfettered in its power to censor the private morals of Florida Bar
members, regardless of any nexus between the behavior and the
ability to responsibly perform as an attorney.' "254
The court reserved the question of whether its position would
differ "where evidence establishes that an individual has actually
engaged in homosexual acts."' 55 The record was silent on that sub-
ject, and the court did not remand for additional information.56
When the question arises, as inevitably it must, the court will need
to face the question whether the state may regulate private consen-
sual sexual behavior between adults. 57
F. Privacy in the Florida Constitution
Privacy is an interest protected by various provisions of the
United States Constitution, including the first, third, fourth, fifth,
eighth, and fourteenth amendments.258 Privacy is just as clearly
implicated in the counterpart provisions of the Florida Constitu-
tion.59 Although privacy has been directly or indirectly involved in
a few state constitutional cases, the vast majority of Florida consti-
tutional privacy litigation has revolved around the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The notable exception
is the recent decision of Byron Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Associates,
Inc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, in which the First District Court
of Appeal recognized a right of privacy in the due process clause of
the Florida Constitution."'
1. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
In the 1960's, the United States Supreme Court declared that the
254. Id. at 10 (emphasis supplied by the court). The quotation is from Chief Justice
Ervin's concurrence in Florida Bar v. Kay, 232 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1970), a case involving
disbarment for public homosexual conduct. Justice Ervin had previously urged that any
inquiry by the Bar into the morals of attorneys constituted an invasion of privacy. Florida
Bar v. Hefty, 213 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1968). In Kay, Justice Ervin again explored the privacy
issue and suggested guidelines to limit Bar discipline to proper boundaries. The Kay concur-
rence was quoted extensively in Eimers. The court in Eimers noted, however, that standards
for Bar admission may differ from standards for disbarment, 358 So. 2d at 9 n.1, a distinction
defensible only to those already admitted to the Bar.
255. Id. at 8.
256. Justice Boyd urged it to do so. Id. at 10 (Boyd, J., dissenting).
257. The question could, as in Eimers, be addressed in terms of the relationship between
sexual behavior and performance as an attorney. It seems unlikely, however, that the court
would endorse behavior deemed illegal. The next question, therefore, would be whether the
state may regulate private consensual sexual behavior between adults.
258. See notes 23, 24, & 26 and accompanying text supra.
259. FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 (basic rights), 3 (religious freedom), 4 (freedom of speech and
press), 5 (right to assemble), 9 (due process), 12 (searches and seizures)., 17 (excessive punish-
ments).
260. No. DD-30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 1978).
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primary purpose of the federal protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures "is the protection of privacy rather than prop-
erty ' 21' and began to focus on one's "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" in deciding the scope of fourth amendment protection.26 2 A
plethora of state court decisions since then have differentiated those
areas in which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy from
those areas in which one does not.6 3 Numerous other decisions have
examined the reasonableness of searches and seizures under a vari-
ety of circumstances.2 4 While occasional search-and-seizure cases
raise constitutional issues of great magnitude, 211 most recent deci-
sions have simply applied settled principles to particular facts.
2. The 1968 Constitution: Unreasonable Interception of Private
Communications
In 1968, Florida expanded the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures to protect "against the unreasonable intercep-
tion of private communications by any means . "266. Article 1,
section 12, went on: "No warrant shall be issued except upon proba-
ble cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing. . . the
communication to be intercepted . . . ." Finally, the 1968 revision
provided that "[a]rticles or information obtained in violation of
this right shall not be admissible in evidence."
In adopting these changes, Florida became one of ten states to
deal with privacy expressly in the state constitution. 27 The new
protection of privacy of communications made a dramatic differ-
ence in Florida decisions relating to wiretapping. Although one Flor-
ida court had, prior to 1968, held that wiretapping was unconstitu-
tional, the ruling was rendered entirely ineffective by the simultane-
ous holding that one had a right to listen in on a party line or an
261. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (citations omitted).
262. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
263. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 355 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (public
restroom stall); Miranda v. State, 354 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (crawfish boat);
Huffer v. State, 344 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (hothouse).
264. See, e.g., Altman v. State, 335 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (inventory
search); Stephenson v. Department of Agriculture & Consumer Servs., 329 So. 2d 373 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App.), aff'd, 342 So. 2d 60 (Fla. 1976) (administrative search); Long v. State,
310 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (drug overdose).
265. See, e.g., Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1977), rehearing denied, id. (Fla.
1978). A fascinating case, Tsavaris involves the relationship between the prohibition of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures and the prohibition of compelled testimony when one's personal
papers are subpoenaed. This is the juncture, as Boyd v. United States put it, where "the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other." 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
266. FiA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
267. See Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 690, 721-24.
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extension phone."'8 The 1968 measure, augmented by a strong wire-
tapping statute, 29 has led to strict judicial scrutiny of electronic
surveillance and exclusion of improperly obtained evidence.
270
This constitutional provision was examined in detail in Toward
a Right of Privacy 2' and only the basic features will be outlined
here. The constitutional measure applies only to government-
conducted surveillance, not to private action. The existence of the
constitutional provision has been taken into account in civil cases,
however, and has evidently influenced the courts to take a severe
view of privately conducted wiretapping. Moreover, the wiretapping
statute forbids privately conducted surveillance without the con-
sent of both parties to the communication.2 2 The protection af-
forded by the constitutional and statutory measures substantially
exceeds that provided by the federal counterparts.
The 1968 constitutional exclusionary rule provides that illegally
obtained articles or information "shall not be admissible in evi-
dence." The exclusionary provision does not differentiate between
admissibility in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings. In
the 1920's, Florida adopted the exclusionary rule by judicial deci-
sion.27  The 1968 constitutional exclusionary rule has sometimes
268. Griffith v. State, 111 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 114 So. 2d 6
(Fla. 1959). Party-line or extension phone eavesdropping was apparently the universal
method of electronic eavesdropping in that period. See Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578, 585
(Fla. 1958) (on rehearing en banc); Perez v.'State, 81 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1955).
269. FLA. STAT. ch. 934 (1977).
270. See State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1978); In Re Grand Jury Investigation (Frank
Cobo), 287 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1973); Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973); Horn v. State,
298 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 308 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 1975); Mark-
ham v. Markham, 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972), aff'd, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla.
1973).
271. See Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 721-24.
272. Interceptions for law enforcement purposes require the consent of only one party.
The requirement that both parties consent to interception of a private communication
survived an unusual challenge in Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla.
1977), appeal filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1978). Representatives of the news media
argued that they had a first amendment right to gather the news, which right was unconstitu-
tionally infringed by the statute. They sought to record conversations during investigative
reporting without revealing to the interviewees that the recording was taking place. The
Florida Supreme Court ruled that a first amendment right to gather the news did not exist,
that the statute was constitutional as applied, and that "[a] different rule could have a most
pernicious effect upon the dignity of man." 351 So. 2d at 727.
273. Hart v. State, 103 So. 633, 635 (Fla. 1925).
The origin of the exclusionary rule in Florida .has been variously ascribed to court action
and to legislative enactment. Cases tracing the exclusionary rule's origin to court decision
include, e.g., Sing v. Wainwright, 148 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. 1962) (citing Jackson v. State, 99
So. 548 (Fla. 1924) (Jackson dealt with the right to resist unlawful search; it did not deal with
the exclusionary rule)); Taylor v. State, 355 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (citing
Gildrie v. State, 113 So. 704 (Fla. 1927) (exclusionary rule; often cited as the leading case)).
Other cases have ascribed the exclusionary rule to legislative action in 1927. See Chacon v.
State, 102 So. 2d 578, 589 (Fla. 1958) (citing FLA. STAT. § 933.19). FLA. STAT. § 933.19 (1977)
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been regarded as a mere codification of preexisting Florida law,
thereby incorporating pre-1968 interpretations, 24 though the 1968
commentary describes it as a "major change. ' 275 In any event, pre-
1968 decisions did not settle whether the exclusionary rule prevents
introduction of illegally obtained evidence in civil or administrative
proceedings." The plain language and deterrent purpose of the rule
support a total proscription.2 17
The incorporationist view of the 1968 exclusionary provision has
led to one erosion of the rule of otherwise complete inadmissibility:
in a nonwiretap case, illegally seized evidence has been admitted for
impeachment purposes, notwithstanding the apparently total pro-
hibition of article I, section 12.78 So long as the statutory exclusion-
ary rule remains intact, this judicial exception will have no impact
in wiretap cases 79
3. A State Constitutional Right of Privacy: Byron Harless,
Schaffer, Reid & Associates, Inc. v. State ex rel Schellenberg
2s0
As previously mentioned, the Jacksonville Electric Authority re-
tained the Byron Harless psychological consulting firm to conduct
a search for a new managing director. Confidential interviews ex-
plored highly personal aspects of the candidates' lives. Subse-
quently, a television station sought access to the psychologists'
notes. The First District Court of Appeal held that the notes were
public records but that to disclose them would violate rights of
privacy guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.
is an intriguing statute which adopted the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), as the admissibility rule in Florida. The statute
is still in force.
Hart appears to be the earliest Florida case to adopt the exclusionary rule in Florida and
predates the 1927 legislative enactment.
274. Dornau v. State, 306 So. 2d 167, 169-70 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1011 (1975).
275. D'Alemberte, Commentary, in 25A FLA. STAT. ANN. 269 (West 1970).
276. Note, Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Noncriminal Proceedings, 22
U. FLA. L. REv. 38, 53 (1969).
Dictum in one decision states that "evidence secured as result [sic] of an illegal search
is inadmissible as evidence in any cause . . . . Weiner v. Kelly, 82 So. 2d 155, 157 (Fla.
1955) (emphasis added).
277. Even if the constitutional rule were construed narrowly, the statutory rule prevents
introduction in evidence of an illegally obtained communication or evidence derived there-
from "in or before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legisla-
tive committee, or other authority of the state, or a political subdivision thereof ....
FLA. STAT. § 934.06 (1977).
278. Dornau v. State, 306 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1011 (1975).
279. See note 277 supra. See generally In Re Grand Jury Investigation (Frank Cobo), 287
So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1973).
280. No.DD-30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 1978).
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Judge Robert Smith, writing for the First District Court of Ap-
peal, acknowledged that the federal right of privacy has generally
been confined to the categorical relationships of marriage, procrea-
tion, contraception, childrearing and education, and family rela-
tionships. 8' But, he continued,
Intimate relationships are not protected because those relation-
ships are constitutional norms of life, but because they involve
"matters so fundamentally affecting a person" that government
intrusion tends to debase personhood. Intimate relationships are
not themselves the core of the right of privacy, either in its aspect
of decisional autonomy or that of disclosural privacy. At the core
is the inviolability of personhood ...
A fundamental aspect of personhood's integrity is the power to
control what we reveal about our intimate selves, to whom, and for
what purpose. 8 '
Finding a degree of support in Whalen v. Roe '83 and Nixon v. Ad-
ministrator of General Services, ' the court concluded that disclo-
sural privacy was protected by the Federal Constitution.285
Judge Smith then reviewed various provisions of the Florida Con-
stitution, finding within them a variety of protections for individual
privacy:
The Florida Constitution restates the fundamental guaranties of
the United States Constitution which are associated with the right
of privacy: the "inalienable rights" of persons, including the "right
to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness," to wor-
ship and speak freely, to security against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and to protection by due process against deprivation
of life and liberty. But the Declaration of Rights also contains,
more explicitly than any clause of the United States Constitution,
a guaranty of the right of disclosural privacy. Section 12 of the
Declaration of Rights protects the "right of the people to be secure
• ..against the unreasonable interception of private communica-
tions by any means . . .,.
Smith cited several Florida decisions as evidence that there has
been recognition in the past of a right of privacy, in both decisional
281. Id., slip op. at 13.
282. Id. at 14-15 (footnotes omitted).
283. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
284. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
285. No. DD-30, slip op. at 15-16, 29.
286. Id. at 16-17 (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2-4, 9, 12).
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and disclosural aspects."8 7 He concluded that the state constitution
"expresses the theme that disclosural privacy-the personal right of
some control over the broadcast of intimate information concerning
the self-is an aspect of personhood which is to be protected . . .
as fundamental.""2 ' He identified the precise source of the state
constitutional right of privacy as the liberty protected by the due
process clause.
8 9
The First District Court of Appeal ruled that these rights of pri-
vacy could be overcome only by an overriding or compelling state
interest. The court resolved a preliminary issue, that there must be
a legitimate expectation of privacy before the right will attach, and
then concluded that there was no compelling public interest in re-
vealing the information in the consultants' papers.
Byron Harless breaks new ground with regard to the state and
federal rights of privacy. 20 The federal constitutional analysis is
creative in its examination of the relationship between decisional
and disclosural privacy. It is possible, though by no means certain,
that the United States Supreme Court would endorse the result
reached.
The state constitutional analysis employed by Smith is much like
that used by the United States Supreme Court in 1965 in Griswold.
Smith began with the accurate premise that the state constitution
protects a variety of privacy interests. The court may have placed
more of a burden on article I, section 12, and on several court deci-
sions, than they are able to bear,291' but the result is undoubtedly
correct. Indeed, one may plausibly argue that privacy is implicit in
one's inalienable right to liberty, or the liberty protected by the due
process clause, without regard to the protection of privacy by other
constitutional sections or court decisions.2 2 One has a right-a pri-
287. Id. at 17 (citing, as examples of decisional autonomy, Pasco v. Heggen, 314 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1975); Battaglia v. Adams, 164 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 1964); Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); as examples of disclosural
privacy, In re Grand Jury Investigation, 287 So. 2d 43, 47 (Fla. 1973); Hagaman v. Andrews,
232 So. 2d 1, 6-7 (Fla. 1970); and "the remarkably prescient" Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243,
250 (Fla. 1944)).
288. No. DD-30, slip op. at 19.
289. Id. at 29.
290. Byron Harless is similar in certain respects to a well-reasoned Alaska case, Falcon
v. Alaska Pub. Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469 (Alaska 1977). Falcon dealt with the Alaska
conflict of interest law, as applied to a physician member of a local school board. The law
required disclosure of the names of the doctor's individual patients. The Alaska Supreme
Court held that the statute, as applied to reveal patients' names, constituted an impermissi-
ble infringement on their constitutionally protected zone of privacy.
291. As the court acknowledged, some of the decisions relied on were not expressly decided
in constitutional terms or did not rest specifically on the Florida Constitution.
292. Given the holding in Byron Harless that a right of privacy is implicit in the current
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vacy right-to be protected when government agents extract highly
personal information on solemn oaths of confidentiality, then place
it in files that are open to the public.
But in resolving one privacy issue, the court overlooked another.
The attorney general's suggestion that the psychologists' notes
should never have been made and should be destroyed or returned
was characterized by the court as a "cri de coeur. "293 But it may be
that the attorney general sensed the underlying privacy issue:
whether psychological employee screening of this type, when con-
ducted for government agencies, is a violation of a fundamental
right of privacy.
One of the characteristics of constitutional privacy is protection
against governmental intrusion-whether physically, into one's
home or office or person, or psychologically, into one's thoughts,
ideas, beliefs, or fundamental decisions. As the Byron Harless court
put it, the core idea is "the inviolability of personhood." Intimate
relationships are protected "because they involve 'matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person' that government intrusion tends to
debase personhood."
It is difficult to imagine a greater violation of personhood than the
psychological interviewing process used in this case. The psycholo-
gists engaged in the most deeply personal inquiries, having not even
an arguable relationship to the interviewee's ability to manage a
municipal utility. Among them were "church and recreational asso-
ciations"; "his wife's personality and her relationship to his career";
"self-image ('square, loner-not with crowd')"; "his children (one
child is described as 'lost sheep of family, wandering, dropped out
of college-not dope')"; "ideas for living his 'life over' and psychol-
ogical test results." 2" As the court explained it, the psychologists'
notes portrayed the interviewees "in intimate detail. The portraits
[were] based on the prospects' own statements, induced by a prom-
ise of confidentiality, which reveal[ed] personal characteristics,
relationships, thoughts, beliefs and aspirations.1
2
Oddly enough, it does not seem to have occurred to the court that
such inquiries violate the very privacy it had just recognized.2 6 Or-
state constitution, one might well ask why the constitution should be amended to make that
right explicit. The difficulty is that few state courts have so held. Byron Harless is only a
district court of appeal decision which has not been reviewed, at this writing, by the Florida
Supreme Court. Additionally, placement of an express provision in the constitution provides
a clear expression of the citizens' desire to protect the right of privacy. See generally Toward
a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 688-90.
293. No. DD-30, slip op. at 3.
294. Id. at 9-11.
295. Id. at 11.
296. This aspect of the constitutional issue was apparently not argued since the informa-
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dinarily, any governmental agency inquiry into "relationships,
thoughts, beliefs and aspirations" is enough to raise constitutional
danger flags. But intrusion by any other name, it seems, is psychol-
ogy.
The attorney general asked the court "'to enunciate a public
policy which prohibits, in the absence of statute, public funds to be
expended for psychological and personality employee screening.' ",97
Since the request was placed on public policy rather than constitu-
tional grounds, the court was undoubtedly correct in declining so to
rule. But the court went on to say, "we should hesitate in any event
to deprive public employers of interview methods which are widely
employed in private industry to obtain employees suitable for sensi-
tive tasks. Unless prohibited by law, agencies may acquire for evalu-
ation such personal information as is here recorded.' 9 8 This aspect
of the decision is unfortunate, for it overlooks an important privacy
issue and simultaneously creates a harmful side effect for the public
right to know.
The flaw in the analysis is the analogy to activity outside govern-
ment. The constitutional right of privacy reaches public action but
does not directly regulate the private sector. The fourteenth amend-
ment limits state action, not private action. Absent statutory or
case-law regulation, private organizations are free to practice mana-
gerial cloning if they choose, using psychological consultants to as-
sure uniformity of lifestyle, thought pattern, family composition,
and any number of other non-performance-related criteria.
Among public agencies, plainly the rule must be otherwise. There
must at least be a rational relationship between the information
sought and the responsibilities of the job to be performed. As the
inquiry begins to impinge on fundamental rights of privacy,
thought, belief, or association, there must-as the court itself de-
cided-be a compelling or overriding public interest. And there is
surely no overriding public interest in unearthing intimate facts
which have little or no relationship to the duties the job applicant
seeks to perform. The attorney general was right in asking for cessa-
tion of this type of activity, though wrong in resting the request on
public policy rather than on constitutional grounds.
The endorsement of psychological screening methods is likely to
be a focus of general criticism of Byron Harless, though for different
reasons. Public employee recruitment ordinarily is subject to the
tion had already been collected, though the attorney general objected to psychological inter-
viewing techniques on public policy grounds.
297. No. DD-30, slip op. at 28.
298. Id.
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open records and open meetings laws. After Byron Harless, those
laws can be circumvented simply be delegating the screening pro-
cess to a psychological consulting agency, thus cloaking all informa-
tion gathered in a constitutional mantle of confidentiality.'"
Byron Harless has, therefore, both positive and negative features.
It takes a dramatic step in declaring the existence of a state as well
as a federal constitutional privacy right. The First District has sup-
ported its position with a thorough and thoughtful analysis of the
privacy issues. The court reached the correct result in protecting the
privacy of the interviewees. 3®
The difficulty is that the decision did not go far enough. The
fundamental question is whether information of this type can be
constitutionally collected in the first instance. A ruling that such
personal information cannot be collected constitutionally would
have protected privacy while limiting the need for confidentiality in
recruitment. But the court did not take that view.
V. THE 1978 CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION:
DELIBERATIONS AND PROPOSALS
A. The First Phase
The Constitution Revision Commission held its organizational
session on July 6, 1977. One of the commissioners, then Chief Jus-
tice Ben F. Overton, called for action to protect individual privacy:
The fact that this is an age where citizens are more aware of their
legal rights is partly because our government now touches or con-
trols many more citizens than ever before. Because government in
its operation does affect more citizens, the task of this Commission
to review our basic constitutional document is even more critical
to ensure constitutional protection of individual rights.
Another factor that should be recognized is that changes in our
way of life occur very rapidly . . . . Our technological advance-
299. Confidentiality might be appropriate in the ordinary recruitment process in limited
circumstances. But Byron Harless complicates the matter by sanctioning the collection of
considerable amounts of material for which confidentiality is essential.
300. The court reported no concession by the television station that the consultants'
notes ought to be kept confidential. One suspects, however, that the television station was
less interested in the contents of the notes than it was in vindicating the principle involved.
The 1976 legislature had adopted an amendment to the public records law expressly de-
signed to make public the records, including work product, of private consultants under
contract to public agencies. The amendment was intended to overrule an earlier First District
Court of Appeal case holding that such work product was not a public record within the
meaning of the public records law. See No. DD-30, slip op. at 5-6. Given that background, it
is not surprising that the Jacksonville Electric Authority's recruitment procedure was chal-
lenged.
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ments continue to surpass our imagination, but our political and
economic problems are increased with this advancement.
And who, ten years ago, really understood that personal and
financial data on a substantial part of our population could be
collected by government or business and held for easy distribution
by computer operated information systems? There is a public con-
cern about how personal information concerning an individual citi-
zen is used, whether it be collected by government or by business.
The subject of individual privacy and privacy law is in a develop-
ing stage. Fifteen states have adopted some form of privacy legisla-
tion, and many appellate courts in this nation now have substan-
tial right of privacy issues before them for consideration. It is a new
problem that should be addressed. 0 1
At the outset, the entire commission held a series of public meet-
ings throughout the state, soliciting citizen suggestions. The author
testified at a hearing on the declaration of rights urging the adoption
of a right of privacy as a separate section of the revised constitu-
tion . 2 The presentation summarized the information which was
later published in Toward a Right of Privacy.30 3 The author recom-
301. Address by Chief Justice Ben F. Overton to the Constitution Revision Commission
(July 6, 1977).
302. The Center for Governmental Responsibility, Public Testimony Before the Florida
Constitution Revision Commission, Summaries of Hearings August 18, 1977-September 26,
1977, at 76-79 (Oct. 6, 1977). See also Fla. C.R.C., Summary of Proposed Revisions to the
Florida Constitution 7 (Sept. 27, 1977).
303. See note 1 supra. After reviewing the history of the privacy idea, the author provided
the commissioners with the texts of the relevant provisions of the 10 states whose constitu-
tions in some way protect privacy. These were classified into three groups. In the first were
the states with a strong, freestanding right of privacy-Alaska, California, and Montana. In
the' second were the states that have included privacy with the prohibition against unreason-
able searches and seizures, thus affording an intermediate level of protection-Florida, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Louisiana, and South Carolina. In the third were Washington and Arizona, for
which the right of privacy is the functional equivalent of the prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures.
In his presentation, the author noted that if the commission decided to include a privacy
right in the constitution, several issues would need to be examined. First, the commission
would need to decide whether to try to define privacy or, as other states have done, leave the
precise boundaries open for case-by-case adjudication. Second, a balance would need to be
struck between the right of privacy and the right to know, possibly in the constitution itself.
Third, a decision would need to be made on whether the privacy right should be self-executing
or not.
Finally, the author suggested that the commission would need to consider what standard
of review should be applied when weighing the right of privacy against other important
interests. For a strong right of privacy, the author maintained that the standard would need
to be the same as that for other important personal rights, like freedom of speech. The author
suggested that a right of privacy could be adopted without impairing other important societal
goals, including freedom of the press, open government, and financial disclosure.
At a more conceptual level, the author suggested that the function of a declaration of rights
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mended that there be a freestanding right of privacy as a separate
section of the Florida Constitution. The specific suggestion was a
modified version of the Montana constitutional provision, which
read: "The right of the people to privacy is essential to the well-
being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing
of a compelling state interest."30'
B. The Committee Proposals
After the public hearings ended in September, 1977, the commis-
sion divided into committees. Commission Chairman Talbot
"Sandy" D'Alemberte created an Ethics, Privacy and Elections
Committee to examine several interrelated problems, including pri-
vacy, free speech, open meetings, public records, and financial dis-
closure.3
1. Private Communications
The logical beginning for the committee's deliberations was the
question of whether there should be any change in the Florida Con-
stitution's existing privacy provision. Article I, section 12 was modi-
fied in 1968 to protect against the "unreasonable interception of
private communications by any means." The committee quickly
decided that there was no inconsistency between the specific pro-
tection afforded by section 12 and the more general statement which
would be provided by a freestanding right of privacy. The commit-
tee concluded that "any action concerning a right to privacy should
not impact upon this specific provision." 8 The committee voted to
carry section 12 forward unchanged. 0 7
within a constitution is to describe the relationship of the individual to his or her government
and to other members of the society. The optimum relationship was best described by John
Stuart Mill's "one very simple principle":
That principle is that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others
* . . . Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.
J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Bobbs-Merrill ed. 1956). The author concluded that we use the term
"right of privacy" as shorthand for that zone of autonomy which every individual should
have.
304. See Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 739.
305. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 1-2 (Oct. 5, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as October 5 Minutes].
Chaired by Commissioner Jon Moyle, members included Vice Chairwoman Lois Harrison,
former Governor LeRoy Collins, Dexter Douglass, Jesse McCrary, Chief Justice Ben Overton,
J.B. Spence, Senator Kenneth Plante, and Charlotte Hubbard (alternate commissioner).
Staff support was provided by Florida State University law professor Patricia Dore.
306. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 5 (Oct. 14, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as October 14 Minutes].
307. October 5 Minutes, supra note 305, at 4-5; October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at
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2. The Right of Privacy
From the outset, the committee agreed in principle that there
should be a right of privacy.0 The committee also was of the view,
later confirmed in the voting, that the commission as a whole fa-
vored the idea. The discussion focused, therefore, on the precise
form the privacy right should take.
The first issue to surface was the standard of review. At the com-
mittee's initial meeting on October 5, 1977, the author's proposal
was used as the starting point for discussion. 09 The author had
followed the Montana Constitution by including the compelling
state interests standard in the privacy provision itself but was un-
sure if that was the best approach.
Florida has never adopted the federal two-tier model of rational
basis and strict scrutiny, the latter being applied in the federal
system where fundamental rights or suspect classifications are in-
volved. Inclusion of the compelling state interest standard in the
Florida Constitution could introduce confusion in Florida constitu-
tonal law unless it were also applied to other fundamental rights.
The federal model has been much criticized, and an express consti-
tutional mandate for. a compelling interest analysis could produce
rigidity in judicial review at a time when many courts are moving
away from the two-tier system.
On the other hand, absent a standard of review, the privacy sec-
tion appears to state an absolute. The Alaska Constitution, for ex-
ample, provides that "[tihe right of the people to privacy is recog-
nized and shall not be infringed." 310 But much of government in-
volves intrusion on privacy in some way. Some intrusions are neces-
sary for vital functions to be carried out. It is, as H.L.A. Hart put
it, "a question of justification," for "the use of legal coercion by any
society calls for justification as something prima facie objectionable
to be tolerated only for the sake of some countervailing good.9
3 1'
The first step taken by the courts considering a new constitutional
right should be, and usually is, to decide the standard of review:
what sort of showing must be made in order to justify government
impingement on a fundamental right. This is a crucial decision. If
the reviewing court decides that one must show a compelling or
5-6. The committee did not discuss specific court decisions construing art. 1, § 12.
The Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee shared jurisdiction of § 12 with the Declara-
tion of Rights Committee, chaired by Commissioner Collins. That committee likewise recom-
mended no change.
308. October 5 Minutes, supra note 305, at 1-2, 4.
309. Id. at 4.
310. AlAsKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
311. H. HmRT, LAw, Lwai rn, AND MoRA.u 20 (1969) (emphasis in original).
TO BE LET ALONE
overriding state interest, or the like, then the proposed privacy right
will be a strong one."' On the other hand, if the courts decide that
a mere rational basis is all that need be shown, then the privacy
right will add little or nothing to the constitution.3
It is impossible to predict what standard of review would be
adopted for a new constitutional right. Florida decisions have dealt
with standards of review in connection with federal, but not state,
constitutional rights. The danger is great that state constitutional
cases will be decided on their particular facts or in an unarticulated
process of balancing.
Thus, there was much to be said for including an express standard
of review in the constitution. The compelling interest standard
shifts the burden to the state to justify the validity of a regulation,
and an extremely high degree of necessity must be shown. Indeed,
the test has been criticized as one which is too difficult for the
government to meet, and the author worried that it might be
thought to impose too high a standard. The author concluded that
the compelling state interest standard should be specified in the
constitution, though it was a close question." 4
The committee disagreed. To the author's surprise, the commit-
tee members felt that the compelling interest standard was too
weak, not that it was too strong. 15 They feared that inclusion of the
standard in the constitutional provision would invite the courts
to create exceptions and invite government agencies to test the per-
missible limits of the right. The committee members believed there
would be little judicial reluctance to find a great many state inter-
ests to be "compelling. ' 31 A staff paper on the meaning of the
phrase did nothing to allay their fears, and the compelling state
interest standard was dropped from consideration." 7
The second major issue confronted by the committee was whether
the privacy section should apply only to government intrusion or to
312. See, e.g. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 234 (Cal. 1975). Alaska first adopted the
compelling interest standard, then changed to a "middle tier" approach. Compare Breese v.
Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972) with Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
313. See, e.g., State v. Baker, 535 P.2d 1394 (Hawaii 1975).
314. Commission Chairman D'Alemberte suggested that the commission might consider
adopting such a standard with reference to several of the fundamental rights in the declara-
tion of rights. Telephone conversation with Chairman D'Alemberte (Aug. 1977). See also
October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at 2-3.
315. October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at 3.
316. The substance of the discussion does not appear in the minutes. See Fla. C.R.C.,
Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 6 (Oct. 19, 1977) [hereinafter cited as
October 19 Minutes]. See also October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at 4.
317. This course of events is strikingly similar to that in the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention on the same issue. See Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 697-99.
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private intrusion as well. There had been an early consensus that
the privacy right should be self-executing. The question of its scope
was less settled.
It is rare for constitutional measures to reach private action.
Under conventional doctrine, a state constitution serves as a re-
straint on otherwise unrestrained sovereign power. Thus, if privacy
is to be protected against government action, constitutional mea-
sures are needed. But private action is subject to regulation through
statutes and court decisions. Ordinarily, therefore, private action
need not be restrained by constitutional provisions. This, however,
is not universally observed. California has adopted a self-executing
right of privacy which applies directly to both the public and the
private sectors.
318
The author proposed a privacy right applicable to government
intrusion only. But the committee initially expressed strong feelings
that private action should be proscribed as well. 311 Committee mem-
bers reasoned that intrusion was no less offensive when done by the
private sector. Consequently, the constitutional right should protect
against intrusion, regardless of the source. The committee felt that
dealing with the issue comprehensively in the constitution would
provide more certainty and direction for the courts than if privacy
law evolved by implication from other more generalized rights.
32 0
The committee view was not long in drawing opposition. Commis-
sion Chairman D'Alemberte urged that the right of privacy speak
only to governmental intrusion."' Mr. James Spaniolo, counsel for
the Miami Herald, foresaw potential problems for the newsgather-
ing activities of the press. He argued that private intrusion could be
addressed more effectively by statute and that tort law already
provided remedies for invasion of privacy by private persons or busi-
nesses. He feared that a constitutional provision would trigger liti-
gation to determine whether new causes of action or new theories of
privacy had been created. Assistant Attorney General Sharyn
Smith voiced the same concern.22
318. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 702 n.364,
705-06.
Illinois has been described as "the only State whose constitution explicitly guarantees an
affirmative legal remedy for privacy invasions." PRIvAcY LAw IN THE STATEs, supra note 5, at
1. But that provision merely guarantees access to courts. Remedies are fashioned as part of
Illinois common law. The Illinois Constitution does not provide a self-executing right of
privacy applicable to the private sector.
319. See October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at 4-5; October 19 Minutes, supra note 316,
at 7.
320. October 19 Minutes, supra note 316, at 7.
321. October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at 2.
322. October 19 Minutes, supra note 316, at 7-8.
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In contrast, the author believed the press was unlikely to be af-
fected at all. 3 ' He found it difficult to conceive that such a right of
privacy would do more to the areas of concern to the press than
constitutionalize the already well-defined boundaries, of the inva-
sion of privacy tort. The unsettled areas of private-sector privacy
law, he believed, were those relating to the accumulation of vast





Despite the opposition, it appeared on October 19 that the com-
mittee would approve a measure reaching both private and govern-
mental intrusion.3 5 The committee began to waiver, however, as
Commissioner Overton wondered aloud whether the committee
proposal would overrule Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, a recent
tort privacy case. 26 Committee Chairman Moyle likewise expressed
concern about the private-sector aspects and obtained agreement to
defer the matter.
32 7
By the committee's final meeting on November 21, 1977, the idea
of a self-executing right against private intrusion had been aban-
doned. Instead, the privacy right would have two parts. There
would be a self-executing right against governmental intrusion,
and there would be a non-self-executing mandate that the legisla-
ture protect against intrusion by others. 328 Given that formula, most
of the opposition died away.
The third topic of debate in the committee was the specific lan-
guage to recommend to the commission. The author's proposal was
merely one of several suggestions. For example, Commission Chair-
man D'Alemberte recommended the following: "The right of citi-
zens to individual privacy shall not be infringed by government."
3n
It was Assistant Attorney General Sharyn Smith, however, who
suggested the approach eventually adopted by the committee. Her
formulation was: "The right of the people to be let alone and free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion into their private lives is
recognized and shall not be infringed."33 Professor Patricia Dore
323. Id. at 8.
324. See Proposed Amendments to [California] Constitution, General Election, Novem-
ber 7, 172, at 26-28, reproduced in Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 702-04 n.364.
One commissioner cited Ralph Nader's surveillance episodes with General Motors. See Nader
v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. 1970).
325. October 19 Minutes, supra note 316, at 8.
326. Id. (referring to Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977)).
327. October 19 Minutes, supra note 316, at 8.
328. Fla. C.R.C., Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee Minutes 4-5. (Nov. 21, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as November 21 Minutes].
329. October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at 2.
330. Id. at 4. The minutes do not reproduce the text of her recommendation.
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formulated eight variations on that theme, embracing the various
viewpoints that had been placed before the committee.3  On Octo-
ber 19, Commissioner Douglass, the committee's most vigorous pri-
vacy advocate, moved the adoption of the following: "The right of
the individual to be left alone and to be free from governmental or
private intrusion is essential to the well-being of a free society and
shall not be infringed."3' 2 Though the amending process was com-
pleted, there were misgivings about the private intrusion aspect,
and the Douglass proposal never came to a vote.
By the November 21 meeting, the privacy section had metamor-
phosed into the two parts in which it would ultimately be proposed
to the full commission as a new section 23 in article I: "Every indi-
vidual has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life," and "The legislature shall protect by
law the private lives of the people from intrusion by other per-
sons." 333 Commissioners Collins and Overton sought to insert the
word "unwarranted" before the word "intrusion" in both sentences,
on the theory that some intrusions are inherent in governmental and
private activity, and only unreasonable intrusions ought to be pro-
hibited. The other committee members believed that to qualify the
privacy right in that way would reduce it to a nullity. The commit-
tee defeated both proposed amendments. Thus, the measure was
passed without the word "unwarranted" and introduced by the
committee as Proposal No. 132.
3. Financial Disclosure
In November, 1976, less than a year before the Constitution
Revision Commission began work, Florida voters ratified article II,
section 8 of the constitution. Popularly known as the Sunshine
Amendment, it created a scheme of detailed financial disclosure.
The Sunshine Amendment had been placed on the ballot through
an initiative campaign organized by Governor Reubin Askew after
he had been unable to secure legislative approval of similar mea-
sures. 3
34
Given the recent and overwhelming general election vote, there
was little support for any modification of the Sunshine Amendment.
331. Memorandum to Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee from Patricia Dore (Oct.
19, 1977); see October 19 Minutes, supra note 316, at 6.
332. October 19 Minutes, supra note 316, at 8.
333. November 21 Minutes, supra note 328, at 4-5. Professor Dore had produced a number
of alternatives for the committee's consideration, including the version adopted by the com-
mittee.
334. See Note, Legislative Efforts to Amend the Florida Constitution: The Implications
of Smathers v. Smith, 5 FA. ST. U.L. REv. 747, 755 n.40, 781 (1977).
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Moreover, with the addition of the right of privacy, it was necessary
that financial disclosure retain constitutional status lest it be
argued that the right of privacy had effected an implied repeal. All
proposed modifications to the Sunshine Amendment were defeated,
and it was carried forward intact. 5
4. Open Government
As with financial disclosure, there was concern among the com-
missioners that adoption of the right of privacy alone, without a
corresponding "right to know," might impliedly repeal or weaken
provisions for open meetings, public records, and judicial proceed-
ings. The eventual solution was to address the issue in the constitu-
tion itself by elevating the current open meetings and public records
laws to constitutional status.
A somewhat different course was taken than in Montana. There
the voters adopted a single "right to know" section, declaring the
right to examine public documents and deliberations, "except in
cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the
merits of public disclosure."3ss Montana tipped the balance in favor
of disclosure by saying that the demands of individual privacy must
clearly exceed the merits of disclosure.337
But the Montana provision left troublesome, unanswered ques-
tions. First, who would make the determination? Could government
bodies unilaterally begin closing records and proceedings, using pri-
vacy as an excuse, thereby causing litigation and delay in public
access? Second, could the government invoke secrecy to protect a
governmental, rather than a privacy, interest? Could the govern-
ment keep secret the answers to civil service examinations or com-
petitive bids until the time for bid opening? Finally, would a single
rule suffice for all branches of government, or were special rules
335. See October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at 7; November 21 Minutes, supra note 328,
at 1-2.
The situation was complicated by the fact that several powerful senators had filed a federal
court privacy challenge to the Sunshine Amendment, refusing in the meantime to comply
with its disclosure provisions. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 437 F. Supp. 536 (N.D. Fla. 1977),
aff'd, no. 77-3109 (5th Cir. June 30, 1978); section IVC(3) supra. Three of the sena-
tors-Kenneth Plante, Dempsey Barron, and John Ware-served on the Constitution Revi-
sion Commission, and Senator Plante was a member of the Ethics, Privacy and Elections
Committee. The district court heard and decided Plante v. Gonzalez in September, 1977, and
an appeal was pending in the Fifth Circuit throughout the balance of the deliberations of the
commission. Senator Plante had prepared a series of proposed modifications to the Sunshine
Amendment, but he withdrew them when it became evident that the members opposed any
change at all. See November 21 Minutes, supra note 328, at 1-2. It may be worth noting that
15 of the 37 commissioners were appointed by Governor Askew, the principal author of the
Sunshine Amendment.
336. MONT. CONST. art. n1, § 9.
337. See Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 699-700.
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needed for the judiciary?
In answer to the first question, the committee decided that excep-
tions to disclosure should be made by general law, not by any agency
or governmental body. In the case of the judiciary, the committee
felt exceptions could also be made by rule. In answer to the second
question, it seemed clear that on occasion the government has a
legitimate interest in confidentiality which has nothing to do with
individual privacy. The secrecy of civil service examination answers
and sealed competitive bids serves important governmental inter-
ests, but only by the most tortured logic could nondisclosure of those
matters be said to protect individual privacy. Thus, the committee
concluded that confidentiality should be allowed also to protect
overriding governmental purposes. Finally, in view of the supreme
court's substantial rulemaking power, the committee concluded
that judicial proceedings and records could be made confidential by
general law or by rule. However, the same limitations would apply:
confidentiality could be justified only for the protection of privacy
interests or overriding governmental purposes.
338
Of necessity, the language used to give effect to these policies was
somewhat intricate. With regard to nonjudicial meetings and re-
cords, the committee proposed:
No person shall be denied access to any meeting at which official
acts are to be taken by any nonjudicial collegial public body in the
state or by persons acting together on behalf of such a public body.
The legislature may exempt meetings by general law where it is
essential to protect privacy interests or overriding governmental
purposes.
No person shall be denied the right to examine'any public record
made or received in connection with the public business by any
nonjudicial public officer or employee in the state or by persons
acting on their behalf. The legislature may exempt records by
general law where it is essential to protect privacy interests or
overriding governmental purposes.-'
These paragraphs were introduced as Proposals No. 137 and No.
138, respectively.
The suggested measure relating to judicial proceedings and re-
cords provided:
338. November 21 Minutes, supra note 328, at 6.
339. Id. at 5.
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All judicial proceedings and records and all proceedings and re-
cords of judicial agencies shall be open and accessible to the peo-
ple. Where it is essential to protect privacy interests or overriding
governmental purposes, the supreme court by rule or the legisla-
ture by general law may exempt proceedings and records from this
section .3
This was introduced as Proposal No. 133. The term "proceedings"
was deemed to exclude conferences of appellate judges or delibera-
tions of petit juries. Disciplinary proceedings of The Florida Bar
were considered "proceedings" and would be open unless action was
taken to exempt them. The Judicial Qualifications Commission
would continue to be governed by the express confidentiality provi-
sion of article V, section 12(d). 341
C. The Commission Considers-And Reconsiders
The committee recommendations proceeded to the floor of the
Constitution Revision Commission for consideration. As the com-
mittee had suggested, article I, section 12, relating to unreasonable
searches and seizures and unreasonable interceptions of private
communications, was carried forward intact. Likewise, article II,
section 8, the Sunshine Amendment, was not changed. Changes
were made, however, in the committee's privacy recommendation.
1. The right of privacy
In January, 1978, the commission took up Proposal No. 132, the
proposed right of privacy. The floor managers for the committee
proposal were Commissioners Moyle and Douglass. Commissioner
Moyle reviewed the development of American privacy law and the
growing importance of the states in the protection of privacy. Tech-
nological advances and increasing societal interdependence pose
threats to privacy, Commissioner Moyle explained, but there is no
general constitutional right of privacy as a matter of federal or Flor-
ida law. The best solution, he argued, was a self-executing right of
privacy against governmental intrusion and a non-self-executing
policy statement which would direct the legislature to protect indi-
vidual privacy against intrusion by the private sector.4 2
In response to questions, Commissioners Douglass and Moyle
explained that the phrase "to be let alone" had been chosen for its
historical and legal significance . 3" They indicated that the phrase
340. Id. at 6.
341. Id.
342. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 1-14.
343. Id. at 22-23. The phrase had been coined by Thomas Cooley in his Treatise on the
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"governmental intrusion" was used instead of "unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion" in order to make the privacy right as strong
as possible.3" Moreover, Moyle maintained that "intrusion carries
with it the term of unwarranted. .... Intrusion has to be unwar-
ranted when you define it."'
Douglass and Moyle asserted that the right of privacy would not
impair the ability to conduct criminal surveillance. Article I, section
12 would continue to set the standards for searches, seizures, and
interceptions of private communications.3 " Background investiga-
tions of employees conducted by private employers would not be
reached by the self-executing right of privacy; this would instead be
left for action by the legislature. 37 The right of privacy would apply,
however, to investigations of the backgrounds of government em-
ployees. Such investigations would have to have reasonable rele-
vance to theposition sought and the ability to perform the duties.348
The two commissioners also insisted that the right of privacy
would not affect the existing constitutional measure for financial
disclosure, the Sunshine Amendment, 349 nor, assuming adoption of
the committee's other proposals, would it affect open meetings and
Law of Torts in 1880. It had appeared in Warren and Brandeis' 1890 law review article and
in a number of court decisions since. Thus it had been selected for the committee proposal
in lieu of a more contemporary or grammatically correct phrase.
Commissioners Douglass and Moyle were also asked whether they had considered omitting
the phrase "to be let alone" so as to create better parallelism between the two parts of the
privacy proposal. The commissioners replied that the proposed language was the best the
committee had been able to devise to express the desired result and that numerous combina-
tions had been tried. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 24-25.
A related aspect of that same question is, what is the precise significance of the parallelism
within the phrase, "the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into his
private life"? The phrase suggests that there is some difference between "to be let alone" and
"free from governmental intrusion." Without the second part, one logical interpretation
would be that "to be let alone" refers to all action, government or private, while "free from
governmental intrusion" refers more specifically to government action. But the existence of
the second part negates the inference that the first part reaches private action.
The relationship of the two phrases was not specifically discussed in the committee minutes
or commission debate. It appears that the two phrases were considered to be synonymous. A
declaration of a right "to be let alone" in the context of a constitution which, absent contrary
indications, reaches only state action, would necessarily signify a right to be "free from
governmental intrusion."
344. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 23-24.
345. Id. at 49. Commissioner Douglass' remarks, id. at 23, can be read to express the same
view. He alluded to Professor Dore's analysis. She had said that "the dictionary definition of
the word 'intrusion' indicated 'uninvited' or 'unwarranted' interjection or presence and that
in one sense 'unwarranted intrusion' could be considered a redundancy." October 19 Minutes,
supra note 316, at 7.
346. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 14-16; see id. at 33-34, 42-43.
347. Id. at 19-20.
348. Id. at 30-32.
349. Id. at 26-27, 52.
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public records laws. 50 They said the privacy right would not affect
public nuisance or disturbing-the-peace laws, since what is done in
public is not private. 5' In addition, it would not affect existing tort
law,3 5 nor would it inhibit the ability of the government to conduct
a census or needed surveys. 3 The right of privacy could, however,
afford some additional protection for the doctor-patient relation-
ship, where government agencies sought medical information with-
out adequate confidentiality safeguards, or sought unnecessarily to
restrict the prescription of some medicines. 354 The right of privacy
would not impede discovery in civil litigation since the civil dis-
covery rules were promulgated under separate constitutional
authority in article V.3 5
Commissioner Douglass conceded that the outlook was uncertain
for the regulation of behavior within private homes. 6 He pointed
out that state court decisions have divided on whether the posses-
sion of marijuana, for example, is protected by a right of privacy.
Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the state could prohibit
possession of marijuana within the home, while the Alaska Supreme
Court held that it could not.3 57 Commissioner Douglass felt that the
Alaska court had placed greater weight on privacy because of the
remoteness of the state. He believed Arizona to be more like Florida.
He offered the personal belief that the Florida Supreme Court would
conclude that the privacy right would not prohibit regulation of
such activities, but conceded that there was no certainty: "There is
no assurance of what our court would hold. I have to say that."3
8
The committee view, accurately represented by Commissioners
Moyle and Douglass, did not go unchallenged. Commissioners Over-
ton and Collins sought, as they had in committee, to insert the word
"unwarranted" before the word "intrusion." '  A similar motion
was made by Commissioner Shevin, who preferred to use the word
"unreasonable."3 0 All three believed that the right of privacy would
sweep too broadly if not qualified in some way.
350. Id. at 27.
351. Id. at 29-30.
352. See id. at 31.
353. Id. at 32-33.
354. Id. at 28.
355. Id. at 68-69, 72-74; see FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
356. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 16-18, 75-76.
357. Id. at 16-18; see Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 694-95, 729. Compare
State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070 (Ariz. 1977) with Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
358. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 18.
359. Id. at 34, 39.
360. Id. at 42, 50.
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Commissioner Overton argued that the first part of the commit-
tee's privacy proposal would lead to the Alaska result allowing pos-
session of marijuana in private homes. The second part might, he
believed, overrule Florida Publishing Co. v. Fletcher."' Finally, he
expressed a concern about possible restrictions on electronic surveil-
lance .362
In Commissioner Collins' view, the proposed right of privacy, if
unmodified, would constitute "an absolute bar for the invasion of
privacy," thus making it impossible to conduct essential govern-
ment activities . 33 He expressed concern about limitations on discov-
ery in civil litigation.
Commissioner Shevin feared that the privacy section might nul-
lify the use of electronic surveillance in organized crime investiga-
tions.34 He suggested that the privacy proposal could "lock us into
a situation where no governmental action could ever survive the
provision of privacy.''311
Basically then, the debate was over the scope and likely judicial
interpretation of the committee proposal. The proponents of the
committee proposal adhered to the views they had expressed pre-
viously. Commissioner Douglass argued vigorously that the inser-
tion of "unwarranted" would create a "weasel word" to allow the
dilution of an important right.16 Commissioner Moyle pointed out
that other fundamental constitutional rights are not protected
against "unwarranted" or "unreasonable" intrusion. Rather, they
are stated in a straightforward, unqualified way. 37 The proponents
reiterated their view that the dire consequences would not mate-
rialize. Their view prevailed, and the proposed amendments were
rejected, twenty-four to eleven.
3 1
8
The commission then considered and ultimately accepted an
amendment adding to the first part of the committee proposal the
phrase "except as otherwise provided in this constitution." The
amendment was offered by Commissioner Mathews out of fear that
the right of privacy would impliedly repeal the Sunshine Amend-
361. 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977); see sections IVA(6)
and VB(2) supra.
362. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 35-36.
363. Id. at 39.
364. Id. at 42, 44-45.
365. Id. at 44.
366. Id. at 37.
367. Id. at 48.
368. Id. at 50. The vote was on Commissioner Overton's motion to add the word "un-
warranted." When it failed, Commissioner Shevin withdrew his motion to add "unreason-
able." Id.
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ment, on the theory that when two constitutional provisions con-
flict, the later in time controls.3 18 Although this argument might
have some merit with reference to a constitutional amendment, it
would appear inapplicable to a complete constitutional revision.
But the floor managers acquiesced in the amendment, and it was
adopted.370
After still further debate, Proposal No. 132 was approved by a
twenty-nine to four vote. 7' Commissioners Overton and Shevin
voted in favor and Commissioner Collins voted against the proposal.
The proposed right of privacy was inserted, as amended, into the
commission's draft constitution. The draft was completed in Janu-
ary, 1978, and circulated for public comment. Another round of
public hearings was held, after which any portion of the constitution
could be reconsidered by the commission.
There ensued yet another process of modification. The initial
changes were proposed by the Committee on Style and Drafting.
The Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee had consciously cho-
sen the word "individual" in the phrase, "[e]very individual has
the right to be let alone," in order to exclude corporations. The
committee considered privacy to be a right pertaining only to natu-
ral persons and not to corporations. The Committee on Style and
Drafting changed "individual" to "natural person" to remove all
possible doubt that corporations were to be excluded. "
After the public hearings, further amendments were offered. On
March 7, 1978, Commissioners Collins, Overton, and Shevin again
endeavored to add the word "unwarranted" to the privacy section.
Commissioner Collins cited public hearing testimony from a repre-
sentative of the League of Cities suggesting that the privacy amend-
ment could undermine the police and taxing powers of the state.
Collins argued that the privacy section could limit law enforcement
and suggested that agricultural and health inspections could not be
carried out if the privacy right were approved. 373
369. Id. at 51-52.
370. Id. at 51-61.
371. Id. at 76.
372. Fla. C.R.C., Style and Drafting Committee Minutes 5 (Feb. 14-16, 1978); Transcript
of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 12, 15 (Mar. 6, 1978). The same approach was used in art. I, § 9.
The fear that "individual" could be construed to include corporations was not an idle one.
That result was reached in Montana, despite an intent to restrict the right of privacy to
natural persons. See Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 697-98 & n.334.
The Style and Drafting Committee also changed "in this constitution" to "herein." See
Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 15 (Mar. 6, 1978).
373. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 9-16, 34, 40-41 (Mar. 7, 1978).
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Commissioners Overton and Shevin supported the amendment,
arguing that its adoption would better express the intent of the
commission and would avoid needless litigation. Their views dif-
fered from those of Commissioner Collins, however. They believed
that the proposed amendment would clarify the privacy section,
rather than work a major substantive change. Commissioner Collins
could not support the privacy section without the amendment, but
Commissioner Shevin believed the right of privacy should be
adopted in any event .1
7
Commissioner Moyle again opposed adding "unwarranted." He
suggested that the judicial approach to a right of privacy would be
the same as that for free speech. Though the right of free speech is
stated in absolute terms, reasonable restrictions have been allowed.
The absolutist view of the first amendment has never prevailed. If
the right of privacy is important enough to be placed in the constitu-
tion, Moyle argued, "it ought not to be a conditional right. It makes
just as much sense to say 'reasonable free speech' as it does
'unwarranted intrusion.'' Intrusion was, he felt, by definition un-
warranted. To say "unwarranted intrusion" was redundant.375
After a complicated parliamentary process, the motion to add the
word "unwarranted" initially passed, 3 7 but died on reconsidera-
tion.177 An amendment to delete the entire privacy section also
failed. 378 The commission agreed, however, to delete the second part
of the committee proposal-that portion which would have man-
dated the legislature to provide by law for protection against private
intrusion.3 79 The amendment was offered by Commissioner James
primarily on the theory that the language was unnecessary. Since
the constitution serves as a limitation on power, not a grant of
power, it was unnecessary to require that the legislature protect
rights of privacy from private intrusion. The legislature already pos-
sessed the power to do so.
Thus amended, the measure was finally ready for the ballot.
2. Open government
Proposals No. 137 and No. 138, relating to open meetings and
public records, respectively, were initially debated and voted on in
December, 1977. Since they did not receive the required constitu-
374. Id. at 25-27 (remarks of Ben Overton); id. at 37 (remarks of Robert Shevin).
375. Id. at 19, 23-25, 38-39.
376. Id. at 41.
377. Id. at 180-82.
378. Id. at 16-30.
379. Id. at 30-33, 183-92; 1 Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 75-80 (Mar. 81 1978).
380. Objection was made also that the second part lacked clarity. March 7, 1978 Tran-
script, supra note 3, at 21-23.
TO BE LET ALONE
tional majority at that time, they were reconsidered. They passed
in January, 1978.
The December debate made it abundantly clear that both propos-
als were intended to give constitutional status to the open meetings
and public records statutes-including the judicial interpretations
of each. Commissioner Shevin offered an amendment to the open
meetings proposal, objecting that Proposal No. 137 applied only to
meetings "at which official acts are to be taken.""38 Under one inter-
pretation, elected officials could have "unofficial meetings," or
meetings of less than a quorum, without being subject to the open
meetings requirement. Commissioners Moyle and Douglass re-
sponded that the language of Proposal No. 137 was the language of
the present statute and that the intent was to carry with it the
existing judicial construction-which forbade the sort of subterfuge
Shevin feared. 2 With that assurance, Shevin withdrew his amend-
ment .
383
Commissioner Shevin also offered an amendment to allow the
legislature to exempt meetings only to "promote compelling and
governmental interests," rather than "to protect privacy or overrid-
ing governmental purposes." He feared that protection of privacy
was too broad and uncertain a criterion, one that might provide the
legislature too much discretion to close its meetings. Shevin's fears
were met by the objection that protection of privacy would not be
included in the category of "compelling and governmental inter-
ests." The amendment was defeated.8
The commission defeated an amendment which would have in-
cluded the judiciary in Proposal No. 137. The judicial branch of
government was left for separate treatment under Proposal No.
133 .3 Also defeated was an amendment proposed by Commissioner
Mathews to guarantee public access to meetings only "during good
behavior," in order expressly to allow expulsion of unruly specta-
tors.3 86 Opponents of the amendment believed reasonable limita-
tions were implicit in the committee proposal and feared "during
good behavior" could be given a more expansive reading than in-
tended.
381. December 8, 1977 Transcript, supra note 131, at 218.
382. Id. at 218-23; see id. at 205-06. The judicial construction of the open meetings law is
reviewed in section IVC(2) supra.
For a caveat indicating that the information placed before the voting public may be more
important in aid of judicial construction than the intent of the framers, see December 8, 1977
Transcript, supra note 131, at 224-26.
383. December 8, 1977 Transcript, supra note 131, at 223.
384. Id. at 226-29.
385. Id. at 229-37.
386. Id. at 209-16.
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Proposal No. 137 was thus put to a vote without amendment. It
failed to obtain the necessary majority in December but passed
easily on reconsideration in January, with little additional debate.,A
The discussion of Proposal No. 138, relating to public records,
developed along similar lines, with debate in both December and
January. The floor managers again made it clear that the intention
was to elevate the public records statute to constitutional status.M
As with the open meetings provision, the proposal would limit ex-
emptions to those necessary to protect privacy interests or overrid-
ing governmental purposes.
Existing statutory exemptions would not be "grandfathered" into
the constitutional provision. Rather, the legislature would be re-
quired to review the existing exemptions to assure that they met the
constitutional test .1 9 In order to facilitate the process, the commis-
sion approved a delayed effective date of June 1, 1979.390
As in the open meetings debate, an unsuccessful effort was made
to include the judiciary.39' Some commissioners opposed the mea-
sure because it applied to the legislature, a criticism intended also
for Proposal No. 137. The legislature has consistently taken the view
that the open meetings and public records laws apply only to the
executive branch, though Attorney General Shevin has published
opinions to the contrary. 2 Although legislative rules have opened
many records and meetings to the public, exemptions have been
created for legislative correspondence and work papers. Commis-
sioner Lew Brantley, president of the senate, candidly argued that,
with the passage of Proposal No. 138, pressure from the public and
the press would prevent enactment of exemptions for legislative
work product and correspondence, exemptions he believed vital."
Like the open meetings measure, the public records proposal did
not pass in December, but it received the requisite vote on recon-
sideration in January. As amended, the proposal was added to the
ballot .3,
387. Id. at 239; January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 79-81.
388. December 8, 1977 Transcript, supra note 131, at 240.
389. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 96-97. There were estimated to be in
excess of 100 exemptions. One witness before the Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee
put the figure at 160. October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at 4.
390. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 99-103.
391. Id. at 94-96.
392. 1977 FLA. Op. Arr'y GEN. 077-10; 1975 FLu. Op. Arr'y GEN. 075-282; 1972 FLA. Op.
ATr'y GEN. 072-16.
393. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 86-90, 97-98; December 8, 1977 Tran-
script, supra note 131, at 243-44.
394. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 104; December 8, 1977 Transcript, supra
note 131, at 246.
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3. Open judicial proceedings
The open government proposals discussed earlier pertained only
to the executive and legislative branches of government. The judi-
cial branch was singled out for treatment as a special case, though
the same basic principles were applied.
The Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee initially reported
Proposal 133 as part of its privacy and open government package.
Like Proposals 137 and 138, Proposal 133 contained a general state-
ment of public access to judicial proceedings and records and to
proceedings and records of judicial agencies. Exemptions could be
granted in order to protect privacy interests or overriding govern-
mental purposes. Although Proposals 137 and 138 allowed only leg-
islative exemptions, Proposal 133 allowed exemptions by supreme
court rule for judicial proceedings and records.
In the initial debate in December, 1977, Commissioner Moyle
explained the committee's views on Proposal 133. The committee
had wanted a specific provision governing the judiciary, lest the
other open government provisions, relating to nonjudicial bodies, be
thought to "impose some type of confidentiality or secrecy insofar
as the judiciary is concerned." ''9 Thus, as a general principle, pro-
ceedings would be open and accessible. Moyle suggested that rule-
making might be appropriate to allow closure of certain hearings to
the public, such as divorce cases. He also suggested that the su-
preme court could adopt rules leaving some discretion to trial judges
regarding closure in individual cases in which sufficient need was
shown.396
Commissioner Moyle explained the committee's view that the
term "judicial proceedings" in Proposal 133 did not include confer-
ences of appellate judges or deliberations of petit juries. 97 Proceed-
ings of the Judicial Qualifications Commission and Bar disciplinary
proceedings would be open unless action were taken by the legisla-
ture or by rule to close them."' However, when Commissioner Moyle
indicated the same would be true of grand jury proceedings, the
discussion came to an abrupt halt.3" The measure was referred back
to committee.' °°
After further work by a subcommittee headed by Commissioner
Overton, Proposal 133 re-emerged. As revised, it provided public
395. December 8, 1977 Transcript, supra note 131, at 120.
396. Id. at 121.
397. Id.; see section VB(4) supra. The uncorrected transcript consistently refers to
"appellate juries" rather than "petit juries."
398. December 8, 1977 Transcript, supra note 131, at 121.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 125.
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access to "all judicial hearings," rather than "all judicial proceed-
ings," and contained an express exemption for grand and petit ju-
ries.40' This version was adopted. 02 Though an intention was ex-
pressed also to include the Judicial Qualifications Commission and
the judicial nominating commissions in Proposal 133,403 ultimately
this idea was dropped. Article V, section 12(d), which provides for
confidentiality of Judicial Qualifications Commission proceedings
until charges are filed and public disclosure thereafter, was car-
ried forward intact. Article V, section 11, relating to judicial nomi-
nating commissions, was modified to declare a policy of public
access except insofar as the supreme court by rule exempts portions
of records or proceedings in order to protect privacy interests or
overriding governmental purposes.
VI. To BE LET ALONE: PROTECTING THE INDIVIDUAL
RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A. In General
Certain basic features about the right of privacy emerge from the
Constitution Revision Commission proceedings. The right is, to
begin with, a general right of privacy. The proposed constitution
declares, in article I: "SECTION 23. Right of Privacy.-Every natu-
ral person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided
herein.""'
This provision is a separate, freestanding constitutional section
which declares a fundamental right. The proceedings reveal it was
adopted in direct response to the United States Supreme Court's
challenge a decade ago in Katz v. United States: "the protection of
a person's general right to privacy-his right to be let alone by other
people-is, like the protection of his property and of his very life,
left largely to the law of the individual States.'
'40 5
The revision commission intended to create a strong privacy
right, and it chose appropriate means to achieve that intent. As a
separate constitutional section, privacy has equal dignity with other
fundamental rights. It does not engulf or erode other constitutional
rights, but neither is it inferior to them.
401. Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 143, 161 (Jan. 13, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
January 13, 1978 Transcript].
402. Id. at 166; Transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 4-5 (Jan. 24, 1978).
403. See January 13, 1978 Transcript, supra note 401, at 165-66 (Judicial Qualifications
Commission); id. at 160-62 (judicial nominating commissions).
404. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 23 (May 11, 1978).
405. 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
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Like every other state that has taken this step, Florida has cre-
ated the right of privacy in general terms, leaving precise definitions
to be developed through the familiar process of case-by-case adjudi-
cation. While this is consistent with Florida practice throughout the
declaration of rights, flexibility of definition is particularly impor-
tant in the case of privacy. As Warren and Brandeis said almost
ninety years ago, "Recent inventions and business methods call
attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection
of the person . . . . [N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to
make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall
be proclaimed from the house-tops.' "40 Just as flexibility of defini-
tion has permitted the fourth amendment to be interpreted so as to
deal with the technological changes that produced electronic sur-
veillance, so also a right of privacy requires flexibility of definition
if it is to remain viable in decades to come.107
In evaluating the proposed section 23, it is initially most useful
to review the measure phrase by phrase.
"Right of Privacy. "-The section begins with the caption, "Right
of Privacy." This is the only place that the word "privacy" is found
in the proposal. The word does not appear in the text of section 23,
though plainly the drafters considered that "the right to be let
alone" is synonymous. ' Indeed, as the quotation from Katz illus-
trates, the "right of privacy" and the "right to be let alone" have
been used interchangeably from the time of Warren and Brandeis'
article to the present. Section 23 thus invokes America's most his-
toric phrases in privacy law: Cooley's 1880 "right . . . to be let
alone"40 and Warren and Brandeis' 1890 "right to privacy."410
"Every natural person"-Section 23 declares that "every natural
person" enjoys the right to be let alone. The words were chosen to
make unmistakably clear that section 23 protects human individu-
als, not corporations or other entities. The right of privacy is de-
406. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 195 (footnote omitted).
407. See generally Packard, The Work on Man-Animals and Man-Computers, SATURDAY
REV., Aug. 20, 1977, at 46 (excerpt from V. PACKARD, THE PEOPLE SHAPERs (1977)).
408. The point is of some constitutional significance. The rules of construction in present
art. X, § 12 provide in part that "[titles and subtitles shall not be used in construction."
FIA. CONST. art. X, § 12(h) (carried forward as art. X, § il (g) of the proposed constitution).
Thus if the text of § 23 were deemed to create something other than a right of privacy, the
fact that the caption reads "right of privacy" would not save it. But the interchangeability
of the terms "right of privacy" and "right to be let alone" is so well-established in privacy
decisions and writings as not to admit of question on the subject.
409. T. CooLEY, supra note 12, at 29.
410. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 15, at 196. Warren and Brandeis referred to the "right
to privacy" rather than the synonymous "right of privacy." The Supreme Court in Griswold
adopted the latter phrase, and contemporary usage seems to have followed suit.
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signed to protect a fundamental aspect of human liberty. It is not
designed as a barrier to the regulation of economic activity."' Sec-
tion 23 is the only one of the several privacy provisions restricted to
natural persons.
412
"has the right to be let alone"-Standing alone, the phrase sug-
gests a complete immunity from interference, public or private. But
section 23 imposes a series of three further limitations.
"and free from governmental intrusion"-This phrase limits the
"right to be let alone" by indicating that section 23 operates only
against governmental intrusion." 3 As against the government, natu-
ral persons have a self-executing right of privacy. But section 23
does not apply to intrusions on privacy by private individuals or
businesses. The private sector will continue to be regulated by the
tort right of privacy and by statute, as in the past.
"into his private life"-The right of privacy does not confer a
complete immunity from governmental regulation. Rather, the pro-
tected zone consists of the private lives of natural persons. There
must be some reasonable expectation of privacy before the right will
attach, and by definition that which is knowingly exposed to the
public is not private. Although it may be reasonable to protect cer-
411. As Professor Kurland has so ably put it,
In the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, the concept of individuals
and individual freedom was perverted into a form of constitutional protection
against the regulation of corporate and organizational economic activities. It should
be clear that privacy is an individual's right and not that of a corporation, or a class,
or an association. When the affairs regulated are not those of individuals but those
of groups, the concern is not privacy. This is not, of course, to suggest that corpora-
tions, classes, organizations, and associations are not entitled to constitutional
protections, including certainly those of due process of law and freedom of speech
and press and political activities. It is simply to say that the right of privacy is
essentially the right of a person, an individual, a human being.
Kurland, The Private I, U. CHI. MAGAZINE, Autumn 1976, at 34.
412. This, too, was intentional. Thus art, I, § 12 protects the "private communications"
of corporations as well as individuals. Proposed art. I, §§ 24-25 and proposed art. V, §§ 1 &
11 allow confidentiality to protect "privacy interests," and those sections are not restricted
to the protection of natural persons. Thus the legislature (or the supreme court in art. V)
could, if it chose, enact measures to protect the privacy of corporations. Examples could
include protection of corporate tax returns, business secrets, and the like from public dis-
closure by state agencies. See, e.g., section IVC(1) supra.
413. Some difficulty arises from the use of the word "and" to introduce the phrase. Under
one reading, "and" means "in addition." Thus one has a "right to be let alone," and in
addition, a "right to be free from governmental intrusion." But such a reading renders the
section nonsensical. Section 23 declares "the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion," indicating it is only one right, not a series of rights, that is being described.
Moreover, if the first phrase stands by itself, there is an all-inclusive "right to be let alone,"
after which the right to be "free from governmental intrusion" is superfluous. Thus the only
construction which gives meaning to the section is to read it as the drafters intended-as a
limitation on the "right to be let alone." See generally Miami Shores Village v. Cowart, 108
So. 2d 468 (Fla. 1958).
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tain places presumptively, like the home, ultimately an expecta-
tion test must control. For example, plainly one yields privacy when
one invites strangers into the home to do business with them. 14 But
just as plainly, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy for some
activities in public places. One does not yield privacy when placing
a telephone call from a public telephone booth, for, upon closing the
door, one has a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusion
by the uninvited ear.4"5
"except as otherwise provided herein. "-This final limitation was
inserted to make clear that the right of privacy does not undercut
the constitutional provisions relating to financial disclosure, public
records, and open meetings."' The phrase is unnecessary, "7 for it is
merely declaratory of the doctrine that repeals by implication are
not favored and that constitutional provisions must be read to give
harmonious effect to each provision and to the constitution as a
whole. " ' The phrase was added for this limited purpose only. It
was not intended to create a general substantive test for balancing
governmental actions against individual claims of privacy."'
When one applies section 23 to specific factual situations, the
language of the privacy section itself suggests three basic inquiries.
First, there is a threshold question of whether the matter is within
414. See, e.g., State v. Roy, 510 P.2d 1066 (Hawaii 1973) (defendant invited a drug
informer into his home to make a sale). Even so, one does not yield all rights of privacy. See,
e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (alleged "quack" was recorded
and photographed in his own home by disguised reporters who then published the results;
held, privacy invaded).
415. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
416. Those are, respectively, present art. II, § 8, and proposed art. I, §§ 24-25.
417. The commission feared a "later-in-time" construction whereby § 23, having been
added to the constitution after the Sunshine Amendment, would be deemed by implication
to limit or repeal it. One can imagine such an argument being made if § 23 were added by
amendment, although it would be unlikely to succeed. The Sunshine Amendment is a very
detailed measure, and it would be difficult to construct a plausible argument for the repeal
by implication of any portion of it.
Any merit that a "later-in-time" argument has with regard to amendments disappears
entirely with regard to a complete constitutional revision. Obviously, if the commission had
wished to repeal or limit the Sunshine Amendment, it was at liberty to do so directly in art.
II, § 8. There was no necessity to do so indirectly through the addition of art. I, § 23.
It is virtually certain, however, that the addition of the phrase aided passage of § 23. During
the time of the commission deliberations, the appeal in Plante v. Gonzalez, 437 F. Supp. 536
(N.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, No. 77-3109 (5th Cir. June 30, 1978), was pending. There was acute,
though usually unspoken, awareness that a federal privacy argument was being marshalled
against the Sunshine Amendment. The additional phrase merely declared what should al-
ready have been clear: that § 23 would have no impact on art. II, § 8.
418. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 132 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1961); Gray v. Bryant,
125 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1960); State ex rel. McKay v. Keller, 191 So. 542 (Fla. 1939); State ex
rel. West v. Butler, 69 So. 771 (Fla. 1915).
419. See section VIB infra.
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the exclusion, "except as otherwise provided herein." Financial dis-
closure, open meetings, public records, free speech and press, and
unreasonable searches and seizures are all governed by other express
provisions of the constitution. Where those sections are implicated,
they control.
Second is the question of whether privacy is involved. Does the
alleged governmental intrusion invade "private life?" Is there a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy?
Third, does the governmental regulation or action constitute
"intrusion"? Or, if one assumes that all governmental regulation or
activity is in some sense an intrusion, what showing of public ne-
cessity is sufficient to justify it? In short, what standard of review
will be used to evaluate alleged intrusions on privacy, and on whom
does the burden of proof rest?
In the sections that follow, these questions will be explored. Be-
cause of its importance, the standard of review will be considered
first. Then follows a consideration of section 23 as applied to various
types of activity.
B. The First Priority: A Standard of Review
The most important single issue in the interpretation of the pro-
posed privacy right is a technical one: what standard of review will
be applied by Florida courts in construing it? All else depends on
the answer to this question. If the Florida Supreme Court adopts a
strong standard of review, it will require close judicial scrutiny when
individuals seek to protect their privacy from governmental action.
It will shift the burden of persuasion to the government. Such a test
would ensure a strong and viable right of privacy.
If, on the other hand, the Florida Supreme Court adopts a weak
standard of review, or worse, no explicit standard at all, then the
right of privacy will be just so much excess baggage in the Florida
Constitution. A weak standard of review would mean that the asser-
tion of virtually any governmental interest would override individ-
ual privacy rights. The failure to adopt an explicit standard of re-
view would create ad hoc decisionmaking whereby individual
judges would decide individual cases on their particular facts
through an unarticulated balancing process.
The root of this question lies in our custom, dictated to some
extent by necessity, of stating constitutional rights in absolute
terms. "The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
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not be infringed," says the Alaska Constitution.120 But plainly that
constitution does not mean what it says. Much governmental action
could be said in some sense to infringe privacy, and Alaska voters
clearly did not intend to terminate all government. The solution in
Alaska, and the custom generally in this country, has been to adopt
standards of review by which individual rights and governmental
interests are weighed. If the government can sustain a rather strin-
gent burden to demonstrate an important societal need and use of
the least intrusive means in achieving the goal, then the governmen-
tal activity is permitted to continue." In the federal courts, a "two-
tier" model of analysis has been adopted: the "compelling state
interest" test for fundamental rights and suspect classifications,
and the lesser "rational basis" requirement for all other constitu-
tional analysis.
2 2
To be sure, not all the Bill of Rights, nor all state constitutional
declarations, are written in absolute terms. The fourth amendment
prohibits only "unreasonable searches and seizures," thereby estab-
lishing "reasonableness" as the standard of review. The Montana
Constitution expresses the standard of review when it states that
privacy "shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.""' But in general it has been customary to describe
fundamental rights in absolute terms, and therein lies a source of
difficulty for modern constitutional revision. The desire for a high
degree of certainty about the scope of a fundamental right conflicts
with the constitutional imperatives of brevity and flexibility in the
statement of general principles.
That this problem is not unique to Florida is evident from a
review of constitution revision proceedings in other states. One
quickly falls prey to a feeling of ddjA vu, for many of the Florida
commissioners' concerns are mirrored in the proceedings of states
such as Montana, Hawaii, Illinois, and Louisiana, and in the gen-
eral election brochure for California's 1972 privacy amendment. 2' In
varying degrees the proceedings reveal the same conceptual diffi-
culties.
The heated debate over the wording of the Florida privacy section
stems primarily from uncertainty over these basic concepts, and
hence over the fundamental question of how Florida courts would
420. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22.
421. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
422. There is, however, some evidence of a possible federal shift to a "middle tier"
approach. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
423. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10.
424. See Toward a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 697-701, 710-11, 713-15, 718-20.
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interpret the constitutional privacy right. The effort to insert the
word "unwarranted" or "unreasonable" into the privacy section did
not stem from opposition to the protection of privacy. Rather, it
stemmed from an effort to insert a textual standard of review. The
proposed amendments were rejected primarily because they would
have anchored the privacy right to the weaker rational basis test.
Since the privacy section as adopted contains no textual standard
of review, the first task facing Florida courts is to identify the stan-
dard to be applied.
While the question is not entirely free from doubt, the available
evidence suggests that the Florida Supreme Court would employ the
compelling state interest test for the evaluation of governmental
actions affecting individual privacy. In so doing, Florida would fol-
low the practice of California, Montana, and the United States
Supreme Court. The only state with a strong right of privacy that
diverges from this pattern is Alaska, which has adopted its own
"means-ends" test as an intermediate form of scrutiny. 25 The First
District Court of Appeal in Byron Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Asso-
ciates, Inc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg decided that the Florida
Supreme Court would apply the compelling state interest stan-
dard. 2 Several Florida Supreme Court decisions point to the same
conclusion.
For example, the right of privacy was at issue in Laird v. State.'2
There, the. Florida Supreme Court considered a challenge to the
possession-of-marijuana law as applied to possession in the home for
personal consumption. The court analyzed the federal right of pri-
vacy and concluded it did not apply. The court distinguished
Alaska's Ravin v. State,2 1 saying Ravin rested on a state constitu-
tional provision having no counterpart in Florida. The court contin-
ued:
The record before us is simply inadequate to support a determina-
tion of whether the health hazards of smoking marijuana justify its
proscription to the general public. None of the parties really
argued whether the legislature lacks a 'rational basis' for its deci-
sion to ban private possession of cannabis. (Since we have deter-
mined that there is no fundamental right to smoke marijuana, the
test becomes whether there is a 'rational basis' for outlawing such
an activity as opposed to a 'compelling state interest' in the subject
matter of the legislation.) Thus in affirming the trial court, we do
425. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
426. No. DD-30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 1978).
427. 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977).
428. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
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not foreclose the possibility of making such a determination on a
properly-developed record wherein both sides have had an oppor-
tunity to present evidence of competing expert authorities before
an impartial tribunal.""
The conclusion seems inescapable that the federal two-tier model
is to be used for state, as well as federal, constitutional analysis. If
this reading is correct, then the compelling state interest standard
would be applied wherever rights of privacy are involved.
While Byron Harless did not rely on Laird, it did rely on two
recent Florida privacy cases. In Re Grand Jury Investigation (Cobo)
considered privacy in the context of wiretapping.13 ' The court noted
that the Florida wiretap law "is a statutory exception [sic] to the
constitutional (federal and state) right to privacy. Therefore, as an
exception [sic] to a constitutional right it must be strictly con-
strued and narrowly limited in application to the uses delineated
by the Florida Legislature. '43' Similarly, in Hagaman v. Andrews,
the Florida Supreme Court considered a claim by the so-called Gov-
ernor's Club that legislative efforts to obtain disclosure of its mem-
bership infringed associational privacy under the federal and state
constitutions.' 3 The court said:
The interest of the Appellants in their associational privacy hav-
ing been asserted, we have for decision the question of whether the
public interest overbalances conflicting private ones ...
We cannot simply assume .. .that every legislative investiga-
tion is justified by a public need that overbalances any private
rights affected. To do so would be to abrogate the responsibility
placed by the Constitution upon the Judiciary to insure that the
Legislature does not unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's
right to privacy nor abridge his liberty, his speech, or assem-
bly ....
[The giving of funds by individuals of wealth and by private
associations to enforce some particular law or group of laws, which
they single out from the great body of the statutes, is shocking to
the law-abiding, public-spirited citizen. This is a subject of
429. 342 So. 2d at 965 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
430. 287 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 1973).
431. Id. at 47, cited in Byron Harless, slip op. at 24.
432. 232 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1970). The federal associational privacy claim rested, as is custom-
ary, on the first amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Interest-
ingly, the state constitutional claim of associational privacy did not rest on the state free
speech counterpart, art. I, § 4. Instead, it rested on art. I, § 12, presumably that portion
relating to unreasonable interception of private communications.
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overriding and compelling state interest which may require legis-
lative prohibition or regulation after an appropriate investigation
433
Thus, although there are not many Florida constitutional privacy
cases, the cases available point to the compelling state interest stan-
dard. 34 This is consistent with the intent of the revision commis-
sion, which rejected amendments it believed would invite the courts
to weaken the constitutional measure. By placing the right of pri-
vacy in a separate constitutional section, the commission sought to
create a privacy right of equal strength and dignity with other con-
stitutional rights. In taking this approach, the commission was sup-
ported by earlier Florida constitutional precedent: "Every particu-
lar section of the Declaration of Rights stands on an equal footing
with every other section. 4 5
At a minimum, then, the section 23 right of privacy would elicit
the same level of scrutiny as that required for other fundamental
rights.43 1 If the Florida Supreme Court chose, as Alaska has done,
to articulate its own unique standard of review for fundamental
rights, then that standard would need to be applied uniformly,
rather than to section 23 alone.
4 7
The foregoing represents a straightforward and conventional con-
stitutional analysis. A word should be said, however, about two
other alternatives, both of which are potentially disastrous. One
alternative is to hinge constitutional analysis on construction of the
word "intrusion." It would be simplicity itself for courts to engage
433. 232 So. 2d at 7-9, quoted in Byron Harless, slip op. at 24-25 (emphasis added). While
the passage seems to apply the compelling interest standard to federal and state privacy
issues, some uncertainty is created because the state privacy issue was raised under art. I, §
12, which is governed by the "reasonableness" standard.
434. This statement must be made with something less than absolute certainty because
in each of the cited cases the state constitutional right of privacy was considered in tandem
with the federal constitutional right. It is doubtful whether adoption of a differing standard
of state constitutional review would have led to a different result in any of those cases. Under
the new privacy section, however, the court would have to decide whether the compelling
state interest standard-or some other standard-would be followed.
435. Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d 536, 552-53 (Fla. 1953) (en banc).
436. An exception would be required for those cases in which the text of the fundamental
right contained its own standard of review, such as art. I, § 12.
437. The case for state independence of approach has-been well made in Brennan, State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977). See also
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L.
REv. 873 (1976).
The proposed constitution adopts this philosophy through a declaration of state constitu-
tional independence. Proposed art. I, § 1 provides in part: "Rights guaranteed by this consti-
tution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. "Fla.
C.R.C., Rev: Fla. Const. art. I, § 1 (May 11, 1978).
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in an unarticulated process of balancing, followed by use of the
appropriate label. If the governmental activity in question were
deemed socially desirable, the court could simply deem it not to be
an "intrusion." But if the activity were deemed improper, it would
be condemned as an "intrusion."
The mischief in the labelling approach is that the game can be
played without articulating any standards whatsoever. Particular
cases could be decided on particular facts, according to the often
unspoken assumptions and value judgments of the decisionmakers,
in a standardless process of balancing. True, the application of all
standards of review involves the weighing of competing social inter-
ests. But the crucial point is that the standard of review should
reveal, not conceal, the process by which these judgments are made.
This is not to say that the word "intrusion" is without meaning.
There is a threshold requirement that government activity intrude,
in some commonly understood meaning of the word, on private life,
before the right of privacy becomes operative. The language would
certainly support the notion that minimal effects on privacy are not
an "intrusion" within the meaning of the constitution. But the word
"intrusion," without more, does not establish a constitutional stan-
dard of review.
Another potentially disastrous approach is analysis by exclusion.
The privacy section ends with the phrase "except as otherwise pro-
vided herein." This phrase could be taken to have another meaning,
apart from its intended purpose of sustaining open government. The
phrase could be read to indicate that the right to be let alone is
absolute-except when governmental action is authorized by some
other constitutional section. Under this approach, one seeks to jus-
tify governmental activity by ransacking the constitution for an-
other controlling section. If some other constitutional provision ap-
plies, it prevails.
The danger in this approach is twofold. First, such an approach
was never intended. There was no systematic review of the constitu-
tion to determine whether this novel brand of exegesis would strike
the proper balance between individual privacy and vital govern-
mental functions. Such an approach would, in all likelihood, create
distorted constitutional analysis and totally unanticipated results.
While there was an intention that the privacy section not repeal by
implication other constitutional sections, there was no intention
that "except as otherwise provided herein" should become the stan-
dard of review for constitutional analysis.
Second, an "except as otherwise provided herein" analysis, like
the "labelling" approach, is susceptible of great abuse. The consti-
tution contains broad, undefined grants of power to the three
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branches of government. Article III, section 1 commits "the legisla-
tive power" to the legislature, while article IV, section 1 vests "the
supreme executive power" in the Governor, and article V, section 1
places "the judicial power" in the supreme court and named inferior
courts. Nowhere are these powers defined.
If, in order to sustain a governmental regulation or activity, it is
necessary to find a constitutional source "otherwise provided
herein," the analysis then could be made to focus on the content of
those broad grants of power. As with the labelling approach, noth-
ing would prevent a process of unarticulated balancing, followed by
the announcement that the governmental activity either was, or was
not, within the legislative, or executive, or judicial power. The mis-
chief, once again, is that such an approach can be followed without
articulation and application of specific standards.
It follows, therefore, that the analytical approach for construction
of the right of privacy should be the same analysis that is applied
to other fundamental state constitutional rights, rather than a tex-
tual interpretation of the privacy section itself. Moreover, that anal-
ysis should begin with expression of the relevant standard of review,
with clearly stated criteria for guidance of counsel and courts. Once
the standard of review is established, all else follows, for courts and
counsel are then able to develop a proper record in individual cases
and apply the relevant constitutional tests accordingly.
For the remainder of this analysis, the compelling state interest
test will be taken as the appropriate standard. That test shifts the
burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The
burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged regulation
serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through
the use of the "least intrusive means. 4 31 The latter requirement
assures that an otherwise necessary state activity does not sweep too
broadly into private affairs.
C. As Applied
The previous sections have outlined general principles of privacy.
The question remains: what impact would the new section have on
Florida privacy law? The following analysis is designed to answer
that question and to identify areas of uncertainty. 39
1. The Private Sector
The section 23 right of privacy operates only against governmen-
438. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 631-32 (1978); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
439. This section is organized generally to parallel section IV supra, relating to the Florida
law of privacy.
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tal action, not against action by the private sector. This is clear from
the language of the section itself and also from the revision commis-
sion's proceedings. The private sector will continue to be regulated
by statute and by court decision as the tort law of privacy continues
to evolve.
a. The Invasion of Privacy Tort
Section 23 would neither expand nor reduce the scope of the exist-
ing invasion of privacy tort. The much-debated decision in Florida
Publishing Co. v. Fletcher would not be affected, for there was no
governmental action in that case. " '
b. The Press
As a part of the private sector, the press would not be affected by
the section-23 right of privacy. The tort right of privacy would con-
tinue to be applicable to the press.
c. Depositor Records
Section 23 is likely to afford new protection for depositor records
when access is sought by governmental agencies or private persons
engaged in civil litigation. Section 23 would be applicable to these
two special cases because both involve governmental action: the
government agency seeks the records directly, or private individuals
invoke the aid of a court-a governmental entity-in order to obtain
them. The topic is considered in more detail below.
d. Other Statutory Regulations
Existing statutes relating to collection practices, consumer credit,
and medical records would endure since these statutes generally
regulate private behavior where governmental action is not in-
volved. Similarly, if additional steps are to be taken to protect indi-
vidual privacy from intrusion by the private sector, action by the
legislature or by the courts under the rubric of the invasion of pri-
vacy tort will be required.
2. The Right to Know
The revision proposal constitutes a very substantial strengthening
of the public right to know. Here the language "except as otherwise
provided herein" comes into play, since the public right to know is
governed by the provisions relating to public records, open meet-
ings, open judicial proceedings, and financial disclosure.',
There are several major contributions to the public right to know.
440. 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977). The fact that the re-
porter in that case accompanied the fire marshal onto burned-out premises is of no signifi-
cance, for he did not enter under color of the fire marshal's authority. Rather, the court
ruled, entry was by virtue of the landowner's consent implied through custom and usage.
441. Article I, §§ 24-25, and art. V, §§ 1 & 11 of the proposed constitution, and art. H1,
§ 8 of the present constitution.
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First, the revision proposal would cover all three branches of govern-
ment. At present only the executive branch is undisputedly covered
by open government legislation. The legislative branch has consis-
tently argued that it is exempt from the open meetings and public
records laws; those laws do not cover the judiciary at all. The revi-
sion would clearly include all three.
Second, the revision limits the ability of the legislature and the
courts to make exceptions to the general policy of openness. At
present the public records and open meetings laws can be amended
for any reason the legislature deems sufficient. The judiciary may
do likewise through court rulemaking. Under the constitutional
revision proposal, records or meetings may be exempted only by
rule or general law, and then only "when it is essential to accomplish
overriding governmental purposes or to protect privacy interests."
If legislative or judicial exceptions did not meet the criteria, they
would be void. Thus, for the first time, judicial review of legislative
exceptions would be possible.
Third, the basic policy declarations for public records, open meet-
ings, and open judicial proceedings are not subject to modification.
At present, public access is guaranteed by statute, which could be
changed. Under the revision proposal, the principles of open govern-
ment would be given constitutional status, thus insulating them
from legislative change. The legislature and the judiciary are given
limited roles in creating needed exceptions but are not at liberty to
repeal the basic principles or make unlimited exceptions.
Fourth, the constitutional revision proposal applies to all existing
exemptions; no exemptions have been "grandfathered in." Thus,
on the effective dates of the respective sections, "2 any nonconform-
ing laws would automatically be voided.
With that general outline, somewhat greater detail follows:
a. Public Records
Proposed article I, section 24 would guarantee public access to the
records of the executive and legislative branches of government. It
would elevate to constitutional status the language of the existing
public records law. The commission intended that the existing judi-
cial interpretation of the law be carried forward intact,"3 and there
is Florida authority for doing so. "4 However, insertion of the word
442. Proposed art. I, § 24 has a special effective date of June 1, 1979. Present art. II, § 8
remains continuously in effect. The other sections take effect on the general effective date
for the revision.
443. See section V supra.
444. See, e.g., Dornau v. State, 306 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1011 (1975). See generally Greater Loretta Improvement Ass'n v. State ex rel. Boone,
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"nonjudicial" in section 24 removes all doubt that the legislative
branch is covered, for plainly the legislature is included in the
phrase, "any nonjudicial public officer or employee."
Like its companion measures, section 24 permits exceptions to be
made by the legislature, but the legislature is limited in two ways.
First, exceptions must be made by general law rather than by ob-
scure special laws. Second, exceptions may be made only "when it
is essential to accomplish overriding governmental purposes or to
protect privacy interests." The use of the word "essential" suggests
that the burden of proof would be on the state to demonstrate the
validity of any exceptions.
The use of the phrase "overriding governmental purposes" is used
in recognition of the fact that confidentiality sometimes is in the
public interest, even though there is no issue of individual privacy.
Examples include the confidentiality of civil service examinations
and competitive bids prior to bid opening.
The phrase "privacy interests" differs from the language used in
the section 23 right of privacy and is intended to be read more
broadly. While section 23 is restricted to natural persons, section 24
and the other open government sections contain no such restriction.
Thus, if the legislature deemed it desirable, it could continue some
of the present exemptions designed to protect what might be called
"business privacy." Examples include the confidentiality of corpo-
rate income tax returns and information gathered in connection
with economic development or regulation."5
Section 24 contains a delayed effective date, which might be char-
acterized as an "action-forcing" provision. Section 24, like its com-
panion provisions, contains no grandfather clause to preserve exist-
ing statutory exemptions which violate the new criteria. The propo-
nent of the "action-forcing" provision argued that some of the nu-
merous existing exemptions might not be justified."' Thus, rather
than wait for challenges in individual cases, the commission ap-
proved a delayed effective date of June 1, 1979, in order to provide
both an opportunity and a mandate for legislative review of all
existing exemptions. In this sense, the provision is action-forcing. If
the legislature failed to assure that existing statutes conform to
section 24, there would be a risk of piecemeal invalidation. Thus, if
the proposed constitution is ratified, review of existing confidential-
ity statutes will be a major priority in the 1979 legislature.
234 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1970); Hayek v. Lee County, 231 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 1970); Ammerman v.
Markham, 222 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1969).
445. See section IVC(1) supra.
446. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 96-97, 99-103.
1978]
754 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:671
One area of uncertainty is whether the judiciary would have the
power, under the revision, to create exceptions to the public records
section. This question involves not only interpretation of section 24,
but also its relationship to the section 23 right of privacy.
Section 24 states that the legislature may make exemptions by
general law; it does not provide for exemptions from any other
source. But the commission debates make it clear that the intention
was to elevate the existing public records law to constitutional sta-
tus, including existing judicial interpretations. It was settled under
pre-1975 law that the courts could create public policy exceptions
to the public records law, even though the statute contained no
express authorization to do so.
Some uncertainty is created, however, because the law was
amended in 1975. And the amended statute does not declare that
judicial exceptions are forbidden, nor is it plain on the face of the
statute that such was the intent. " 7 One district court of appeal has
concluded that the legislative history reveals an intention to elimi-
nate judicial power to create exemptions. " ' On the other hand, the
Florida Supreme Court in News-Press Publishing Co. v. Wisher, a
post-1975 decision, assumed that it did have such power. "' It is not
clear what weight should be given Wisher, for the case arose under
pre-1975 law. If the power to create judicial exemptions survived the
1975 amendments, that power would be carried into the constitution
when the existing statute is elevated to constitutional status. Con-
versely, if the district court of appeal is correct, the judicial exemp-
tion power did not survive. The question must be regarded as an
open one.
There is another line of inquiry: whether sections 23 and 24 them-
selves reflect an intent to grant or deny the judiciary the power to
create judicial exemptions. Section 24 provides: "The legislature
may exempt records by general law when it is essential to accom-
plish overriding governmental purposes or to protect privacy
447. The pre-1975 version provided: "All public records which presently are deemed by
law to be confidential or which are prohibited from being inspected by the public, whether
provided by general or special acts of the legislature or which may hereafter be so provided,
shall be exempt from the provisions of this section." Act of May 31, 1967, ch. 67-125, § 7,
1967 Fla. Laws 257.
The 1975 version provided: "All public records which presently are provided by law to be
confidential or which are prohibited from being inspected by the public, whether by general
or special law, shall be exempt from the provisions of subsection (1)." Act of June 27, 1975,
ch. 75-225, § 4, 1975 Fla. Laws 638.
448. State ex rel. Veale v. City of Boca Raton, 353 So. 2d 1194 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
449. 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977).
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interests.' 50 This sentence can be read to make the legislature the
sole source of exemptions, or it can be read simply to impose a
limitation on legislative power. The existing statute makes records
exempt "which presently are provided by law to be confidential or
which are prohibited from being inspected by the public, whether
by general or special law . . . . 45 The existing statute allows ex-
emptions by general or special law for any purpose which the legisla-
ture deems appropriate. Section 24 limits legislative power to gen-
eral laws and to the categories of "overriding governmental pur-
poses" and "privacy interests." Under the latter reading, the second
sentence in section 24 was intended as a limitation on legislative
power but was not intended as a limitation on judicial power to
create exemptions.
The Constitution Revision Commission proceedings are not en-
lightening on this point. The author raised the question briefly as
part of a discussion before the Ethics, Privacy and Elections Com-
mittee,'52 but the point was never addressed by the committee or the
commission as a whole.
The question becomes significant when sections 23 and 24 inter-
act. In the usual case, the legislature will have conferred confiden-
tiality on private information collected by public agencies. Cer-
tainly most of the existing exemptions from the public records law
were enacted to protect individual privacy.
53
But suppose the legislature has not acted. To pose one actual
example, several years ago the Florida Division of Youth Services,
the state juvenile correctional agency, operated under authority of
chapter 959, Florida Statutes, which had been comprehensively re-
vised in the 1969 legislative session.'54 Purely through oversight, no
one thought to insert a provision on confidentiality of records. Thus,
individual case files, which contained psychological and psychiatric
information, as well as the most intimate information about home
and family life, were public records, though the agency blissfully
continued its longstanding practice of treating the records as highly
confidential. When the true situation was discovered, the agency
secured corrective legislation.
55
Fortunately, in the example given, no one sought general access
to peruse case files at will. If someone had done so, judicial relief
450. Fla. C.R.C., Rev. Fla. Const. art. I, § 24 (May 11, 1978).
451. FLA. STAT. § 119.07(2)(a) (1977).
452. October 14 Minutes, supra note 306, at 3.
453. See section IVC(1) supra.
454. Ch. 69-365, 1969 Fla. Laws 1279.
455. Ch. 72-179, 1972 Fla. Laws 559.
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could have been sought. The records in question were a logical sub-
ject for a judically created exemption. ' But assume that the same
scenario occurred under the proposed constitutional revision. Would
the judiciary have the power to make particular records confidential
in order to protect individual privacy? Or, phrased differently,
would the judiciary have the power to protect the privacy of records
when the legislature had failed to do so?
The question admits of no easy answer. Of course, if it is deter-
mined that the power to create judicial exceptions was imported
into section 24 from the statute, then a judicial remedy is possible.
But the more fundamental question is whether the constitutional
scheme permits or demands judicial action. At issue is the vexing
question of how to strike the balance between the individual right
of privacy and the public right to know.
One answer would be as follows: Section 23 declares the right to
be let alone and free from governmental intrusion into one's private
life. That is a fundamental right, which can be infringed only in
order to accomplish a compelling state interest. In the example
given, surely there is a compelling state interest in the operation of
the juvenile correctional system which, of necessity, must collect
highly personal information. But, in infringing the fundamental
right of privacy, the government must also use the least intrusive
means. In the example given, it is this aspect of the test that the
government fails. The least intrusive means are not employed when
private information is placed in public files, absent good reason for
doing so. In the example given, no reason exists for public disclosure
of individual case files.1
57
Under this analysis, the statutory scheme violates the section 23
right of privacy. The question then becomes one of what remedy to
use. One possibility is to declare the individual case files, or sensi-
tive portions thereof, confidential. Some other possibilities are con-
sidered in the next section, including expungement, return of the
records to the individual citizen, or an injunction against collecting
private information in the first place. In the example given, the
latter possibilities seem unsuitable. Plainly, the most effective rem-
edy would be the creation of a judicial exemption.
The question may be put another way. Suppose the legislature
456. In the example given, some of the records probably would have qualified for exemp-
tion as medical records or juvenile court records. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.12, 458.16 (1977). Even
so, the majority of each case file, including the majority of the clearly private information,
would not have fit within existing exemptions.
457. This discussion applies only to individual case files. All other records pertaining to
the agency operations are open to public inspection.
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chose to repeal all exemptions in section 24. Thus, every public
record of whatever description, from tax returns to mental hospital
case histories, would be open to inspection. Would the courts then
have the power to declare private information confidential? Or is
the legislature's unreviewed judgment under section 24 dispositive?
Sections 23 and 24 should be read together to give harmonious
effect to the whole of the constitution. Section 23 confers a right to
be let alone. Section 24 declares the right to know and places pri-
mary responsibility in the legislature to protect individual privacy
and overriding governmental purposes. But where the legislature
has failed to act, yet privacy is clearly and unnecessarily infringed,
the judiciary retains power under section 23 to declare records confi-
dential. Under this view, the second sentence of section 24 should
be read as a limitation on the power of the legislature rather than
as an intention to exclude judicial exemptions. This approach would
allow vital governmental functions to continue without the necess-
ity of declaring an entire statutory scheme unconstitutional, an al-
ternative to be considered later.
This question is highly debatable. A very respectable argument
can be made that only the legislature may create exemptions under
section 24. With this view, whatever is placed in government files
is public, absent a general law creating an exemption. If this view
is taken, the section 23 right of privacy comes into play in the crucial
preliminary question of what information is placed in government
files in the first instance.
b. Open Meetings
The foregoing analysis applies in almost identical fashion to arti-
cle I, section 25, relating to open meetings. The primary difference
is that Section 25 carries no delayed effective date. Thus, on the
general effective date for the constitutional revision, section 25
would be fully applicable. At that time, existing exemptions from
the general policy of public access would need to meet the constitu-
tional criteria of being "essential to accomplish overriding govern-
mental purposes or to protect privacy interests." Any exemptions
not meeting the test would be void.
c. Open Judicial Proceedings
The preceding observations substantially apply to proposed arti-
cle V, sections 1 and 11, relating to the judicial branch. The consti-
tutional right of access extends to judicial hearings and records,
thus excluding conferences of appellate judges. The proposal ex-
pressly exempts grand and petit jury proceedings from public ac-
cess. The proceedings and records of judicial agencies are, like exec-
utive branch agencies, open unless made confidential. The Judicial
Qualifications Commission continues to be regulated by article V,
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section 12, providing for confidentiality up to the point of finding
probable cause and filing charges.
Article V, section 1 allows for exemptions by supreme court rule
or general law; section 11, relating to the judicial nominating com-
missions, allows for exemptions by supreme court rule only. Like the
other open government provisions, sections 1 and 11 restrict exemp-
tions to those "essential to accomplish overriding governmental pur-
poses or to protect privacy interests." This represents a reduction
in judicial discretion in this area. Presently, Florida courts maintain
that they have inherent power to regulate their proceedings, includ-
ing the power to close hearings and records. Under the proposed
revision, section 1 restricts judicial discretion in two ways. First,
exemptions can be made only if they meet the constitutional cri-
teria. Second, judicial exemptions must be made by supreme court
rule. Thus, trial judges would need to act pursuant to a rule or
statute before closing a hearing or record.
The proposal also would increase the legislative role in the pro-
cess. The legislature is expressly authorized to enact statutes on the
subject. At present, some statutes, such as those relating to closure
of hearings in adoption cases, have been honored by the courts. But
others, such as those relating to expungement of arrest records, have
been invalidated as infringing on the inherent power of the courts
to supervise their own proceedings.45 8 Under the revision commis-
sion's proposal, such legislative enactments would be valid.
The legislative role also would be increased because of the re-
quirement in section 1 that exemptions be made by supreme court
rule or general law. Since article V, section 2(a) provides for repeal
of a supreme court rule by two-thirds vote of the legislature, judicial
exemptions would be made subject to a "check and balance" in the
legislature.
d. Financial Disclosure; Public Officials Generally
Financial disclosure will continue to be regulated by the Sunshine
Amendment, article I, section 8, which would be renumbered as
section 7 in the proposed constitution. Like the other open govern-
ment measures, the Sunshine Amendment provides a legislative
role, for the meaning of the constitutional phrase "full and public
disclosure" of financial interests is subject to definition and modifi-
cation by the legislature. The section 23 right of privacy would have
no impact on the Sunshine Amendment.
In addition to financial disclosure, recent controversy has sur-
rounded the question of closure of divorce proceedings of public
458. See section IVD(2) supra.
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officials or public figures. 5 Under the proposed revision, those ques-
tions would be dealt with in the framework of article V, section 1.
There would need to be either a legislative enactment or a rule
authorizing closure; otherwise the proceeding would be open.
3. Privacy and Governmental Snooping
The previous sections assumed that information has been col-
lected by the government for a legitimate purpose and that the
information collected is reasonably necessary for that purpose. The
proposed constitutional revision contemplates that such informa-
tion will be made public unless proper action is taken to make it
confidential.
But two questions arise. First is the question of whether govern-
ment may gather information which is not needed for a legitimate
governmental purpose. The answer seems clear. If the section 23
right of privacy means anything, it must mean that government
cannot compile dossiers on citizens without justification, engage in
unauthorized surveillance, or collect private information unneces-
sarily for placement in agency files, whether or not open to the
public.
One example of such intrusion was examined in White v. Davis,
a California privacy case. 60 There it was alleged that police officers
had posed as university students, enrolled in classes, compiled intel-
ligence reports about class discussions, and then turned the reports
over to the police department. The California Supreme Court had
no difficulty concluding that such a complaint made out a prima
facie violation of the state constitutional right of privacy. During the
Florida Constitution Revision Commission deliberations, Commis-
sioner Lew Brantley focused on this type of threat to privacy, cit-
ing a senate investigation of information-gathering practices in a
Florida law enforcement agency.' 1
Another example of intrusive information gathering is Byron
Harless. 11 2 Although the First District Court of Appeal endorsed the
use of the psychological screening methods at issue there, it is diffi-
cult to imagine a greater or more improper intrusion of privacy. Not
only was the information of the most personal kind, but it had no
arguable relevance to the applicant's ability to manage a major
459. See sections IVC(3) and IVD(3) supra.
460. 533 P.2d 222 (Cal. 1975).
461. January 9, 1978 Transcript, supra note 3, at 54-60.
462. Byron Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, No. DD-
30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 1978); see section IVF(3) supra.
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electric utility. Plainly the section 23 right to be let alone should
prevent this type of inquiry as a condition for public employment.
One result of adoption of section 23 should be the imposition of
limits on the authority of the government to extract personal infor-
mation. Information sought should be reasonably necessary to a
legitimate government purpose, and the burden of demonstrating
necessity should be on the agency. Personal information should not
be sought if some less intrusive alternative would suffice.
If an agency seeks private information improperly, the appropri-
ate remedy would be injunctive in nature. If, as in Byron Harless,
the agency had already collected the information, the remedy would
be either complete expungement or return of all records to the indi-
vidual. Certainly it would be proper to make interim arrangements
to preserve confidentiality during the pendency of the litigation,
such as delivery of the documents to the clerk of the court to be kept
in sealed files. It would not be proper, however, to reach the Byron
Harless result, that is, to permit the agency to retain unnecessarily
intrusive information but order that the files be nonpublic. The
retention and use of such information would violate the right of
privacy even if kept in confidential files.
The second question which arises has been explored to some ex-
tent in an earlier section. Assume that a government agency seeks
private information for which there is a legitimate public purpose
and for which there is no alternative. Assume further that the
agency is acting pursuant to statutory authority but that the legisla-
ture has not made the information confidential. In an earlier sec-
tion, we considered whether this information could be made confi-
dential once placed in government files. But could production of
this information be resisted under section 23 on the ground that the
government may not compel production of highly private informa-
tion without making suitable arrangements for confidentiality?
Consider a variation on Whalen v. Roe. '63 Suppose the legislature
enacted a statute requiring pharmacists to file with a state agency
a copy of each prescription for an addictive drug for entry into a
central computer bank. The avowed purpose is to detect illicit drug
sales and use, a legitimate state purpose. Suppose that, unlike
Whalen, the records are to be entered in public files, with no provi-
sion for confidentiality. Could the pharmacists and patients block
collection of the information on the theory that it infringed individ-
ual privacy?
463. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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This writer's answer would be in the affirmative. The government
may intrude on privacy in order to accomplish a compelling state
interest, and here the interest in enforcing the criminal law could
be deemed compelling. But the government must also use the least
intrusive means in infringing a fundamental right, and it is this
aspect of the test that the government would fail. The collection of
highly sensitive medical information is not accomplished by the
least intrusive means when it is placed in a central data bank acces-
sible to the general public.
The question then becomes one of remedy. One alternative is to
declare confidential those records which, if unnecessarily disclosed,
would invade privacy. Whether this remedy is available depends on
the interpretation given section 24.464
But even if that remedy is not possible, several other alternatives
are available. If the statutory scheme is unconstitutional and the
courts are unable to save it by declaring the necessary records confi-
dential, it follows that the entire statutory scheme is void. The
government may not collect new information and must return that
information it has already obtained. The remedies would be in the
nature of injunction or prohibition, as well as expungement or re-
turn of property.
The government would then have a choice. It could abandon its
plans altogether, or it could reenact the statutory scheme with suit-
able provisions for protection of the section 23 right of privacy. In
essence, section 23 establishes a quid pro quo. The government may
intrude on privacy to accomplish a compelling state interest-but
only if it minimizes the intrusion through confidentiality arrange-
ments to protect individual privacy.
The rule would naturally be otherwise if public disclosure were
essential to effectuate the statutory scheme. An obvious example is
financial disclosure for public officials. Even in the absence of a
constitutional measure like the Sunshine Amendment, there is ar-
guably a compelling state interest in financial disclosure.4" In order
to achieve its purpose, financial disclosure must be public. Disclo-
sure into confidential files would not suffice since the purpose of
disclosure is to permit the public to detect and evaluate actual or
potential conflicts of interest.
A further example may be considered. In the scenario considered
above, a public agency seeks to place private information in public
files when it is not necessary to do so. However, it is also possible
464. See section VIC(2)(a) supra.
465. See Goldtrap v. Askew, 334 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1976); section IVC(3) supra.
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that a public agency would place private information in confidential
files but allow unnecessarily broad access to the supposedly re-
stricted files. This was the situation in Merriken v. Cressman, in
which a school district had administered psychological question-
naires to all eighth graders in an attempt to identify potential drug
abusers. ' The results were to be placed in a massive data bank,
easily accessible to a wide variety of personnel throughout the school
system. The federal district court concluded that the project in-
vaded the right of privacy. It seems plain that the section 23 right
of privacy would apply to cases such as Merriken. This, once again,
would offend the "least intrusive means" aspect of the compelling
state interest test.
One final question may be considered. Suppose in Merriken strin-
gent security precautions had been taken. Would the collection of
such data nonetheless violate the right of privacy? The answer to
the question depends, once again, on application of the compelling
state interest test. While the state may have a compelling interest
in the prevention of drug abuse, it does not follow that all things
done for that purpose are permissible. In the example given, con-
structing a psychological profile of every eighth grader in the school
district, labelling some with the undefined term "potential drug
abuser," and referring them to compulsory treatment programs,
must be considered an astonishing and massive intrusion on pri-
vacy. Plainly there is not a compelling state interest in the imple-
mentation of such a program. Alternatively, the means chosen can
hardly be deemed the least intrusive way to achieve the permissible
goal of preventing drug abuse. Erecting a shield of confidentiality
should not save governmental information-gathering when there is
no sufficient reason for the government to collect the information.
4. Privacy in the Judicial Process
The constitutional revision proposal would have a definite impact
on several aspects of privacy in the judicial system.
a. Discovery
As suggested earlier, there is great concern over access to individ-
ual depositor records in banks and other financial institutions. 7
The United States Supreme Court has taken the view that depositor
records are business records of the bank. Thus, an agency or a civil
litigant may obtain access directly from the bank, without notifica-
tion to the depositor or opportunity for the depositor to intervene
or object.
466. 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973); see Toward A Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at
640-42.
467. See sections IVB(3), VIC(I)(c) supra.
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California's constitutional right of privacy has brought about a
change in that rule as a matter of state constitutional law. In Valley
Bank v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court held that the
right of privacy protects one's confidential financial affairs.6 8 The
court balanced the civil litigant's need for discovery against the
right of privacy and concluded that neither could prevail absolutely.
Rather, when customer information is sought, "the bank must take
reasonable steps to notify its customer . . . and to afford the cus-
tomer a fair opportunity to assert his interests . . ."I" Protective
orders could be fashioned where necessary to protect the privacy of
records ordered to be disclosed. The California Supreme Court
reached a similar result regarding criminal investigations with its
interpretation of the state search-and-seizure clause. 7 '
The section 23 right of privacy should produce similar applica-
tions in Florida. This would provide greater privacy in banking
records than now exists but would not create an absolute barrier to
civil discovery or agency investigations. The issue arises when dis-
covery is sought from third persons who are not parties or when an
agency is in the investigation phase prior to commencing proceed-
ings. When litigation is under way, the parties would have notice of
discovery requests and would have an opportunity to defend their
interests.
b. Sealing or expungement of records
The constitutional revision proposal would affect the sealing or
expungement of records in two ways. First, article V would limit the
circumstances under which records could be made confidential. In
order to seal or expunge records, trial courts would need to act
pursuant to supreme court rule or general law designed to protect
privacy interests or accomplish overriding governmental purposes.
Presumably the supreme court or the legislature would respond to
the constitutional revision by articulating specific criteria for invok-
ing confidentiality. Litigation to date has produced no clear set of
rules, and no consensus has emerged on the circumstances under
which court records could be sealed purely to protect privacy. There
is some irony in the priorities of a judicial system which has long
observed confidentiality to protect financial interests-trade se-
crets-but which has been reluctant to believe that privacy itself is
worthy of protection. Although the constitutional revision would not
mandate any particular rules, it would require the supreme court to
468. 542 P.2d 977 (Cal. 1975).
469. Id. at 980.
470. Burrows v. Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974).
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promulgate a clear set of standards, thus producing more certainty
than presently exists.
The second effect would be an increase in the legislative power to
act in this area. The Florida Supreme Court held in Johnson v.
State that expungement of arrest records is a judicial function, thus
invalidating a statute on the subject.'7' The proposed article V,
section 1 would reverse that decision. The constitutional revision
would expressly authorize the legislature to act by general law, and
the supreme court to act by rulemaking, to protect privacy or over-
riding governmental purposes.
c. The Power to Close Judicial Proceedings
The pattern would be the same as that discussed above.
d. Financial Disclosure and Open Meetings
Financial disclosure for judges would continue to be regulated by
the Sunshine Amendment and the Code of Judicial Conduct. The
judicial nominating commissions would be governed by a uniform
set of rules, and the Judicial Qualifications Commission would con-
tinue to operate as it does now.
5. Privacy and Autonomy: The Right to Decide
One important aspect of the right of privacy is the right to make
important decisions about one's own life. It is in this area that the
effect of the proposed right of privacy is difficult to predict.
a. The Griswold Constellation
The federal right of privacy protects the right to make fundamen-
tally important decisions relating to the family, including marriage,
contraception, procreation, abortion, childrearing, and education.
In this area the federal privacy right is controlling. 72
b. Helmets, Hair, and Neckties
Florida courts have upheld against privacy challenges a statute
requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets and a requirement that an
attorney wear a necktie in court.73 On the other hand, privacy has
been invoked successfully to invalidate a school's regulation of hair
length.
Of these decisions, the only one that seems vulnerable under the
section 23 right of privacy is the necktie case, and that primarily
because the district court of appeal decisions were so poorly rea-
soned. Plainly there is an important interest in maintaining deco-
471. 336 So. 2d 93 (Fla. 1976).
472. It is, of course, theoretically possible that the state right of privacy would have some
effect in this area. But the point has no significance. Few state regulations in this area have
withstood federal privacy challenges. As a practical matter, the field is so thoroughly
preempted that nothing remains on which a state privacy right could operate.
473. See section IVE(2) supra.
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rum in the courts, but the real issue is one of least intrusive means.
Since the attorney in that case had argued in many courts, includ-
ing the Florida Supreme Court, without a necktie, preservation of
order in Florida courts apparently does not depend on that particu-
lar regulation.
c. Marijuana
The Constitution Revision Commission discussed the marijuana
issue at some length. 74 The commission itself was uncertain whether
the proposed right of privacy would limit the power of the state to
regulate possession of marijuana for personal use in the home,
though Commissioner Dexter Douglass offered the personal opinion
that it would not. As Douglass pointed out, state court decisions go
both ways. 75
This writer must leave the question open and can only suggest
some of the relevant considerations. Of the ten states with a state
constitutional right of privacy, four have had state supreme court
decisions on the subject: Alaska, Hawaii, Arizona, and Florida.
After reviewing the scientific evidence, Alaska found that the state
did not have a sufficient interest in prohibiting possession for per-
sonal use in the home. Possession outside the home could be pro-
hibited, as could possession in the home of quantities large enough
to indicate intent to sell. The Alaska court made two crucial as-
sumptions. First, the court assumed that the home deserves a higher
degree of protection than other places. Thus, intrusions into the
home would be severely scrutinized. Second, the court reasoned that
although possession and sale of marijuana in the community at
large could be proscribed, there was not sufficient justification for
intrusion into the home.47
The Hawaii Supreme Court reached the opposite result. Like the
court in Alaska, the Hawaii court made two crucial assumptions
which ultimately determined the outcome of the case. First, the
Hawaii court assumed that its right of privacy was a weak one,
unlike Alaska's strong privacy right. Thus, the Hawaii possession-
of-marijuana law would need only to meet a relatively weak showing
of necessity. Second, the Hawaii court assumed that the state could
properly prohibit private possession in the home as part of a scheme
to control possession and sale in the community at large. Thus, the
home apparently did not occupy the same place of special import-
474. See section VC supra.
475. See notes 356-57 and accompanying text supra.
476. See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); Toward a Right of Privacy, supra
note 1, at 694-95.
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ance in Hawaii that it did in Alaska.
477
The Arizona Supreme Court likewise decided that prohibition of
possession of marijuana in the home did not violate the right of
privacy. 7 8 Its decision is unilluminating since it rested primarily on
an analysis of federal privacy cases. The Arizona right of privacy has
consistently been held to be the functional equivalent of the fourth
amendment, and it is used exclusively to regulate searches and
seizures. Thus, the state privacy section was involved only to deter-
mine what level of scrutiny would be applied to determine the rea-
sonableness of a search of a private residence. Since the Arizona
privacy section has never been construed to create a general right
of privacy, the Arizona analysis is inapplicable to the proposed Flor-
ida privacy right.
Florida decisions are likewise inapplicable since Florida's present
privacy provision merely protects "private communications." In
Laird v. State, the Florida Supreme Court indicated that the rele-
vant inquiry at the present time is whether there is a rational basis
for the proscription of marijuana possession in the home.' 7 Given
the regularity with which marijuana cases arise, if section 23 is
ratified it seems likely that the courts would soon be called on to
consider the issue.
When that issue is raised, how might the Florida courts decide?
Only a general suggestion can be made. As in Alaska and Hawaii,
the outcome would depend primarily on the strength of the privacy
right and on the assumptions which the court makes. To begin with,
as the court suggested in Laird, a properly developed record con-
taining scientific evidence of the effects of marijuana use would be
needed. Only with such evidence could the court evaluate whether
there is a compelling state interest in proscription of marijuana use
generally or in places outside the home. The compelling state inter-
est test would be applied rather than the weaker rational basis test,
since Florida's proposal is for a strong, freestanding right of privacy.
The court would also need to compare the dangers of marijuana
use in the home against the intrusion involved in prohibiting posses-
sion there. Here, too, the court's assumptions would be important.
Alaska assumed that the home is deserving of more protection than
other places and thus subjected the law to its closest scrutiny as
applied to possession in the home. Hawaii took a contrary view.
Plainly Florida's proposed right of privacy is not restricted to the
477. See State v. Baker, 535 P.2d 1394 (Hawaii 1975); Toward a Right of Privacy, supra
note 1, at 711.
478. State v. Murphy, 570 P.2d 1070 (Ariz. 1977).
479. 342 So. 2d 962 (Fla. 1977).
TO BE LET ALONE
home, but the courts could well take the view that the home is a
place of special importance.
Even if the Florida courts concluded that there was no compelling
state interest in prohibiting possession of marijuana in the home,
the inquiry would not be over. A second question is whether there
is a compelling interest in prohibiting marijuana possession in
places outside the home. Assuming an affirmative answer to that
question, the inquiry is whether the state may prohibit possession
in the home as an incident to an overall scheme to prohibit posses-
sion in the community at large. It is here also that the Alaska and
Hawaii assumptions diverge. If the Florida court took the Alaska
view, possession in the home could not be prohibited; if it took the
Hawaii view, it could.
This writer has no knowledge of what the scientific evidence
would show and is unable to predict what assumptions the Florida
Supreme Court might make in the analysis outlined above. As Com-
missioner Douglass put it, "There is no assurance of what our court
would hold. I have to say that."' 4
d. Sexual Behavior
Most of the considerations outlined above also apply to laws regu-
lating consensual sexual behavior between adults in the home. It is
difficult to locate cases relating to purely private sexual behavior.
Most litigated matters have wound up in court because the sexual
behavior was done in a public place or involved third persons, the
use of force, or photographs.4 8' While some reported cases involve
surveillance of public restroom stalls, 482 law enforcement agencies
apparently have not yet sought to install electronic surveillance
devices in private homes in order to regulate sexual practices.
It is this latter possibility that should cause some concern. If the
state has the power to regulate purely private behavior of this type,
there would appear to be no reason why a law enforcement agency
could not apply for a warrant to conduct such surveillance. Surely
it would be little consolation for the average citizen to learn that
surveillance showed he had been wrongly accused. Thus, one funda-
mental inquiry is to identify what sorts of intrusion into homes
would be permitted183
480. See section VC(1) & note 358 supra.
481. See, e.g., State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6 (Ariz.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864
(1976); see section IVE(4) supra.
482. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 355 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
483. An alternative way to deal with this type of surveillance is to hold it to be an
inherently unreasonable search and seizure under the search and seizure clause. See Toward
a Right of Privacy, supra note 1, at 733-35 n.503.
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The question may very well be posed at some future date in a Bar
admission case. The Florida Supreme Court has recently held that
a homosexual preference, without more, is not ground for excluding
an otherwise qualified applicant from the Bar.484 The court reserved
the question of whether evidence of homosexual acts would require
a contrary result, but it refused to remand to develop a record in
that case. It seems likely that some future case will pose the issue
directly.
As with the marijuana issue, it is difficult to predict what result
would be reached. Alaska has suggested, without deciding, that the
right of privacy prohibits regulation of purely private consensual
sexual behavior between adults, but not otherwise.' Arizona has
held precisely the opposite, though its analysis relied on the federal
right of privacy.
46
Under Florida's proposed right of privacy, the courts would be
called on to determine if such regulations, as applied to conduct in
the home, serve a compelling state interest and, if so, whether that
interest is accomplished by the least intrusive means. As with the
marijuana issue, whether the court assumed that the home is a
special place worthy of special protection would be important to the
outcome of the case.
6. The Proposed Right of Privacy and Florida's Existing Consti-
tutional Privacy Decisions
Florida's present constitution protects privacy through the prohi-
bition of unreasonable searches, seizures, and interceptions of pri-
vate communications. Additionally, one district court of appeal has
recognized a state constitutional right of privacy. Thus, the question
arises whether ratification of section 23 would have any impact on
present state constitutional privacy law.
a. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
The proposed revision carries forward intact article I, section 12,
relating to unreasonable searches and seizures. Under conventional
doctrine, the coverage of that section would remain intact, including
those court decisions construing it. The section 23 right of privacy
would not have the effect of modifying a coequal constitutional
provision. Thus, the present criteria for searches and seizures would
continue to be applied as they have in the past, and the ability to
investigate crime and obtain search warrants would continue unim-
paired. This view is supported not only by the proceedings of the
484. Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Eimers, 358 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1978).
485. Anderson v. State, 562 P.2d 351, 358 (Alaska 1977).
486. State v. Bateman, 547 P.2d 6 (Ariz.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 864 (1976).
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revision commission but, more importantly, by principles of consti-
tutional construction and the plain language of section 23 itself.
Plainly, searches and seizures are regulated by section 12, so the
provision of section 23, "except as otherwise provided herein,"
comes into play.
b. Unreasonable Interception of Private Communications
The same is true of the section 12 prohibition of unreasonable
interception of private communications. Again, the commissioners
made it clear that electronic surveillance would continue to be regu-
lated by the existing section 12, as it had in the past. Accordingly,
section 12 was carried forward intact. This, too, is an area
"otherwise provided herein."
It should be noted that the pace of technological change enhances
the importance of privacy and legal mechanisms to protect it,
whether it be through a freestanding privacy section such as article
I, section 23, or through an unreasonable search, seizure, and inter-
ception provision such as section 12. There has been a tendency
historically to give the search and seizure section a purely proce-
dural meaning. That is, absent exigent circumstances, a search,
seizure, or interception is considered reasonable if done with a war-
rant, and unreasonable if done without. But section 12 creates a
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, an evalua-
tion which has a substantive as well as procedural aspect. To be
sure, the standards for sections 12 and 23 are very different, and the
"reasonableness" criterion for section 12 is considerably less strin-
gent than the compelling state interest test for section 23. But the
common feature of the two is that both may impose, at some point,
substantive limitations on the power of government to intrude on
privacy.
c. The Byron Harless Decision: The State Constitutional Right
of Privacy
The Byron Harless court discovered a state constitutional right of
privacy in the due process clause of the present Florida Constitu-
tion.487 The question is: what impact would ratification of section 23
have on that decision? The answer was suggested earlier. Section 23
would make explicit the right of privacy that Byron Harless found
implicit in the liberty protected by the present constitution. Thus,
ratification would simply confirm or underscore that holding of the
Byron Harless decision.
It is possible, however, that section 23 would modify the Byron
487. Byron Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs., Inc. v. State ex rel. Schellenberg, No. DD-
30 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. June 1, 1978).
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Harless analysis in certain respects. Section 23 emphasizes one's
right to be free from governmental intrusion into his private life.
This writer has already suggested that the collection of psychologi-
cal interviewing information was the fundamental evil in Byron
Harless. The problem of confidentiality of records was purely sec-
ondary since the information never should have been collected. The
language of section 23 should make this clear. If it does, Byron
Harless would be modified at least to that extent.
d. The Police Power and the Taxing Power
One critic of the right of privacy suggested that it could under-
mine the ability of the state to govern through the police power and
the taxing power. 88 There is no basis at all for this concern since the
taxing power of the state exists through express constitutional provi-
sion which would not be undercut by a coequal right of privacy.
Insofar as tax matters are concerned, they would qualify under the
rubric of "as otherwise provided herein."
The police power, which has its origin in the sovereignty of the
state and, by implication, in the state constitution, would likewise
remain viable. The only limitations on the power of the state would
be those described earlier in this article. Essentially, the police
power would not extend so far as to allow governmental intrusion
into one's private life. This in no way describes a complete immun-
ity from governmental regulation, but rather prevents intrusion ab-
sent a compelling state interest and use of the least intrusive means.
This has been the result in states that have already adopted a con-
stitutional privacy section. The Privacy Protection Study Commis-
sion, in reviewing California's experience, found that the right of
privacy did "not appear to have levied an undue burden on State
government or private organizations."'89
VII. CONCLUSION
Fifty years ago, Justice Brandeis wrote:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the signifi-
cance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intel-
lect. . . .They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.'"1
488. See section I & note 3 supra.
489. PRIVAcy LAW mN THE STATES, supra note 5, at i.
490. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
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Brandeis penned this famous passage while writing of the fourth
amendment. In the intervening decades, technology has advanced
beyond belief, government has grown much larger, the population
has become more densely concentrated than ever, and society has
become more complex and interdependent. The fourth amendment
was adequate for the technology of 1791, and it has adapted nicely
to many technological developments since that time.
Unfortunately, it is not adequate today. Modern conditions de-
mand reexamination of the relationship between the individual and
his government. If a free society is to remain free, there must be a
physical and psychological zone of liberty for each citizen. The pro-
posed constitutional revision makes a major contribution to this
enterprise by recognizing each individual's indefeasible and funda-
mental right of privacy.
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VIII. APPENDIX
The current versions of the state constitutional privacy provisions are given here. The dates
are those on which the right of privacy was added, and not necessarily the date of the last
revision of the indicated section.
ALAs. CONST. art. I, § 22:
Section 22. Right of Privacy.-The right of the people to privacy is recognized
and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.
Adopted by amendment, 1972.
ARIZ. CONST. art, II, § 8:
Section 8. Right to privacy.-No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law.
Constitution adopted, 1910.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1:
Section 1. Inalienable Rights.-All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.
Adopted by amendment, 1972.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12:
Section 12. Searches and seizures.-The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
against the unreasonable interception of private communications by any means,
shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause,
supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place or places to be searched,
the person or persons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be inter-
cepted, and the nature of evidence to be obtained. Articles or information obtained
in violation of this right shall not be admissible in evidence.
Constitution adopted, 1968.
HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5:
Section 5. Searches, Seizures and Invasion of Privacy.-The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized or
the communications sought to be intercepted.
Constitution adopted, 1968.
ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 12:
Section 6. Searches, Seizures, Privacy and Interceptions.-The people shall have
the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against
unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptions of communi-
cations by eavesdropping devices or other means. No warrant shall issue without
probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Section 12. Right to Remedy and Justice.-Every person shall find a certain
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person,
privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely,
and promptly.
Constitution adopted, 1970.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 5:
Section 5. Right to Privacy.-Every person shall be secure in his person, property,
communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, sei-
zures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall issue without probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
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the persons or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for the search.
Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in violation of this
Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
Constitution adopted, 1974.
MONT. CONST. art. II, §§ 9, 10:
Section 9. Right to know.-No person shall be deprived of the right to examine
documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state
government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual
privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.
Section 10. Right of privacy.-The right of individual privacy is essential to the
well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a
compelling state interest.
Constitution adopted, 1972.
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 10:
Section 10. Searches and seizures; invasions of privacy.-The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures and unreasonable invasions of privacy shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, the person or thing to
be seized, and the information to be obtained.
Adopted by amendment, 1971.
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7:
Section 7. Invasion of Private Affairs or Home Prohibited.-No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.
Constitution adopted, 1889.
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